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Re: a note about time
- To: BUPS-DIS@bups.org
- Subject: Re: a note about time
- From: Keith Wilson <kw503@york.ac.uk>
- Date: 03 Jan 2006 12:11:49 +0000
- In-reply-to: <1135959529.b87d22fc0203734C@student.gla.ac.uk>
- References: <1135959529.b87d22fc0203734C@student.gla.ac.uk>
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I'm not quite sure what you mean by 'the universe being at time t', but if
a 'time' is just a particular configuration of all the matter and energy
the universe then you'd also need to provide a definition of simultaneity.
According to the special theory of relativity, observers travelling at
different speeds will disagree about which events are simultaneous, and
there is no 'objective' frame of reference that can be used to resolve the
matter.
Also, if by determinism you mean that things could not have been different
at any particular time, then your conclusion is true by definition.
However, if you take it as meaning that the state of the universe at time
t+1 can be precisely predicted from its state at time t, then the scenario
you describe could (I think) still be non-deterministic. Just because the
universe was at a particular state at time t is not to say that it could
not have been different (where 'could have been' is cashed out in terms of
some counter-factual theory of causation, such as David Lewis's possible
worlds explanation, mad though it is), and this is true of both
deterministic and non-deterministic universes. Of course, you might then
want to say that because things are different, the alternate state no
longer represents the same 'time', which seems peculiar, but perhaps this
is because the word 'time' is now being used in a slightly different sense?
In general, it seems more natural to think of a time as being an additional
property of the universe rather than its actual state. Otherwise, if the
universe were to reach the same state more than once then you would have to
say that it did so 'at the same time', which seems wrong.
Personally, I'm inclined to agree with Lowe and say that although 'time'
may exist (as a process), there are no such things as 'times' and we should
exclude them from our ontology. (And as for a completely random suggestion
as to what time is: could it be something to do with the way that the
possible becomes actual? Just a thought...)
- Keith
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