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Greetings,
David-
Thank you for your reply :-)
You're right. I'm not overly concerned with consequences (though I'm
not
blind to their importance).
I'm going to disagree with you're claim that act A is superior to act
C.
The fact that act A results in a film is irrelevant. The fact that
act C
results in no film is also irrelevant.
What is relevant is whether the act of stealing was morally right or
wrong. As far as I am concerned, the idea of stealing being good or
bad
by virtue of the consequences is dodgy.
Take for example the following line of thought:
suppose that A is an action that will result in a positive
consequence
X. Now, suppose that A results in X but that A itself is a negative
state of affairs.
For example, say that you have two air-tight chambers- one has a
single
person inside, the other has a group of five. Now, suppose that there
is
not enough air to sustain them both. Now, considering each case on
it's
own we'd say that diverting enough oxygen to a given chamber would be
a
good thing since, the consequences would be positive for a given
group.
However, when we consider both groups we can see that diverting air
from, say, the single-person's chamber would be consequentially good
for
the group but, consequentially bad for the single person. So, it
seems
that the consequences are both good and bad. And if the goodness or
badness (or rightness or wrongness) or an action is determined by the
nature of it's consequences then it seems that diverting air away
from
the single-chamber is both good AND bad. I don't think that this is
the
right way to go.
You say:
"it is still better that I steal and save his life than not steal and
let him die, even if I could puruse a course which involved not
stealing
and saving his life."
I agree. I've not said otherwise. I, however, do think that this
might
be a false dilemma. Surely the choice isn't 'steal' or 'let him die'-
in
such cases I've already said that no moral choice applies (assuming a
kind of instinct for self-preservation by proxy). I'm saying that IF
there is 'letting a friend die' on the one hand and a choice, in
addition to stealing, on the other then one is not justified in
stealing. So what if getting 5'000 pounds is hard- that's life. It's
that kind of thinking that fuels inessential theft: just because
something is hard to achieve or acquire does not mean that we are
justified in doing whatever we want to get it. If something is hard
to
attain and you choose not to undetake that difficult process then you
do
not deserve it anyway. And that's what, i think, wrankles people most
about theft- it's not merely that someone has taken something that
belongs to you, it's also that the thief does not deserve it. Like
the
Casino which stacks the decks in their own favour- they do not
deserve
to win because they are cheating. it's not called 'cheating their
clients' because the client/ player looses. It's the fact that the
House
has not earnt its winnings. I think I mentioned something similar
when I
was talking about performance-enchancing drugs in a earlier thread.
Regarding (re)distribution of wealth:
Well, you may have gathered that I don't think that states of
affairs,
consequences, duties etc are the proper objects of morality (or moral
judgement, if your prefer).
For some of the reasons given before, I think that freely willed
choices
(where a choice entails more than one option from which to choose)
are
the proper object of moral judgement. Bringing things like the
distribution of wealth into the mix is rather like asking whether the
fact that there are trees is moral. Hey, sometimes trees fall on
people-
which is obviously bad thing for some people. Does that make the fact
that there are trees a proper object of morality? No. We must be
careful
not to cast our net so wide that we allow moral judgement to enter
where
it has no business.
Whether people should aim to accumulate money or to re-distribute it
IS
a good object of morality since we can ask "Why has this person
chosen
good?" instead of "what is good?".
Respectfully,
Luis Johnstone.
David Mitchell wrote:
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Hi,
I think we're in danger of going round in circles a little bit, but
I'll try to answer a few, if not all, of your points. 1. You suggest
that what makes theft wrong or immoral is that there is usually a
better way to achieve the end in mind than stealing e.g working
harder, doing more hours etc. I don't deny that in many cases of
theft this is true, although it is monumentally difficult for someone
to get say 5,000 pounds for a film in the short run.
However I don't believe that this initself makes the act of stealing
in the example wrong. Since the good of the film outweighs the
negative effects of the theft, say the distress to the rich person,
this act remains justified. It is indeed true that a BETTER act would
be to raise the money myself without stealing, then I get the good of
the film without the bad consequences associated with the theft.
HOWEVER the fact that act B [no theft+film] is superior to act A
[theft+film] does not mean that act A is not superior to act C [no
theft, no film] where the film is more important than avoiding theft.
Therefore whilst I should ideally commit act B, it is better that I
commit act A than act C, where there is no theft. The same reasoning
can be applied to the example of the starving friend, it is still
better that I steal and save his life than not steal and let him die,
even if I could puruse a course which involved not stealing and
saving his life.
I accept that perhaps if you regard consequences as insignificant
then you might find this line of argument unconvincing, and then we
are into a debate about consequentialism. HOWEVER I am not convinced
on your answer to the question of why it is acceptable for a starving
man to steal, if you reject an appeal to the effects of an action.
I suppose the real issue which needs to be adressed is why we regard
stealing as wrong at all. Part of the answer to this seems to be that
it is wrong because stealing involves taking what somone deserves.
e.g if I decide not to work and mug somone who has, I am taking what
ought to belong to them. If this is the case though we are forced
then to ask the further political question of whether wealth/income
in this society is really distributed according to desert.
The answer to this for the most part I think is probably 'no'. The
distribution of wealth in capitalist societies can mostly be
attributed to social/natural advantage and relatively little to
individual choice or 'effort' [even if we can detach such a thing
from genetic and social factors]. As a consequence, stealing in this
society painlessly and from the rich is not in many cases immoral,
especially if you are poor through no fault of your own [Although I
hasten to add that most theft can not be achieved painlessly, ie.it
usually involves physical violence, intimidation etc. therefore I am
not condoning most actual theft.]
Nevertheless, if we recognise that the distribution of wealth in the
world is on the whole unfair, then theft is to a large degree not
inherently wrong [that is the act as oppossed to negative
consequences usually associated with it].
Moreover since we live in a society charcterised by property rights
we are encouraged to see theft as naturally immoral, this is an
attitude we should try and question though and attempt to think for
ourselves why theft [or anything] is wrong, rather than just
accepting it as fact.
David
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