Re: Epipenominal Qualia 1 - The knowledge Argument

[Felicity Graham <graham.felicity@gmail.com>]

1. A non-pysicalist might ask the physicalist on what basis are you
claiming seeing red one is one and the same with the hard facts about
red?

2. Do you not think you have merely appropriated the definition of 'physical'?

On 10/21/05, David Saitch <philosophy@saitch.net> wrote:

What I am saying is:

1. From a Physicalists point of view, seeing red is physical, and the
experience is physical, so from a physicalist point of view it must be
included in the set of physical facts. How can you argue that they should not
be from a PHYSICALIST point of view.  You could say it if you were some for of
dualist, but for a physicalist they are physical and Jackson must include them
if he is going to refute physicalism...which he then can't.

2. The HARD scientific facts are descriptionss of the process of seeing, they
are explanatory facts. Seeing is the physical fact!

The Dualist Intuition blocks our view of this and I am expanding my paper to
explain it more.


Felicity Graham <graham.felicity@gmail.com> wrote:

> David,
>
> 1) How do you know the seeing and experiencing of red MUST be included in
> any subset of facts that is supposed to include all the physical facts about
> seeing red, unless you are happy to say the scientific facts about red and
> the "what it is like to see red" are one and the same, which cannot
> plausibly be said to be the case?
>
> 2) On what basis do you claim that seeing and experiencing
> red are the ONLY physical facts over say the hard scientific facts about
> red, without a simple appropriation of the definition of 'physical'.
>
> Felicity
>