RE: re Philosophy and Rhetoric

In response to Andy's 're ausser' message,

There is a technique in argument called 'straw man', the caricaturing of another's views and knocking down that (mis)representation. It is often seen in political debate but generally considered disreputable rhetoric in philosophical discussion. However, before I get to the rhetoric and Melvyn's questioning of Marx's position as a philosopher I would like to explore what appears to be an inconsistency.

In Andy's final para he dismisses vehemently 'poles like that'. Andy is entitled to his opinion but perhaps he thinks that others are not, or that if we are to have regard to them then they must be presented in a particular form. The dismissal seems to be a mere prejudice that stands in contrast to, and is inconsistent with any sincere argument for philosophy as providing 'conditions of possibility for 'human' thought' (which Andy claims to argue). Why so?

This was an OPINION (what else) pole, and in this instance it asked for reasons for the voters choice. This included in some cases a critique of the poling process itself. I don't believe that the precise nature of the pole matters to the issue at hand (although does make it difficult to understand how someone philosophically inclined can derogate the views of thousands of people without having actually read any of them). However, in dismissing opinions where is the line to be drawn?, Opinions are assessments, conjectures, ideas, judgments, no matter how expressed. A sweeping dismissal of opinion (aside from adding derision) is a dismissal of differences of opinion, dismissal of opportunities to debate, in fact it is a dismissal of the philosophical process which relies upon the _expression_ of opinions, that is, expressing what seems true from the information provided or argument presented. An opinion is what one is justified in believing to be true, even if the justification or knowledge one has is not in fact true (but lets not get in Gettier).

Now, if the response to this is 'Nonsense, I simply meant poles and we all know that poles don't count as a valid means of expressing opinion', then this seems to unjustifiably privilege a notion that to be of value it is necessary to present opinions in some particular approved of form. Obviously opinion poles do not necessarily have the same content, or adopt the same reasoned processes as philosophical papers, but that doesn't mean that opinions expressed in this manner have no value (actually in this instance there was some very clear and well presented reasons from some very knowledgeable people). In providing 'conditions of possibility for 'human' thought' there must be a liberal approach to the _expression_ of opinions. Any discernment should occur after opinions are expressed not in suppressing them (a somewhat controversial claim considering the current debates on the freedom of _expression_ where this might lead to harm). To avoid confusion (and further straw man responses), I am not claiming that philosophy should be conducted by opinion poles, rather that the things we are justified in believing, the opinions we hold, are what feeds philosophy. It is important the we do not ridicule out of hand, or out of ignorance, the opinions of others. Of course, philosophically we can argue keenly and meanly about whether they are valid or not.

Turning now to the assertion that Marx is interpreted as positively affirming his status as a philosopher. An alternative, and more likely interpretation of his 'hitherto....etc.' could be as a simple critique of philosophy and philosophers. A quick review of basic texts (e.g. Oxford Companion.., Routledge Encyc.) clearly refer to Marx's ambivalence towards philosophy (he talks of philosophy, as with religion, being redundant come the 'revolution'.). Marxism is noted for its eclecticism, paradoxically, taking from those very philosophies Marx talked of abolishing. Of course, there are many interpretations of Marx and I admit to having no in-depth knowledge, but the impression that I gather from the 'opinions' of experts (Rosen, McLellan, Ryan) is that 'Marxist Philosophy' is most effective as a critique of, not an alternative, philosophy. There is no doubt that Marx's contribution to philosophical debate has been significant, although in Marx's own understanding he apparently did not see the implications of his work as philosophical at all. Melvyn's programme was interesting, not least because of the participation of Grayling and Stedman Jones - who didn't seem to be troubled by Melvyn's questions, and certainly did not regard them as ridiculous. This takes us to the straw man gambit.

In an earlier email I stated "The vast majority of people just go about their lives oblivious of any contribution from philosophers, " This rests on a presupposition that philosophers have made a contribution, but that people, most of them anyway, are oblivious to this contribution. On a more gracious understanding of 'oblivious' we could say 'have forgotten', or as I suspect is the case, a stronger version would be 'ignorant of' (I'm sure a basic dictionary would give these options as the meaning of oblivious). More neutrally we could simply say 'unaware'.

This is an entirely and obviously different claim, and not even a particularly controversial one, to Andy's interpretation as it being a "claim that philosophy has had no effect". Having set up this obscure interpretation, the comments then proceed to entirely miss the point. I am making no claim that people are oblivious to 'maths, or science, or even pyschology (is this not also a science?), or argument, ...' BUT to the contribution that philosophers have made to these fields of endeavour. Ultimately this is an empirical question and can be tested (as I recently did amongst a group of non philosophy graduate friends - the results of which strongly supported my conjecture to the extent that even if appropriate names, the more famous one's, were fished out the actual contribution was lacking). Is this really a surprise to anyone.

I trust my comments are taken in the spirit of debate as is intended.

helloo,

reply to ausser,

first of all, concerning Melvyn: Although i do not have the Theses on Feuerbach to hand i am pretty sure that the quote begins with a "Hitherto", in which case, Marx would be positively affirming his status as a philosopher and simply critizing previous philosophers for this uniting tednacy toward interpretation from ivory towers, condeming them for missing one (among many, i might add) of the key elements of being a philosopher.

Furthermore, to strip Marx of even later Marxist theory (including, i presume, denying him any claim at all as a partial instigator for existentialism, deconstruction, the Frankfurt school to name but a few) is as ridiculous as to strip Plato of Platonism, or Kant of Kantianism. These Philosophers' names are given to these groups of theory because of the formative, instigational role they play. As such, a great, influential philosopher never stops being a philosopher, at least not just because he is dead anyhow.

But we have diverged onto great philosophers, whereas i think the original point was more general.

Concerning: "The vast majority of people just go about their lives oblivious of any contribution from philosophers, "
If this is to claim that philosophy has had no effect then i think this is simply not the case. This to me would be analogous to claiming that a person living in mainstream Britain who is not a christian can have nothing to do with christianity. Christianity and its influence on the morals, politics etc therefore holds influence over the most ardent atheist (such as myself). Moreover, "The vast majority of people" Are not oblivious to maths, or science, or even pyschology, or argument, ...

My argument was that philosophy studies and partly constitutes the very conditions of possibility for 'human' thought, as such, to be truely oblivious to it would be to deny sapience.

Of course, all this only stands if we go beyond simple empirical investigation into what most people think philosophy is or philosophers do. But i argue from a continental base, where i do not think that empiricism is 'first philosophy'.

i would also briefly suggest that poles like that are just a bit useless, worthless, arbitrary, confused, misleading, local (in a sense) and generally just not worth even thinking about, not to mention in fact completely void of semantic value or content. That is, they would not stand up to philosophical rigour.p.s. The pole should simply have been either 'most influential' or 'most famous'.

cheers,

andy.