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Re: Philosophy general debate
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Hi Daniel,
Perhaps you could explain the notion of implicit/explicit question begging for
those of us who do not have easy access to JSTOR outside of term time? What you
said here seems to make little sense to me:
"I understand a form of implicit question begging to be where one tries to
counter a proposition - however false - by simply making a claim that requires
the denial of the presuppositions of that propositions. Those presuppositions
need removing via a separate argument."
Any true counterexample to a proposition requires the denial of that proposition
(and its presuppositions). That's what a counterexample is intended to do. What
you seem to be saying is that the method of using counterexamples is always
question begging (in fact I've already said any valid argument is question
begging in this silly sense). If by 'requires' you do not mean 'entails the
falsity of' then what do you mean?
As for 'all trees are plants', its not always clear whether it's a case of
conceptual analysis or empirical investigation. Similar things have been said
about 'all men are mortal'. I always find these claims a bit fishy, but in this
case it definitely seems to be on the side of conceptual analysis. It all gets a
bit complicated when we imagine Kripke style thought experiments where
scientists discovered oak trees actually have brains deep inside them and are
capable of complex thought. I suspect in this case, if we were to stop calling
them plants we would cease to call them trees too. I can think of no discovery
which would refute 'all trees are plants'.
Andrew
> To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS@bups.org
>
>
> Hi,
>
> I'm not sure what i've said about question-begging has been addressed.
> Perhaps it is too controversial to call implicit question-begging by that
> title. (I understand a form of implicit question begging to be where one
> tries to counter a proposition - however false - by simply making a claim
> that requires the denial of the presuppositions of that propositions. Those
> presuppositions need removing via a separate argument.)
>
> To get rid of what i'm saying someone has to argue either that an argument
> following a form that I have called (following Wright[2000], amongst others
> - try McKinsey[?1997]*) 'implicit question-begging' can suceed in being
> cogent - that your opposition would be compelled by reason to accept it...
>
> OR work out why someone might hold that 'not all trees are plants' and
> argue (with due care and attention to question-begging issues) that those
> reasons are spurious somehow. If they have no reasons, then as much as you
> might convince the rest of the world, you won't convince the
> tree-semantics-sceptic. You don't need to convince me because i've already
> convinced myself and agree with you.
>
> *I find AGs notion of empirical evidence quite astounding that we have
> empirical evidence for the proposition that trees are plants - surely its a
> conceptual claim? Perhaps he is trying to say that we have evidence that we
> have evidence that people operate under acceptence of this conceptual claim
> - he's not wrong. He and I do, and I suppose most do. However, all this
> shows is that *we* hold a claim that is contra to the
> tree-semantics-sceptic. This doesn't apply 'reasonable force' to the
> sceptic to relinquish his (ludicrous) proposition - and that is surely our
> aim.
>
> Cheers,
> Daniel
>
> P.S. I get the impression (as yet not secure) that much of what is at stake
> here has been found in Wittgenstein's PI and RFM by Kripke in 'Wittgenstein
> on Rules and Private Language' (1982), and has been discussed since then by
> McDowell, Petit, Wright and loads more.
>
>
>
>
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--
Andrew Bacon
Lady Margaret Hall
07830048336
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900
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