Re: counterparts

[Keith Wilson <kw503@york.ac.uk>]

To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS@bups.org


I totally sympathise with your attitude towards Kripke as I felt exactly 
the same way after reading some of his work in my first year. However, on 
revisiting the text I have a new found respect for the man and his views 
and would highly recommend reading N&N if you get the chance.

Your first point about "I could have been a piece of bow resin" illustrates 
that we do have essential properties, at least when we describe ourselves 
as an "I". In this case, being some sort of living creature (or possibly a 
human being, in which case my original example already went too far). 
Kripke gives a similar example with regard to Richard Nixon (p46), who he 
says could not have been an inanimate object, and possibly not a non-human 
creature (although some might dispute the latter!).

The possibility that people or things could have been called something 
different is not a problem for Kripke. The possible world in which you are 
called Hector includes you because you have stipulated this in your 
description; i.e. it is *you* that is called Hector. Conversely, if your 
twin was called James and is identical to the you that inhabits this world 
in every way, then he is still not you because you have already specified 
that he is your twin. This seems pretty intuitive but contradicts what 
David Lewis says about counterparts, a view which Kripke thinks contains 
various logical errors (p45) as well as being misguided.

The confusion arises when we try to compare names as they are used in 
different possible worlds. The James in this world and the James in the 
other world (e.g. your twin) are not necessarily the same person, although 
they could be, depending upon how we have set up the specific example. When 
you describe the possible world you effectively 'pin' the terms you use in 
its description to refer to the same objects across worlds; the rest of the 
world can change around it, but that object remains 'the same thing' in 
both possible worlds. Conversely, when you say '.... is called X', this 
indicates an object that is qualitatively but not numerically identical. 
This might qualify as a Lewisian counterpart, but for Kripke is no longer 
the same object.

Cheers,
Keith.


Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml