[Date Prev][Date Next]
[Chronological]
[Thread]
[Home]
BIVs, semantics, strangers and Creationism
To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS@bups.org
** For Your Eyes Only **
right,
i've been having some chats with a philosophical buddy about our dear friend mr hilary putnam,
we've established that there are three major problems with the argument:
1. putnam fails to prove that im not a brain in a vat, he only shows that my utterance of the statement is false.
2. well, that is if we accept semantic externalism
so, about meaning... putnam says that statements only have meaning if they are in a correct causal relation to the objects to which they refer (semantic externalism). But what about semantic internalism? Ought we not pay further heed to the notion that the meaning of one's statements is not contingent upon causal relations but whether we intend to refer to such substances (i.e. semantic internalism)
.........................
Now, on an additional note, the French have 'a legal obligation to help strangers in distress', do people think that we ought to have one here?
.........
As an aside, for all those fascinated by Rab's paper, those of you living in the East Midlands may be excited by the news that the Nottingham debate society is discussing teaching creationism in school's next Monday....
For further reading on BIVs please see,
Alston, W. (1989), "Epistemic Circularity", in his Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Brueckner, A. (1986), "Brains in a Vat", Journal of Philosophy 83.
----- (1990), "Skepticism about Knowledge of Content", Mind 99.
----- (1991), "If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat", Mind 101.
----- (1992), "Semantic Answers to Skepticism", in K. DeRose and T.A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
----- (1994), "Ebbs on Skepticism, Objectivity and Brains in Vats", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75.
----- (1995a), "Trying To Get Outside Your Own Skin", Philosophical Topics 23.
----- (1995b), "Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference", Philosophical Quarterly 45.
----- (1997), "Is Scepticism about Self-Knowledge Incoherent?", Analysis (1997).
----- (1999), "Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism", in R. Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
----- (2001), " A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available", Philosophical Studies 104.
----- (2003a), "The Coherence of Scepticism about Self-Knowledge", Analysis 63.
----- (2003b), "Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses", in S Luper (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (Burlington: Ashgate).
----- (2004), "Johnsen on Brains in Vats", Philosophical Studies.
Christensen, D. (1993), "Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solution", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53.
Dell'Utri, M. (1990), "Choosing Conceptions of Realism: the Case of the Brains in a Vat", Mind 99.
Ebbs, G. (1992), "Skepticism, Objectivity and Brains in Vats", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73.
----- (1996), "Can We Take Our Own Words at Face Value?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56.
----- (2001), "Is Skepticisism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?", Philosophical Studies 45.
Forbes, G. (1992) "Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited", in K. DeRose and T.A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Gallois, A. (1992), "Putnam, Brains in Vats, and Arguments for Scepticism", Mind 101.
Johnsen, B. (2003), "Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats Might Be", Philosophical Studies 112.
Ludlow, P. and Martin, N.(eds.) (1998), Externalism and Self-knowledge (Stanford: CSLI).
McIntyre, J. (1984), "Putnam's Brains", Analysis 44.
Noonan, H. (1998), "Reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats", Analysis 58.
Nuccetelli, S. (ed.) (2003), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Putnam, H. (1992), "Brains in a Vat", in K. DeRose and T.A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Smith, P. (1984), "Could We Be Brains in a Vat?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14.
Steinitz, Y. (1994), "Brains in a Vat: Different Perspectives", Philosophical Quarterly 44.
Tymoczko, T. "Brains Don't Lie: They Don't Even Make Many Mistakes", in M. Roth and G. Ross (eds.), Doubting (Dordrecht: Kluwer).
Warfield, T.A. " A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds", in K. DeRose and T.A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Wright, C. (1992), "On Putnam's Proof That We Are Not Brains-in-a-Vat", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92.
This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment
may still contain software viruses, which could damage your computer system:
you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the
University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation.
Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.htm