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Re: a chat about luncheon / afternoon tea

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Right, sorry for the slight delay in my reply, I've
been to Lincoln for a few days.  I'm considering this
my final post on the subject of veganism, as it seems
the majority of board members have moved on to other
things.  I direct the majority of this post towards
answering certain criticisms made against my position
by Nick Day, as he was the last person to weigh in on
this topic in any significant depth.  (Apologies for
my reply appearing slightly 'rushed' as I am short of
time tonight!)

Nick begins by criticising my summary of utilitarian
ethics.  Previously I stated that utilitarian ethics
rests on the principle of the maximization of pleasure
for the greatest number, and that this assumption was
made the keystone of that ethical system because of a
prior assumption that humans are animals (and both
humans and animals share the same basic motivation:
seek pleasure and avoid pain).  Nick criticises this
analysis and says that utilitarianism is concerned
with VALUE:

Nick: ?Utilitarianism makes no assumptions about
humans or non-human animals or non-biological persons
or anything. They start by asking what has value, they
answer that it is happiness, or pleasure or
satisfaction of desires, and nothing else. Then they
look at the world to find what things are capable of
feeling happiness, pleasure or having desires. Then
they maximize that value in whatever things can have
it?

But values don't exist 'out there' in the world,
before human beings came along.  All values have human
origins (even the most fundamental ones like
'happiness' ? since we would need to understand the
concept of 'happiness' before we could decide on its
value).  Human beings are the only beings capable of
creating and analysing values.  Without human beings
there are no values.  However, human beings and
animals can certainly be said to share basic
'instincts' (as opposed to 'interests' ? which, like
'values', belong to humans alone): both animals and
humans instinctively avoid pain and seek pleasure.  In
order for utilitarianism to function as a theory at
all it must make certain assumptions about the
entities with which it deals.  For example: What,
exactly, are human beings?  What are animals?  What
motivates each?  What is value?  Is 'happiness'
valuable?  If 'happiness' is valuable then is it of
'ethical' value, and if so, how might it be
incorporated into an ethical system?

Such a list of questions goes on and on.  The point is
that the values and assumptions upon which all systems
of thought (ethical and otherwise) are based, did not
fall out of the sky one day, but instead, belong to a
long history of human thought which contains an even
longer list of assumptions, dogmas, prejudices and
false starts that support all such questions and
values.  Utilitarianism assumes that values are not
unique to human beings, that happiness is the most
fundamental of these, and that interests (as opposed
to instincts) are things that are merely 'given' in
Nature and can be apply to pretty much all living
things that share a certain level of biological and
genetic similarity to ourselves.  The problem is that
humans have much more sophisticated needs and
interests compared to animals (because we are much
more sophisticated and complex beings).  Biologically
speaking humans are indeed animals (because of our
genetic similarities), and it is because of such
similarities, at this level, that we share the same
basic instincts with them (in this utilitarianism is
correct).  Since animals share enough in common with
humans (in that both feel pain) and humans are the
ones that create ethical systems, and the values upon
which these are based, then there is no good reason to
exclude animals from such decision-making processes. 
The problem is finding a way of including animals into
our ethical decisions in a way which does not whittle
down all other human values and interests down to the
level of biological instinct (human beings are capable
of much greater than simply following their built-in
survival mechanisms).  What the utilitarian system
allows for, however (and you were right to defend it
in this respect), is for animals and humans to be
considered TOGETHER under one system of thought.  The
difference between animals an humans is not
significant enough for either to be totally excluded
from any system of ethics (holism is definitely the
way forward).  The problem is how to create an ethical
system which includes all living things, but treats
each according to their specific needs and desires,
instead of trying to sweep a difficult problem under
the carpet by levelling all ethics questions down to
one basic principle.

Nick: ?You say 'But the question of what makes us
?human? cannot be whittled down to simple references
to biological evolution or base motivations. Thus,
when I say that human beings are ?more than our animal
inheritance PLUS the capacity for reason?.'?

