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re: afternoon tea
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Hi Paul,
Ok, first thing, apologies ? the more dynamic of the Nottingham vegans (i.e.
alice) has gone out into the world to make things better and such, so you?ll
have to settle for a reply from an armchair utilitarian for now.
You say ?The reason utilitarian ethics makes maximisation of pleasure for
the greatest number (or, in your case, the minimisation of suffering) the
keystone of the system is because of a prior assumption that humans are
animals - in that both species share a basic motivation to avoid pain and
seek pleasure?.
Um, not sure quite what you?re saying but don?t think this is true.
Utilitarianism makes no assumptions about humans or non-human animals or
non-biological persons or anything. They start by asking what has value ?
they answer that it is happiness, or pleasure or satisfaction of desires,
and nothing else. Then they look at the world to find what things are
capable of feeling happiness, pleasure or having desires. Then they
maximize that value in whatever things can have it ? humans, non-human
animals, androids etc. Animal species are included where they can increase
this value, and excluded where they can?t, and the same with robots, rocks,
etc. It is not the case that they start by looking at what organisms they
want to include in their moral system and then decide on the characteristics
that will include these things. (well, you could probably find someone who
did that, but they would be totally idiotic, so let?s ignore them ;-) )
Ok, that was a slight aside, but I felt the need to defend utility.
You say ?But the question of what makes us 'human' cannot be whittled down
to simple references to biological evolution or base motivations. Thus,
when I say that human beings are "more than our animal inheritance PLUS the
capacity for reason"??
I agree with alice on this one, you?re gonna get into some difficulties if
you follow this route. Humans ARE animals. Are they more than animals?
Well, they might have characteristics than other animals do not have ? but
that doesn?t make them MORE than animals, it just makes them interesting
animals (though those interesting characteristics might allow you to give
them a different ethical system to other animals, but read on).
Furthermore, defining humans as ?more than our animal inheritance PLUS the
capacity for reason? gets things a bit confusing. Is a (heavily) mentally
impaired human not a human then? I think you want to make the distinction
between persons and animals, not humans and animals ? a human really is just
a biological kind, I discover that a mentally impaired human is a human by
testing DNA etc, not testing rational capacities. But I might only discover
that a human is also a ?person? (in the technical abortion debate-esque
sense), by discovering rational capacities, self-consciousness, long term
interests, or whatever. This is a distinction worth making, but it is not
one that allows you to easily separate off humans from non-human animals.
I think this is a key problem with what you have said. You have made this
huge distinction between humans and non-human animals, such that you have
given a different system of morality to each, and I?m not sure how you can
justify thinking there is such a massive divide in relevant characteristics.
You say: ?what 'quality of life' means is different for each person, but the
distinction between the 'quality of life' for animals, and that of humans,
is of an order so vast that we must deal with animals differently?
And ?the "mentally retarded" are people too. And, therefore, they should be
considered within a system of ethics that treats them as entities with needs
and desires of far greater complexity than animals have?
All ethical systems face a problem when they try to exclude all non-human
animals and include all humans. Firstly, no-one (sensible) thinks that
being a member of the biological kind ?human? is itself of intrinsic value.
A spaceship lands at the white house. George bush wanders out to meet the
first Martian ever to land of Earth. The door opens, the Martian steps out.
She is 6ft tall, has 2 arms, 2 legs, 2 eyes, a nose, etc. She speaks
English. Instantly outdoing George. They chat briefly about the weather,
American politics, philosophy, art etc. Suddenly an FBI agent leaps out and
jabs her with a DNA testing device. OH NO ? she?s not human!. Looking
slightly awkward, George tells her ?listen, sorry about this, but the way
things work around here is that we have one system of ethics for humans and
another for non-human animals.? ?Right, what does that mean for me?? asks
the Martian curiously, ?well, I?m afraid,? says George ?it means we?re gonna
have to lock you in a barn, forcefully impregnate you every year, tear your
child away from you within 24 hours of it being born and then milk you in
order to get something to put in our tea??
Ok, slightly unnecessary story I hope, but the point is, the DNA, etc.
really doesn?t matter, whatever moral system we?re talking about, it is some
set of characteristics that can be instantiated in different organisms that
is important. Now, you can still try to say that we want one system of
ethics for non-human animals and one for humans, but you will find that
there is no relevant characteristic that includes all humans and excludes
all non-human animals ? that the characteristic of membership of the
biological kind ?human? does this does not help ? it is NOT intrinsically
morally relevant, as hopefully is obvious. Whichever of the likely
candidates for morally relevant characteristics you do choose you are either
going to miss out some humans (children, the mentally impaired) or include
some non-human animals. To say otherwise is to grossly underestimate the
capacities of non-human animals. You really don?t have to be very
optimistic about non-human animal capacities to put some of them on a par
with very young children and the severely mentally impaired. But reading a
few papers about animal cognition makes it seem pretty clear that many are
on a par with significantly developed children ? I find it hard to
understand why some people view the same problem solving capabilities in
children and the mentally impaired as a sign of true cognition and yet only
take them as a sign of instinct in non-human animals. It seems to me that
you have to want that to be true to believe it, empirical evidence isn?t
gonna get you there. Aside from that, the point is that there is some level
of mental disability, and some level of lack of development in a child,
which is gonna put some non-human animals on a par with them.
Now, I?ll assume that you still don?t want to include the non-human animals
in the mighty ethical system of the human, which I also assume precludes
humans from being farmed for meat and milk, so I?ll look at the rest bearing
in mind that whatever you say about non-human animal ethics must hold for
mentally impaired humans (impaired to the same level as non-human animals
like pigs, cows, chickens etc.).
