equality

[Daniel Deasy <ttwdlondon@yahoo.co.uk>]

There are two principle understandings of equality:

(1) something akin to a logical relation; 'X is equal to Y' says something quite specific about the nature of X and Y, and something that in principle is open to empirical confirmation. But it still needs to be said in what respect they are meant to be equal. X and Y may be persons or objects or whatever.

(2) as something moral- moral equality, fairness &c. Is this normative notion of 'equality' open to empirical investigation? It appears that it can only apply to persons (think about it in relation to objects). Person X is equal to person Y- how? In what way? 'In wealth'. We can confirm this. But does it make them morally equal? It seems not. So: normative equality requires a statement of the respect in which two individuals are said to be 'equal' that does not appeal to something like 'wealth' that can apply non-normatively and can still allow us to say ' but they are not morally equal'. What might this thing be, in respect of which two people can be morally equal?

More importantly: what follows from moral equality? This is the heart of the matter. What moral duties follow from the moral equality of persons? And; can we have a satisfactory moral system that has no need of the notion of moral equality? In that case, we would have the usual moral duties, and no duties that follow from the notion of moral equality. This is quite possible, I'd contend (but not now).

 

  

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