My apologies here.  What I MEANT to say (but didn't
because I put my quote marks in the wrong place) was:
human beings are more than ?our animal inheritance
PLUS the capacity for reason?.  Thus (since I deny
that the essence of any 'human being' can be reduced
either to rationality or biological inheritance from
animals) the problem of classifying the ?mentally
impaired? (i.e. are they human or not?) does not
arise.  Human beings (whether we consider them to be
fully capable of rationality or not) have an essence
which cannot be pinned down precisely to any one
particular interpretation ? there will always be
something that is left out.  Definitions are possible
here but final definitions are not, all such things
are always 'work in progress'.

Nick: ?I think this is a key problem with what you
have said. You have made this huge distinction between
humans and non-human animals, such that you have given
a different system of morality to each, and I?m not
sure how you can justify thinking there is such a
massive divide in relevant characteristics.?

I have not given a different system of morality to
each, neither have I made a huge distinction between
the two.  Humans are animals BIOLOGICALLY ? but
biology can't account for everything.  As such, there
is no need to have a separate ethical system for each,
but one that allows us to treat each being in
accordance with its nature.

In the next section you discuss the difficulties
ethical systems face when excluding non-human animals
(in other words, tying ethics to biology).  However,
as I hoped to have made clear by now, I do not make
the distinction between human and non-human animals,
because humans are NOT animals (they can only be
classified as such at the biological level).  It is
not my ethical system (or its framework, at least)
that ties biology to ethics,  rather, it is
utilitarianism that does so.  (Because, as I have
said, in order to place 'happiness' as the first
principle that underpins the system, utilitarians need
to make certain assumptions about the essential
natures of both humans and animals.  If humans are
animals (references to biology are required to justify
this position) and happiness is an innate value in
nature, then all lifeforms capable of the experience
of happiness can have every ethical dilemma reduced
down to a calculation based upon this one source).

Nick: ?Now, I'll assume that you still don't want to
include the non-human animals in the mighty ethical
system of the human, which I also assume precludes
humans from being farmed for meat and milk, so I'll
look at the rest bearing in mind that whatever you say
about non-human animal ethics must hold for mentally
impaired humans (impaired to the same level as
non-human animals like pigs, cows, chickens etc.).?

The reason we don't farm human beings for meat and
milk probably has a lot to do with our cultural
practices and traditions.  Biologically speaking,
farming mothers for milk and the mentally impaired for
meat (or anyone really) has nothing to do with their
unsuitability for the task.  Now I am no nutritional
expert, but I would imagine that eating human meat and
drinking human milk would be just as good as what we
get at present from animals (assuming humans were
subject to similar farming practices ? as I am aware
that the diet of the average person in the developed
world is poor enough to transfer many nasty toxins
into the blood and tissues and organs).  So given
this, why do we not farm humans?  Because of
TRADITION!  The ethics that we have inherited from
ages past make the consumption of human 'produce' a
forbidden practice.  Therefore, we use animals to
substitute for what we require in our diets (and here
Nick Dippie pointed out that not all humans are
capable of surviving on purely vegan/vegetarian
diets).  The worrying thing is that it is seemingly
tradition alone that prevents us all from descending
into cannibalism when the going gets tough.  But, as I
pointed out before, what is unique about human beings
cannot be tied down to biology, and humans are also
the only beings that can create and enforce values. 
Therefore, since human beings (in most parts of the
world at least) have strict ethical prohibitions about
eating their own kind, then animals are really the
only other alternative.

Nick: ?1) doing the animals a favour:

You say 'Thus, the ?right? we have to kill them for
food comes as a consequence of our providing them with
a better life than they would have had in the wild.'

Let's grant that the animals in your improved farms
have lives better than if they lived in the wild. I'm
not sure I understand the relevance of the comparison.
We don't get domestic animals by riding out into the
wild and rescuing them. If the suggestion is that once
we have bred them we could just dump them in the wild,
where they would be worse off, and since we don't,
then they owe us something, namely their lives, then I
find this highly unconvincing. I could go and torture
someone, but it isn't very plausible to claim that
since I don't, that person owes me something. If the
suggestion is that it requires some cost to support
the animal, and that animal benefits from being
supported by us, so we have the right to take its
products in order to sustain that support, then I find
this more convincing. BUT, it only justifies causing
the minimum harm possible that still allows its life
to be supported (and this is not true of current
farming methods); and if, as you suggest, we kill it,
then this doesn?t seem like such a great deal for the
animal any more.?

