I entirely agree (and never denied) that 'intuitions are relevant in at least some (perhaps all) philosophical fields' - practicle ethics and politics spring immediately to mind. Less obviously intuition is of course massively 'important' in psychoanalysis, which is usually the concern of continentalists. But this does not mean that intuition is taken as a priori intransient or unimpeachable, but rather that it ought to be very carefully studied, and this can only be done by psychoanalysis, psychology, hermeneutic interpretation. This need is particularly relevant if intuition is going to do the crucial work it is often taken to do. This, i suppose, is a moderation of my last flipant comments in that email, designed more to provke response - so now i might argue that this could lead to a reconciliation/reliance/duality/copresence/whatever of continental and analytic philosophy. It seems that perhaps neither account of the world is insufficient.On another issue, the problem i would highlight with OLP is that it can have some seriously relativistic consequences, and some anti-OLP philosophers pin this down to the fact that OLP leaves certain assumtions/intuitions/practices unquestioned. This leads me nicely to a problem i had with what Andrew Bacon said. I am not so sure that modern analytic philosophy has fully succeeded in forging a middle path between the Charybdis of formalism and the Scylla of OLP. My general point is that appeal to unexamined premises starts us on a slippery slope that it is very difficult to halt. Saying that this might mean that we cannot do philosophy does not entail that we can do philosophy. As Andrew Bacon says'In the end if you can't trust your own words then there's very little you can say, you couldn't even formulate the argument that this was the case.'An appeal to the intuition that we do seem to be able to progress and do thing called philosophy (apart from being a bit empirically dubious because of definitions of philosophy and progress etc) must have recourse to pragmatic concerns. And pragmatism too is a slippery slope.Andrew Bacon used the word 'supplement', and etymologically this word can mean arbitrary addition, crucial completion, or complete replacement. And so in a sense i might accept that OLP supplemented early analytics, but i guess not in the sense that he meant. (i am not quite sure what Andrew Bacon was getting at with his short account of causation, but it seemed like he was proposing a pretty extreme linguistic relativism that is not clear elsewhere in his response - i think i may have got this wrong so let me know. Furthermore, historically concurrent events have often been mistakenly linked, as cause and effect have often been confused. I dont think this is necessarily reducible to linguistic drift, particularly with what i would say are undeniable scientific advances. My main problem is that, and this applies to his epistemological example as well, surely Andrew Bacon cannot accept that Truth is reducible to common usage without becoming a pretty extreme relativist.)I do not see how it is possible to disagree with AP but that is because it is tautological and does not say anything but suggest a definition of analysis. Of course, if our analysis of language use contradicts language use the analysis is incorrect, but the analysis of language, unless the argument is circular, is not all there is to philosophy, particularly when the concept of language is reduced, contra so much modern science, to verbal language.i have a feeling i havent really finished this rather sprawling email, but hey.cheers,andy.