[Date Prev][Date Next] [Chronological] [Thread] [Home]

Re: do rich people get what they deserve?

To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS@bups.org


Greetings,

Nicola-

Thanks alot for your reply :-)
-

I think that you've misinterpreted what I've said (if I may say so).
I'm not saying that the way someone chooses morally (i.e. chooses 'good' or 'bad') determines whether that choice is good or bad. To be clear, I'm not saying that if A chooses X (a good) via choice-means C then C is morally good, or anything like that.
I'm saying that how someone chooses (i.e. actually makes their choice) is capable of being morally good or bad. When I say that I 'choose morally' I do not mean simply that I choose what is good or bad; what I mean is that my process of choosing has a moral value independent of what is chosen (though this is not exclusive).

Your point about red is, I think, right in-line with Meno's paradox. It would be amiss of me to not point out that if we already knew what it was for something to be red then we wouldn't need to inquire as to what red was. In the same way, when constructing a moral framework we are asking the meta-ethical question 'what is morality/ what is it for something or some person to be moral?' If we already know the answer to 'what is morality?' then it seems that more than half of our work (at least!) has been done for us. But I'm not (directly) assuming anything of the sort.

Instead, my reasoning (albeit extremely abridged) goes something like this:
In this life we DO want out ethical theory to have something to say about consequences.
However, we don't want (for reasons I've already given) to say that consequences are MORALLY good or bad. Instead, we want to say that a certain something is MORALLY good or bad by virtue of the consequences of that something.
Now, some people go into a 'mean' means-end mode and assume that the only thing that could be morally good or bad by virtue of a consequence (aka, an effect) would be the cause of that consequence/ effect. But I've already suggested that consequences aren't the proper object of moral judgement (or in the domain or morality, if you prefer) because there is no consistent relationship between them and our moral judgements. Now, let me be clear: there is some consistency between the two, which suggest a relationship. However, we don't to say something like "good is a certain kind of consequence. And for those consequences which should thus be good but we judge not to be, then 'oops'". In my view, a good moral theory isn't just going to explain the consistencies, it will also explain the inconsistencies. The fact that moral judgement of consequences is altered by some factor other than the nature of the consequence suggests that the nature of the consequence is, at best, a sufficient condition of being moral. What I am driving at is 'what are the necessary conditions of morality?'. And this is something a means-end analysis will not give us since the same criticisms which can be leveled against an analysis of consequences can equally be laid down against an analysis of means.

It occurred to me a long time ago that although one could not deny that consequences had some value, it seemed intuitively wrong (and given my earlier arguments) to ascribe to them moral value. This might seem like an unsatisfactory position to arrive at. However, it also seems to me that this needn't mean that consequences become of no concern in our ETHICAL dealings. Indeed, it seems obvious that sometimes the value of consequences is as something(s) which direct and regulate our actions. Does this mean that by implementing an effective distinction between valuable-consequences and morally-valuable 'somethings', I could therefore not make statements like 'he was wrong' or 'that was a nice thing to do'? I don't think so. Indeed, I think that such statements make even more sense once the 'moral confusion' has cleared. I think that our sense of double indignation at (for example) murder now begin to make sense. We are, crudely put, saying two things: firstly we are saying that the murder is a 'bad thing' because consequentially it is problematic (here insert your consequentialist theory of choice); but we also feel that the person 'just shouldn't have done it'. We know this is partly to do with the consequences of the action but, in a sense we are also doing more than simply judging (and holding accountable) someone's actions in a means-end analysis. The classic hypothetical is of a man/ woman with a gun to their head. Supposing that they are thus coerced into killing another person. We DO want to say that they did something wrong (consequentially speaking) but we don't condemn them as we do a murderer. We don't want to say that they are morally bad, evil etc (at least I hope not). So what's the difference between the man/ woman coerced and the murderer? Well, the consequences are roughly the same (as similar as consequences can ever be). So why do we condemn the murderer doubly so? Because the person coerced didn't really have a choice (to be precise, they probably didn't know they had a choice); in the case of the murderer, he/ she most probably had a choice. it is both the act AND the choice which we condemn in such cases.
Just to drive the point home: supposing our murderer hasn't actually murdered anyone yet. Instead, he's about to make his first kill. he's wandering around, say, a school with a rifle and a bag full of ammo. Now, we don't need to be psychics to work out that this chap has murder on his mind- he's chosen to murder. Thankfully the police get there in time and incapacitate him with no injury to anyone (it's my thought-experiment and I'll be an idealist if I want to). Does the fact that the negative consequences of an actual murder didn't occur mean that he isn't 'bad'? But I think the point is made.

