Less certainty

[Robert Charleston <rc3673@student.open.ac.uk>]

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I find it very interesting that both sides of this argument so far have 
been far more optimistic about what we can know about mankind or animals 
than I am. There is a whole strand of theory that says humans are rational 
/ self-aware / experiencing creatures (which nobody seems to have objected 
to so far) that is then used either to distinguish mankind from animals, 
or to base a claim for consistent respect across species on.

I am interested in the basis for these beliefs. How do we get over the 
problem of other minds? There is no science currently in existence that 
can tell you whether something is rational or self-aware or can truly 
experience pain and pleasure. This applies equally for humans as it does 
for animals. Why is everyone so sure that all (or even any) humans are 
rational, self-aware or experiencers of pain and pleasure? I'm sure I've 
met people who do not seem to be rational, or particularly self-aware. 
I'm not sure that I can say I *know* that they experience pain and 
pleasure in any way relatable to the way I do.

Sure, it seems neuro-biologically plausible that higher primates such as 
chimps down to more simple creatures such as cats and dogs can respond to 
imput with intelligence. But that's not enough for the three qualities 
being discussed, as thermostats can do the same. And it seems that there 
are some animals too neuronally impoverished to be credible cognizers 
(slugs, wasps, grubs). The last of these are eaten in quite a few 
countries, so it is a relevent concern. I hope that we are not just simple 
behaviourists ascribing the mental content and faculties we experience to 
other creatures merely on the basis of analogy of behaviour. We all know 
the philosophical problems with doing that, from traditional other minds 
objections to Nagel's bat.

This again seems to require some consideration of what we are going to 
count as justification. In a previous posting Alice gave the example of 
being justified in making a cup of herbal tea by knowing that you are 
thirsty, that tea doesn't hurt anyone, that no 'evil' companies are 
involved (though I think that may be a tad loaded for my taste - people 
can act evilly, perhaps even be evil, companies are abstractions from 
people's behaviour, they have no morality in themselves). But these are 
reasons, not a justification. Mental causes, if you will, rather than 
logical argument. A full philosophical justification, at least as I was 
taught, needs to proceed in the form of a deduction.

1. I am thirsty
2. Drinking herbal tea is likely to relieve my thirst
3. There are no moral reasons for me to not make and drink herbal tea
4. Therefore I shall make a cup of herbal tea

Which is fine as practical reasoning, but objectionable as philosophy. 
Premise 3 in particular is going to be extremely difficult to establish 
since it requires knowing all the moral facts that are relevant. Is anyone 
in a position to say that they know that they know all the relevant facts 
(the infamous KK condition of epistemology)? There are usually some things 
we haven't thought of - but more importantly if 1-4 are to constitute a 
valid and sound argument, you must be able to demonstrate that you *know* 
3, not just that you believe it. This is, of course, why philosophy gets a 
name as an impractical subject. Most people just get by with what they can 
resasonably find out at any given time. But note what happens to the 
vegetarian case if 3 is modified to this weaker, achievable form:

3b. There are no moral reasons that I am aware of that I should not drink 
herbal tea.

It then allows for a deliberately ignorant meat-eater to be morally 
'justified' in their eating because they have chosen not to think about 
it, to cover their ears when this is discussed, or to not straighten out 
their thoughts about the consequences of the arguments they have heard, or 
whatever:

1. I am hungry
2. Eating meat is likely to relieve my hunger
3. There are no moral reasons that I am aware of that I should not eat 
meat.
4. Therefore I should eat meat.

Neither the herbal tea nor the meat-eating cases are actually 
justifications, and I cannot see how they can be anything but i) 
enthymemes or ii) partly constituted by indefensible premises. Which is 
why in my original posting I said I cannot see either case being 
justified, and so continue in my default behaviour.

On a lighter note, since Alice said that vegetarian meals can be equally 
pleasurable to meaty ones, and since I've eaten my sister's vegetarian 
cooking over the last 12 years or so, I thought I'd report the empirical 
evidence from being a person with my tastes:

1. Stuff that vege can do better than the meat equivalent:

Curry (actually prefer vege to meat on few occasions I have this)
Ramen noodles (much better with vegetables rather than beef)

2. Stuff which is almost there:

'Meatballs' in sauce - there are some really good mixes you can make
Vege sausages and burgers - burgers better than sausages, which can have a 
weird texture and a disturbing habit of looking like pink fingers

3. Stuff which it seems impossible vege will ever overcome the lack of:

Steak (not even vaguely close)
Bacon sandwiches (there are substitute slices, but nowhere like the real 
experience)

The last two are important. If you really, really fancy a bit of steak or 
a bacon sarnie, nothing in the world can be 'equally pleasurable'. To 
borrow a term from the economists, there are no substitutable commodities 
for what you want. It's binary - you either have what you want, or you 
settle for something less. I'm prepared to buy the theory that if you 
don't like category 3 foodstuffs (and everyone has different things in 
theirs, I'm sure), or if you've never tasted them, then you can find equal 
pleasure in vegetarian meals. However, if you have tasted and do 
occasionally really want something for which there is no substitute, it 
would seem churlish to deny that you are denying yourself something. For 
some of us then, a purely vegetarian diet can never be of truly equal 
pleasure. Unless of course I'm supposed to buy into a Mill-style levels of 
pleasure argument where the moral pleasure of not eating meat outweighs 
the lack of the stuff.

Phew,

Rab.


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