Once upon a time of course we did take animals from
the wild to be domesticated (and in certain
circumstances killed for meat) ? although I don't
understand the relevance of the middle section of your
argument on torture, or the breeding and dumping of
animals in the wild.  My original argument was that
keeping animals for meat, milk, or whatever, was
justified so long as they would receive a better
quality of life on the farm than they would receive in
the wild (and here I was thinking of protection from
the elements, disease, famine, predators and so on) ?
that is what makes this a ?great deal? for the
animals.  Now I would agree with you that, at present,
the conditions under which animals are kept on many
commercial farms is unacceptable.  But this does not
automatically make all forms of animal farming
unethical.  What it signifies is that change must be
brought about (I have discussed some suggestions
before, so I shall not repeat myself here) to ensure
that standards of animal welfare meet 'quality of
life' requirements that would make the 'bargain'
between farmers and their livestock an ethical one. 
(And here your talk of the costs the farmer incurs
when looking after the animals in his care supports my
'contract theory'.)

Nick: ?2) livelihoods of farmers:

You say 'In the case of the farmers who keep
live-stock, it's all very well talking about
"transferable skills", but if you and your family have
lived and worked on that farm and its land for
generations, how can you just pack up and go at the
wave of a wand?'.

I accept that it is a shame that some peoples' lives
may be worse off without an animal farming industry. I
accept that it is a shame that some people's lives may
be worse off without a cluster bomb industry. I don't
blame people who work in either industry, perhaps they
don't realize the harm they cause. Yes, we must take
into account everyone's interests when we dismantle
these industries, but that doesn?t constitute a reason
for thinking they shouldn't be dismantled. If everyone
became vegan overnight it is still possible to
compensate farmers, ease them in to a new way of life,
look after the remaining livestock. Hey , we'll have
tonnes of cash from all the money we save not buying
meat. Just because we don't eat meat any more doesn't
mean we can't look after the farmers and the animals.
You mention the 'what would happen to all the animals
if we became vegan?' argument, but this is just like
if we had been rearing mentally impaired humans for
meat and then suddenly realized it was unethical. 
Just because we don't eat them any more doesn't mean
we just have to go, oh well, and throw them out into
the wild, and watch them perish in agony because of
their lack of survival skills. We would support the
lives of these mentally impaired humans that we had
treated so badly, just as we could support, if we all
became vegan, the lives of the last generation of
domestic animals bred for meat or dairy etc.?

The point that I was trying to make with regard to
farmers' livelihoods, was that it is not purely a
question of economics but one of traditions and ways
of life.  Supposing that the house that you and your
family have lived in for generations was suddenly
marked for demolition because it turned out it had
been illegally constructed and had destroyed the
habitats of certain rare species of animal in the
area.  Fair enough, this is an unlikely occurrence. 
But would you simply say ?Oh yes, I can certainly see
that what my ancestors did was unethical.  You can
bring the bulldozers in tomorrow ? er I will receive
adequate compensation for this won't I??  Or would you
attempt to defend the land and property that was all
you and your family had known?  It is not a question
of economics, it is a question of VALUE ? of the love
of a way of life.   Change can come, and indeed it
ought to come, but at the right pace.  We must be
prepare to initialise reforms step by step, not
overnight revolutions.  Incidentally, even if there
would be enough money saved (from converting the
population to wholesale veganism) to 'adequately'
compensate the farmers for their loss, would the
government be willing to pay out the sums required? 
(When has it ever been willing to part with money,
especially in the form of handouts?)

