Desires of One's Own

[N Tasker <pia03nt@sheffield.ac.uk>]

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Unlike some mental states, desires have the peculiar property that an agent can
?own? some of his desires and not others. For instance, the kleptomaniac or
unwilling drug addict undergoes desires which they disown. They feel that their
desires to steal or take heroin originate from something which is external to
the self. In the vocabulary employed in an interesting body of literature, of
which Harry Frankfurt, Michael Bratman, David Velleman, and Gary Watson are
among the key authors, the drug addict ?identifies? with his desire not to take
drugs, but does not ?identify? with the desire to to take the drugs. This
debate can be seen as a contemporary strand to the free will debate.

Frankfurt accounts for identification in the following way. In addition to first
order desires, such as the desire to drink a cup of coffee, or to be successful
in life, we can also form second (and third, and fourth and fifth?) order
desires. The object of an n-order desire is a desire of the order n-1 (except
in the case of first order desires). So, for example, a second order desire
might be the desire not to desire a second piece of chocolate cake. One is
identified with a particular desire to x when (a) one has a higher order desire
that your desire to x be effective, (b) one is satisfied with one?s higher
order desire, and (c) one?s state of satisfaction is reflectively arrived at.
(To be satisfied with a desire means that the question whether or not you wish
to have the desire simply does not arrive.)

Is this a satisfactory account of what it is to identify with one?s desires? 

I would say not. Imagine that a man is walking home late one night, and when he
spots a lone woman in a secluded place, he is seized by the urge to rape her.
He also has the desire to leave her alone, however, and this latter desire is
endorsed by a higher order desire with which he is reflectively satisfied.
Nevertheless, despite his reflective endorsements of his desire to leave the
woman alone, the man?s sexual desires get the better of him, and he molests the
woman. Is this unwilling rapist identified? According to Frankfurt?s account he
is not, but consider the following argument.

(1) If an agent acts to satisfy some desire, then the agent is only blameworthy
for the act if he is identified with the desire in question.

(2) The rapist acts to satisfy a desire.

(3) The rapist is blameworthy for his act.

(C) Therefore the rapist is identified with the desire to rape the woman.

Do you agree that this example poses a problem for Frankfurt?s theory? If so,
how should it be amended? 

Nick


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