You're right that some of my criticisms were aimed at a kind of moral objectivism (I probably should've made that clear). At the very least I think that something like this is the right way to go (up to a point). It seems important that a moral theory give some account (or suggest a direction) of our common-sense morality and intuitions, which is why I want to say that consequences do have value (just not moral value).
The comment you referred to was an attack on a kind of (implicit) moral realism: the idea that a consequence is actually good in-itself (i.e. NOT by virtue of anything else) suggests that it is the consequence itself which is good. It seems obvious enough that if a consequence cannot be both good and not good in-itself in this way.
-

I've taken a bit longer than I planned to reply to your points but, I wanted to clear things up.
As such, I'll have to be brief on where and how motivation fits in:

Motivation is important since it's identification tells us something about the character of the person under consideration.
When we consider the character of a person we distinguish between the 'natural character' and the 'developed character'. If we are interested in the nature of the human being then the former will be extremely important. However, if all we wish to do is form a moral (or perhaps merely ethical theory) then we need only concentrate on the latter kind of character. It's not so important what a person has developed from (in most circumstances when judging morality) but, rather, what they have developed into.
Specifically, we ask of a person, 'to what extent are they capable of being morally responsible?'. And by "morally responsible" I mean in the sense that I used earlier to refer not only to accountability of actions but also the ability to act (or omit to act) on that perceived responsibility.

Anyway, I'll leave it there for the moment.

Looks forward to your reply :-)

Respectfully,

Luis.



ns4636@bristol.ac.uk wrote:

Quoting Luis Johnstone <luisjohnstone@onetel.net>:
hello there luis,
well now, i'm not sure that you've answered my question. I was not implying that we should simply say that action x is good in an arbitary uninformed manner, I was asking how you thought it possible to chose good or chose to be moral or chosing morally (whichever way you chose to phrase the question) without first making soome attempt at giving an explanantion of the nature of goodness or morality. It is rather like my attributing the coloour red to an object without my understanding of what red is. Without understanding 'what' red is how do propose to attempt to understand 'how' I chose to call something red? With reference to morality, if it is not understand 'what' morality is, how will you investigate 'how' a person is chosing morality? If attributing an adjective to an object/action, the nature of the adjective needs to be understood in order that the sentence be sensical. This is why I do not think your back to front method would work. I agree with most of what your saying, I just think that in order to understand why a person choses morality or how a person choses morality, you need first to understand what morality is and what it consists of, i.e. goodness and badness. Also I disagree with you when you argued that 'if a given consequence is good for person A but bad for person B then we have a contradiction', this would only arise iff moral objectivism (perhaps even moral realism?) were true.
I'm intreged by your theory of motivation though, do tell more...

Nicola


Sorry if this is all a bit muddled- I hope you get the jist of it all.


To reply to this message or start a new topic please email:
BUPS-DIS@bups.org


Greetings,

Nicola-

Well, it seems to me that if we simply say that an action (X) is good

then we're not really doing anything informative. That's not an
explanation.
We want to say something like 'the good actions are good by virtue of

X'. Now, the most frequently misued line would be ' the good actions
are good by virtue of the good consequences'. But this is extremely uninformative too since, we are simply putting the cart before the
horse by failing to identify what it is for something to be good-
consequences can be a subset of good but, not the other way around (that's my thinking anyway). Instead we believe we should identify what it is
for a consequence to be good. But, I think that this is misguided since, it

seems to me that if a given consequence is good for person A but bad
for person B then we have a contradiction. We cannot say that it is the consequence itself (a state of affairs) which is actually good.
Instead we have to say something more like, 'consequence X has a further consequence (Y), of which the latter's goodness is in virtue of the goodness of the first consequence. However, I fail to see the
transitivity:
if Y is good in virtue of X then what is X good in virtue of? Surely
we are not going to say that X is good in virtue of Y since that would
be blatantly circular and uninformative.
So, as I've already mentioned in previous e-mails, I don't think that

consequences are the proper object of morality.
I think that when asking what it is to be moral we must ask what is
it for someone to choose good. Since, I do not deny the importance of aiming at good consequences in the everyday sense of the expression.

