Fwd: Re: Underdetermination and Scientific Realism

[N Tasker <pia03nt@sheffield.ac.uk>]

To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS@bups.org



Dear Andrew,

Thank you for your comments. 

I'll deal with point 2 first.

Scientific realism as I formulated it in my first e-mail - and as it is often
formulated in the literature (eg. Stanford Encyclopedia
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/) - includes both a
metaphysical and an epistemological thesis. Certainly, if anyone believed that
'all the metaphysical facts are discoverable empirically' then they would be,
as you put it, in deep shit. Fortunately, all the writers I have come across
hold a more subtle position than you consider. A more reasonable claim would be
that scientific theories are generally successful in describing the world
beyond our observations, and that we are capable of discerning which theories
are successful and which unsuccessful in this respect.

I think that once we have made a claim like 'there is a world beyond our
observations', it will be natural to ask 'how do we know?' If no constructive
answer can be given to the latter question, then the prior assertion will look
rather foolish. Epistemological questions like these do belong properly within
the realm of philosophy. Answering them is not the task of deciding which
metaphysically possible world exists, but of establishing criteria for how we
could determine which of them exists. So you can join in with the
epistemological discussion without fear of having to renounce your agnosticism.
We're not doing natural science yet!   

Now for point 1.

I?m intrigued by the arguments you give for the underdetermination thesis, but
I
fear we?re talking slightly at cross purposes. ?In his original e-mail Tasker
denies UT on the basis that under a certain reading of 'equally well supported
by the evidence' you can categorically specify the universe.? I hope I?m not
displaying too much ignorance when I observe that this assertion is one which I
neither understand nor recognise as my own position. The interpretation of
?equally well supported? with which I am concerned in the first e-mail is
elaborated by the following principle of evidence: all and only the observed
instances of a theory?s empirical consequences are confirmatory instances.
While I admit that there may be an indefinite number of theories which are
equally well supported by the data given this principle of evidence, I flat out
deny that the principle is correct.

I intend to reflect on the arguments you give for underdetermination, and I?ll
try to get back to you on them in a day or two. In the meantime, I?ll just note
one point about argument (a). It seems that the structure of time ? in the
sense you describe ? would be more a matter for metaphysics than for natural
science. So the fact that the empirical evidence underdetermines theory choice
in this case need not threaten the rationality of choice between theories in
the day to day world of natural science. 

Thanks,
Nick




Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml