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Re: counterparts (sort of)



Andy, Firstly I think that the follow premise of analytic philosophy (at least I think it should be a premise or axiom of analytic philosophy!) should really be accepted by everyone (but perhaps you want to disagree):
 
AP: People happily use language in particular ways. If in analysing the use of language we contradict how we ordinarily use language then this analysis of language is incorrect.
 
For example, suppose that we were (as I recently have been!) investigation when composition occurs, i.e. when do we have a complex object (an object with proper parts). Ordinarily we accept that a book is an object, but we do not accept that the mereological sum of a book and a tree (call it a booktree) is an object. Any analysis of the word "object" that concludes that books are not objects and booktrees are is mistaken. Even if there is more to the meaning of a word to simply knowing under which situations it is used, appreciating when it is used and when it isn't is important to its meaning. Therefore we can appeal to our intuitions about what is and isn't an object to decide whether a theory of objecthood is correct. (Our intuitions about objecthood being namely that books are objects and booktrees are not). I suppose that you could say that this particular exercise is understanding what our (linguistic) intuitions are, and consequently appeal to intuitions is important!
 
However, philosophy is not just uncovering intuitions. How we use our language is just such a matter, and analysis of language had better recognise that, but judging whether the language we use correctly describes the way things are is a different matter. Let's take time, and let's just say that the issue is between eternalism and presentism. I personally think that our linguistic intuitions are in favour of presentism, but this doesn't prove presentism and it doesn't even come close. I think of myself as analytic but am (usually) happy to accept that there is more going on with time than just how we talk about it (but it depends what mood I'm in!) I think that someone in the middle of ordinary language philosophy might have a problem in saying what could be beyond language due to the following reason. Suppose the way we talk presupposes presentism. Now how are we supposed to make sense of the following sentence: "The correct answer to how time works is eternalist." The OLP philosopher will think that this is straightforwardly false: the word "time" is used in a way that presupposes presentism! Maybe something works in an eternalist fashion, but it's not whatever we call "time." There is nothing else to say. There might be more stuff happening that how our langauge works, but since we lack the tools to express extra-linguistic fact (all our tools of _expression_ are linguistic) we cannot express (and perhaps some will want to claim therefore cannot comprehend) extra-linguisitic fact. Since extra-linguistic facts are not comprehendable, the _expression_ "extra-linguistic fact" doesn't mean anything. And so trivially there are no extra-linguistic facts, (since according to OLP I don't even understand what I just said in denying such things as extra-linguistic facts). As Wittgenstein said: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." Since analysing language is all there is to philosophy, it follows that appeal to (linguistic) intuitions is legitimate in all fields of philosophical enquiry.
 
I hope I have got OLP right, if not I think what I said makes reasonable sense. I want to resist the argument I've just spelled out, since I do think that when I engage in speculative metaphysics I do actually mean something rather than just utter garbled and ill-formed sentences. However I am really impressed by this exposition of OLP (or what I think OLP is about!). I have my own thoughts about its problems, but perhaps you guys have some ideas. In any case do you see why intuitions are relevant in at least some (perhaps all) philosophical fields Andy?
 
Matthew

 
On 12/03/06, andrew stephenson <winstonmarx@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

Hi there all you analytics, i am posting to voice a worry i have had for some time, but that had slipped my mind until Andrew Bacon's email. I say hello 'analytics' because i am looking at this problem from a continentalists point of view, and they don't usually have it (for two reasons that shall come out soon).
 
Andrew mentioned two opposing arguments put forth by Plantinga and Lewis. Now, it struck me immediately that both arguments had a similar premise: 'We would normally accept the proposition', and 'something we would be hard pressed to accept'. both of these have recall to what has been called common sense or intuition, or indeed many other things. The Plantinga argument begins with such a premise without which it could not function, the Lewis argument ends with such a premise, without which it would not be a r! eductio ad absurdum.
 
My point is that it seems strange to talk about transworld identity, stipulative definition, rigid designators, contingent a priori, necessary a posteriori etc etc etc etc, and in the end simply decide on the basis of intuition or common sense. This strange phenomena is particularly weird given all the important and enlightening work done in the fields of the social sciences, psychology, and continental philosophy etc regarding things like social indoctrination, matrices of difference, the dogmatism and intranscience of moral education etc etc blah blah blah.
 
Continentalists dont have this problem to avoid, either because they dont construct such clear (ha!) and concise step by step arguments, or because they dont worry too much if the theory or argument fits in with our common way of looking at things (indeed, it is often taken as a sign of a great and innovative idea if it makes us think differently, even if it sounds very odd).
 
i'm not going to develope links this thought has with ordinary language philosophy, or to various issues in the philosophy of scoence, such as the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics or the strong sociology of science program, or to the prevalent problem of the hermeneutic circle, but I do hope (largely due to the lack of enthusiasm for some of my recent posts) this email will provoke a few righteous outcries. I hope it is clear that i am implicitly (now explicitly) questioning the usefulness or self-awarefulness of modern analytic philosophy.
 
cheers,
andy.


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