Re: Philosophy general debate

[Andrew Bacon <andrew.bacon@lmh.ox.ac.uk>]

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On second reading perhaps I have misunderstood your notion of 'presupposition'.
I have assumed that if P is a proposition and X is the conjunction of its
(finitely many) presuppositions, then X entails P. Of course if you refute P you
refute X, but suspect now you mean something different by presupposition.
Perhaps you could clarify?

Andrew B

> To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS@bups.org
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I'm not sure what i've said about question-begging has been addressed. 
> Perhaps it is too controversial to call implicit question-begging by that 
> title. (I understand a form of implicit question begging to be where one 
> tries to counter a proposition - however false - by simply making a claim 
> that requires the denial of the presuppositions of that propositions. Those 
> presuppositions need removing via a separate argument.)
> 
> To get rid of what i'm saying someone has to argue either that an argument 
> following a form that I have called (following Wright[2000], amongst others 
> - try McKinsey[?1997]*) 'implicit question-begging' can suceed in being 
> cogent - that your opposition would be compelled by reason to accept it...
> 
> OR work out why someone might hold that 'not all trees are plants' and 
> argue (with due care and attention to question-begging issues) that those 
> reasons are spurious somehow. If they have no reasons, then as much as you 
> might convince the rest of the world, you won't convince the 
> tree-semantics-sceptic. You don't need to convince me because i've already 
> convinced myself and agree with you.
> 
> *I find AGs notion of empirical evidence quite astounding that we have 
> empirical evidence for the proposition that trees are plants - surely its a 
> conceptual claim? Perhaps he is trying to say that we have evidence that we 
> have evidence that people operate under acceptence of this conceptual claim 
> - he's not wrong. He and I do, and I suppose most do. However, all this 
> shows is that *we* hold a claim that is contra to the 
> tree-semantics-sceptic. This doesn't apply 'reasonable force' to the 
> sceptic to relinquish his (ludicrous) proposition - and that is surely our 
> aim.
> 
> Cheers,
> Daniel
> 
> P.S. I get the impression (as yet not secure) that much of what is at stake 
> here has been found in Wittgenstein's PI and RFM by Kripke in 'Wittgenstein 
> on Rules and Private Language' (1982), and has been discussed since then by 
> McDowell, Petit, Wright and loads more.
> 
> 
> 
> 
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-- 
Andrew Bacon
Lady Margaret Hall
07830048336
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900



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