4 further points:
1) doing the animals a favour -
You say ?Thus, the 'right' we have to kill them for food comes as a
consequence of our providing them with a better life than they would have
had in the wild.?
Let?s grant that the animals in your improved farms have lives better than
if they lived in the wild. I?m not sure I understand the relevance of the
comparison. We don?t get domestic animals by riding out into the wild and
rescuing them. If the suggestion is that once we have bred them we could
just dump them in the wild, where they would be worse off, and since we
don?t, then they owe us something, namely their lives, then I find this
highly unconvincing. I could go and torture someone, but it isn?t very
plausible to claim that since I don?t, that person owes me something. If
the suggestion is that it requires some cost to support the animal, and that
animal benefits from being supported by us, so we have the right to take its
products in order to sustain that support, then I find this more convincing.
BUT, it only justifies causing the minimum harm possible that still allows
its life to be supported (and this is not true of current farming methods);
and if, as you suggest, we kill it, then this doesn?t seem like such a great
deal for the animal any more.
Now, looking at it again with mentally impaired humans: if I bred mentally
impaired humans ? how convinced would you be by my justification that I had
given them a better life than they would have had out in ?the wild? and so I
am allowed to kill them?
2) livelihoods of farmers:
You say ?in the case of the farmers who keep live-stock, it's all very well
talking about "transferable skills", but if you and your family have lived
and worked on that farm and its land for generations, how can you just pack
up and go at the wave of a wand??
I accept that it is a shame that some peoples' lives may be worse off
without an animal farming industry. I accept that it is a shame that some
people?s lives may be worse off without a cluster bomb industry. I don?t
blame people who work in either industry, perhaps they don?t realize the
harm they cause. Yes, we must take into account everyone?s interests when we
dismantle these industries, but that doesn?t constitute a reason for
thinking they shouldn?t be dismantled. If everyone became vegan overnight
it is still possible to compensate farmers, ease them in to a new way of
life, look after the remaining livestock. Hey ? we?ll have tonnes of cash
from all the money we save not buying meat. Just because we don?t eat meat
any more doesn?t mean we can?t look after the farmers and the animals. You
mention the ?what would happen to all the animals if we became vegan?
argument ? but this is just like if we had been rearing mentally impaired
humans for meat and then suddenly realized it was unethical ? just because
we don?t eat them any more doesn?t mean we just have to go, oh well, and
throw them out into the wild, and watch them perish in agony because of
their lack of survival skills. We would support the lives of these mentally
impaired humans that we had treated so badly, just as we could support, if
we all became vegan, the lives of the last generation of domestic animals
bred for meat or dairy etc.
3) justifiable systems of animal farming ?
You argue that there is a system of animal farming that is justifiable, if
conditions were improved etc. I think this is an interesting point, but it
can be separated from whether people now should be vegan or not (not saying
you don?t realize this, just feel that it is worth mentioning). There is a
justifiable way of producing Man Utd merchandise, but if the way it is
actually produced involves the torturing of small children then we should
not support its production ? it is irrelevant to whether we should boycott
it that it is physically possible for it to be made by happy well-paid
people. Similarly, if some particularly tasty treat has been produced by
breeding mentally impaired humans and draining the sweat from their brows
while they are kept in cages only just big enough to move and have had their
hands tied behind their backs to stop them killing each other because of the
stress of their environment, then whether or not there is a justifiable way
of harvesting mentally impaired humans? sweat is irrelevant ? this way is
not it, and we shouldn?t buy the product that supports this system. By
buying it you would be creating a demand that would mean more mentally
impaired humans would need to live in these particular conditions ? not the
improved conditions that may or may not be justifiable ? just to get you
your tasty treats (this example is akin to battery chickens).
4) The ecological argument ?
Alice mentioned this and you replied ?Again, as I said in my previous post,
by our very existence on the planet, human beings consume resources and
destroy the habitats of other animals?.
But, I think one of the things alice was referring to was the argument that
eating animals is an incredibly wasteful method of food production. A
10-acre farm can support 60 people growing soybeans, 24 people growing
wheat, 10 people growing corn and only two producing cattle. Britain could
support a population of 250 million on an all-vegetable diet. If we went
vegan we could use the surplus food to feed starving people around the
world. Alternatively, we could grow less food, freeing up land and recreate
natural habitats for other animals. Doesn?t that sound fun.
5) We cause harm anyway ? ok, this really is the last point,
You say ?I am not a vegan. The only truthful answer I can give as to why
is because I like meat (even though I know there's a high probability that a
lot of it has been produced via methods and means I disagree with). Do you
buy all your food based on 'Free Trade' labels, all your clothes from Oxfam
and never use a car? Each of us, every day, do things that we know are
harmful or wrong in some way.?
Some of the harm we cause has a great benefit for us. Some would say that
we can?t ask people to sacrifice so much for others ? we can?t make moral
claims that are too demanding. Fair enough. *never* using a car would be a
pretty big sacrifice ? getting on in the world would become very difficult
if we refused to *ever* use a car (though it isn?t difficult to reduce the
amount you use them). However, if we cause harm and it has very little
benefit to us, then it is much more difficult to understand how we can
continue to cause that harm. The taste of meat, eggs and milk does not
constitute a large benefit. We should give up on causing this harm even
though we may continue to cause other harms, because the benefits are so
small and the harm so great.
Even Nozick, a man whose moral system asks for almost no sacrifices for
others, thought that the pleasures of taste were not enough to allow the
killing of animals for meat - even Nozick was a vegetarian. And he did agree
with you that there should be a different system of ethics for humans to the
one for animals.
Ok. That?s it. Apologies for going on.
Nick
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