However, I would still like to know just what would be
done with the redundant livestock.  If we kept them to
look after them (but didn't kill or utilise them in
any way) then how do we justify the cost of such care
(since they are no longer providing anything for us ?
as part of the bargain of us keeping them at all)? 
Secondly, if we release them back into the wild, then
they are once more at the mercy of the predators and
all the cruelties of the environment (except this time
they will not know how to survive ? since they were
bred in safe captivity).  And, if we do choose to
release them, where shall we send them?  Part of the
'ecological argument' was that cattle and other
livestock were an ecological nightmare because of all
the space and resources they required (that negatively
impacted upon other organisms and their habitats).  If
we release them into the wild they will cause havoc on
a scale far greater than if they were confined on a
farm; and if we confine them on a 'farm' then,
according to the 'ecological argument' at least, we
are back to square one.

Nick: ?3) justifiable systems of animal farming:
You argue that there is a system of animal farming
that is justifiable, if conditions were improved etc.
I think this is an interesting point, but it can be
separated from whether people now should be vegan or
not?

Indeed, if I interpret you correctly, Alice made a
similar point in her previous post: that if a practice
is morally indefensible, then it is so FULL-STOP (some
forms of right and wrong don't admit of degrees and,
therefore, attempting to limit the harm of certain
practices would be futile).  But, as I have attempted
to show, animal farming is not morally indefensible. 
My initial suggestion of a 'contract theory', between
the farmer and his animals, might be one why in which
our appropriation of animals from the wild (and the
uses we have for them) could be render neither
arbitrary nor unethical (as both the farmer and the
animals get a good deal from the contract ?
admittedly, under ideal conditions).

Nick: ?There is a justifiable way of producing Man Utd
merchandise, but if the way it is actually produced
involves the torturing of small children then we
should not support its production ? it is irrelevant
to whether we should boycott it that it is physically
possible for it to be made by happy well-paid people.?

But this is the dilemma.  If we don't boycott such
practices they continue and so does the harm.  If we
do, then greater harm can come about because the
children loose their nasty jobs and are made even more
poverty stricken than they were before.  Our third
option (that you and Alice seem to argue for) is to
stop consuming 'harmful' produce altogether.  But,
like option two, this would in turn cause greater harm
because (in the case of the farmers) they would loose
a huge amount of their income, and there is no easy
solution as to how to care adequately for the
redundant livestock without running into economic or
environmental difficulties.  I suggested the boycott
option (or reducing our intake of harmful produce)
because this seemed the lesser of many evils. 
Boycotting can introduce change by forcing producers
to examine their methods (as it becomes less
profitable for them if they continue the objectionable
practices).  Additionally, boycotting (where it works)
introduces change over time rather than overnight
(allowing all concerned time to adjust).  The problem
with boycotting is that is does not change the
underlying cause of what is objectionable (in your
case, eating meat) and producers don't always meet the
demands of the boycotters (instead they may decide to
close the factories in one country and relocate
business elsewhere ? thus depriving workers of income
and the animals of any kind of protection at all). 
Nevertheless, since I do not believe that using animal
produce is unethical by default, boycotting appears
one way, at least, of how improvements in the present
system might be brought about.

Nick: ?4) The ecological argument:

eating animals is an incredibly wasteful method of
food production. A 10-acre farm can support 60 people
growing soybeans, 24 people growing wheat, 10 people
growing corn and only two producing cattle. Britain
could support a population of 250 million on an
all-vegetable diet.?

I will assume that you have accurate information for
the figures above (I certainly don't, so I will trust
that you are correct).  But are you serious when you
say Britain could support a population of 250 million
(or are you just posing that figure as a ?what if??)? 
This country is over-populated as it is.  We don't
have enough resources to support the 60-odd million
people we have already (food is only one of many many
resources required to support a large population in a
developed country).

Nick: ?If we went vegan we could use the surplus food
to feed starving people around the world.
Alternatively, we could grow less food, freeing up
land and recreate natural habitats for other animals.
Doesn't that sound fun.?