What I'm angling for is an explanation of the goodness or badness of

consequences which is: not circular (i.e. it does not refer back to other consequences), nor question begging (i.e. it does not argue
that consequence X is good therefore it is a good consequence), nor contradictory (i.e. consequence X is both good and not good).
I am indeed, putting things somewhat back-to-front. But, I think that

things are already the wrong way around (I know that probably sounds

terribly arrogant- sorry).
I think that the crux of the matter is this:
some people want this objective understanding of morality- as if goodness and badness was the same as being good or being bad. I, however, think that this is wrong (for some of the reasons I've
already given). I think that such an analysis would work if we were talking about the operations of, say, a machine using (for example) Dennett's

design stance- we'd simply ask, 'is this thing operating according to

it's design/ specifications?'. But, even if we could answer 'yes' to

that question regarding human actions, it would still not tackle the

question of 'are we being moral?', let alone 'what is morality?'.
Thus, when we ask whether someone is moral we ought not ask whether
they are BEING moral. Instead, we'd do better to ask, 'are they choosing morally?'.

On the one hand, the emphasis has shifted from (please excuse the bad

phrasing) 'what is it to be moral?' to 'what is it to choose moral?'.

And a further shift has taken place from 'what is it to choose
moral?' to 'what is it to choose morally'. So the emphasis has completely changed: now the focus of the analysis is no longer on 'what' we
choose, rather, it is now on 'how we choose'.
And that's where I'd bring in my theory of motivation. Of course, I'm

happy to discuss that theory but, the important thing here is the re-focusing of the analysis.

Respectfully,

Luis Johnstone.


ns4636@bristol.ac.uk wrote:



hello there, I'm just wondering why you think asking why someone


chose

a 'good' action is better than asking what 'good' is. It seems to me


that without first attempting to understand/define what 'good' is


you

would be left question begging when you ask why someone chose a


'good'

action. Before attributing good to an action (or tree) you need


first

to have an objective understanding of 'good' or indeed 'bad'.
Nicola 

Quoting Luis Johnstone <luisjohnstone@onetel.net>:





To reply to this message or start a new topic please email:
BUPS-DIS@bups.org


Greetings,

David-

Thank you for your reply :-)

You're right. I'm not overly concerned with consequences (though


I'm


not blind to their importance).
I'm going to disagree with you're claim that act A is superior to


act


C. The fact that act A results in a film is irrelevant. The fact that
act C results in no film is also irrelevant.
What is relevant is whether the act of stealing was morally right


or


wrong. As far as I am concerned, the idea of stealing being good


or


bad by virtue of the consequences is dodgy.
Take for example the following line of thought:
suppose that A is an action that will result in a positive
consequence X. Now, suppose that A results in X but that A itself is a negative


state of affairs.
For example, say that you have two air-tight chambers- one has a
single person inside, the other has a group of five. Now, suppose that


there


is not enough air to sustain them both. Now, considering each case on
it's own we'd say that diverting enough oxygen to a given chamber would


be


a good thing since, the consequences would be positive for a given
group. However, when we consider both groups we can see that diverting air


from, say, the single-person's chamber would be consequentially


good


for the group but, consequentially bad for the single person. So, it
seems that the consequences are both good and bad. And if the goodness or


badness (or rightness or wrongness) or an action is determined by


the


nature of it's consequences then it seems that diverting air away


from


the single-chamber is both good AND bad. I don't think that this


is


the right way to go.

You say:
"it is still better that I steal and save his life than not steal


and


let him die, even if I could puruse a course which involved not
stealing and saving his life."
I agree. I've not said otherwise. I, however, do think that this
might be a false dilemma. Surely the choice isn't 'steal' or 'let him


die'-


in such cases I've already said that no moral choice applies (assuming


a


kind of instinct for self-preservation by proxy). I'm saying that


IF


there is 'letting a friend die' on the one hand and a choice, in addition to stealing, on the other then one is not justified in stealing. So what if getting 5'000 pounds is hard- that's life.