If we all went vegan we could certainly NOT use the
surplus to feed the starving around the globe.  Can
you imagine what would happen if we started shipping
huge quantities of food to countries, say, in Africa
(aside all the problems we would have in dealing with
the US and the UN ? the number of treaties and trade
agreements we would be in violation of doesn't bear
thinking about!)?  Suppose we start delivering to a
country that has recently been hit by a famine.  What
impact would all these imports of vast quantities of
food have on the economy?  It's all very well feeding
the people in their hour of need, but what about the
after-effects?  If all of a sudden there is lots and
lots of food going for free, then why should the
locals buy food from the farmers and local producers? 
These peoples' livelihoods would already have been
greatly affected by the famine: without any demand for
what is left of their produce they will be made
bankrupt (and, like everyone else, become dependant on
the aid we are giving them).  Additionally, aside from
our good intentions destroying the economies and
autonomy of countries we would be shipping to, how
could we be certain that the food reached its
destination (i.e. the starving)?  Many African
countries are ruled by dictators that look after their
friends and allies, leaving everyone else to fend for
themselves.  If we imported our surplus food, such
rulers may insist on carrying out the local
distribution themselves (making sure that food went
only to their friends and supporters).  They might
also insist upon an import fee (justified no doubt by
the negative impact our food would be having on their
country's economy and farmers' incomes).  Once we pay
them the fee, they pocket it (as opposed to using it
to subsidise the farmers).  Our 'good deeds' would
result in the shoring-up of corrupt regimes and the
collapse of many local economies (undoing all the good
we originally hoped to achieve).

Your alternative suggestion sounds much better, but
there is still the problem of farmers requiring
adequate financial compensation (and the loss of a way
of life, no amount can compensate for!).

Nick: ?5) We cause harm anyway:

ok, this really is the last point,say that we can't
ask people to sacrifice so much for others, we can't
make moral claims that are too demanding. Fair enough.
*never* using a car would be a pretty big sacrifice ?
getting on in the world would become very difficult if
we refused to *ever* use a car (though it isn't
difficult to reduce the amount you use them). However,
if we cause harm and it has very little benefit to us,
then it is much more difficult to understand how we
can continue to cause that harm. The taste of meat,
eggs and milk does not constitute a large benefit. We
should give up on causing this harm even though we may
continue to cause other harms, because the benefits
are so small and the harm so great.?

I never claimed that the 'moral' demand not to eat
meat was too demanding (on a personal level at least).
 What I admitted was that I liked the taste of it too
much to do all that was required to bring about
effective change.  My subsequent examples about
driving cars and buying 'Fair Trade', were intended to
point out to other people that they too engaged in
practices which they knew were harmful, and which they
knew needed to change (and in some cases knew what to
do to bring change about), but nevertheless, they
continued with their entrenched ways.  The taste of
meat, eggs and milk, does have benefits for us as I
have been saying over and over:

a) Not all people can survive on a purely vegan diet.
b) The economic and social life of the countryside
would be devastated.
c) The environmental impact of free-roaming livestock
would be enormous.
d) The suffering created by all of the above combined
would far out weigh suffering caused by improved
farming methods, and the steps necessary to achieve
them.

In conclusion, the thrust of my argument all along has
been that we cannot make ethical demands from the
perspective of the world as we would like it to be. 
In making any ethical prescriptions we should always
take into account our world as it is NOW, and consider
all the negative effects our demands are likely to
have (not just their positive consequences).  As time
passes, we become more enlightened about ourselves
and, consequently, our moral values.  But our
histories and traditions ought never to be considered
as something that we can immediately dispense with
because one day we determine them to have been
unethical all along.  If something has survived
through tradition, then that fact alone does not make
it right, but it demonstrates that it has survived for
a reason ? it is beneficial to us in some way.  By
respecting our traditions, seeking to understand them
(if not always follow them), we can be cautious in our
idealism.  When we ask ?What ought I to do about X??,
and then look to tradition for guidance, we are
admitting to ourselves that our moral dilemmas are not
ours alone (others that have gone before us may have
something worthwhile to say).  Moral problems do not
have solutions that affect only the immediate present.
 The past is a guide to predicting the future, and in
using tradition in this way we are making decisions as
HUMAN BEINGS (beings that exist and question from
within a historical context) ? as opposed to isolated
beings making 'pure' moral calculations in isolation
from the rest of the world.


		
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