It's


that kind of thinking that fuels inessential theft: just because something is hard to achieve or acquire does not mean that we are justified in doing whatever we want to get it. If something is


hard


to attain and you choose not to undetake that difficult process then


you


do not deserve it anyway. And that's what, i think, wrankles people


most


about theft- it's not merely that someone has taken something that


belongs to you, it's also that the thief does not deserve it. Like
the Casino which stacks the decks in their own favour- they do not
deserve to win because they are cheating. it's not called 'cheating their clients' because the client/ player looses. It's the fact that the
House has not earnt its winnings. I think I mentioned something similar
when I was talking about performance-enchancing drugs in a earlier


thread.


Regarding (re)distribution of wealth:
Well, you may have gathered that I don't think that states of
affairs, consequences, duties etc are the proper objects of morality (or


moral


judgement, if your prefer).
For some of the reasons given before, I think that freely willed
choices (where a choice entails more than one option from which to choose)
are the proper object of moral judgement. Bringing things like the distribution of wealth into the mix is rather like asking whether


the


fact that there are trees is moral. Hey, sometimes trees fall on
people- which is obviously bad thing for some people. Does that make the


fact


that there are trees a proper object of morality? No. We must be
careful not to cast our net so wide that we allow moral judgement to enter
where it has no business.
Whether people should aim to accumulate money or to re-distribute


it


IS a good object of morality since we can ask "Why has this person
chosen good?" instead of "what is good?".

Respectfully,

Luis Johnstone.


David Mitchell wrote:





To reply to this message or start a new topic please email:




BUPS-DIS@bups.org




Hi,
I think we're in danger of going round in circles a little bit,


but






I'll try to answer a few, if not all, of your points. 1. You


suggest


that what makes theft wrong or immoral is that there is usually a
better way to achieve the end in mind than stealing e.g working
harder, doing more hours etc. I don't deny that in many cases of
theft this is true, although it is monumentally difficult for


someone


to get say 5,000 pounds for a film in the short run.



However I don't believe that this initself makes the act of


stealing






in the example wrong. Since the good of the film outweighs the
negative effects of the theft, say the distress to the rich


person,


this act remains justified. It is indeed true that a BETTER act


would


be to raise the money myself without stealing, then I get the good


of


the film without the bad consequences associated with the theft.
HOWEVER the fact that act B [no theft+film] is superior to act A
[theft+film] does not mean that act A is not superior to act C [no
theft, no film] where the film is more important than avoiding


theft.


Therefore whilst I should ideally commit act B, it is better that


I


commit act A than act C, where there is no theft. The same


reasoning


can be applied to the example of the starving friend, it is still
better that I steal and save his life than not steal and let him


die,


even if I could puruse a course which involved not stealing and
saving his life.




I accept that perhaps if you regard consequences as insignificant




then you might find this line of argument unconvincing, and then


we


are into a debate about consequentialism. HOWEVER I am not


convinced


on your answer to the question of why it is acceptable for a


starving


man to steal, if you reject an appeal to the effects of an action.




I suppose the real issue which needs to be adressed is why we


regard






stealing as wrong at all. Part of the answer to this seems to be


that


it is wrong because stealing involves taking what somone deserves.
e.g if I decide not to work and mug somone who has, I am taking


what


ought to belong to them. If this is the case though we are forced
then to ask the further political question of whether


wealth/income


in this society is really distributed according to desert.



The answer to this for the most part I think is probably 'no'.


The






distribution of wealth in capitalist societies can mostly be
attributed to social/natural advantage and relatively little to
individual choice or 'effort' [even if we can detach such a thing


from genetic and social factors]. As a consequence, stealing in


this


society painlessly and from the rich is not in many cases immoral,
especially if you are poor through no fault of your own [Although


I


hasten to add that most theft can not be achieved painlessly,


ie.it


usually involves physical violence, intimidation etc. therefore I


am


not condoning most actual theft.]




Nevertheless, if we recognise that the distribution of wealth in


the






world is on the whole unfair, then theft is to a large degree not
inherently wrong [that is the act as oppossed to negative
consequences usually associated with it].




Moreover since we live in a society charcterised by property


rights






we are encouraged to see theft as naturally immoral, this is an
attitude we should try and question though and attempt to think


for


ourselves why theft [or anything] is wrong, rather than just
accepting it as fact.




David


Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the




mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.htm








Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the
mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.htm










Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the
mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.htm










Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.htm