Re: Faith: rational or irrational?

[Andrew Bacon <andrew.bacon@lmh.ox.ac.uk>]

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Yes this is a very good point. If you think the probability of God existing is
very small but you (attempt) to believe in him because you see the expected gain
is good, then you can't really be said to believe in him, since you still
ascribe his existence a low probability. Pascal's reasoning does not increase
your degree of belief in God's existence, your credence could well remain the same.

Also, I have had a little think about Pascals wager and it would appear that
there may not be expected gain after all. If you believe in the genuine
metaphysical possibility of the existence of God (provided being God does not
entail 'necessarily exists', or else you could run a variant of the Ontological
Argument to prove he's necessarily non-existent), then presumably you are also
committed to the metaphysical possibility of Lucifer. My idea is basically that
for every possibility in which belief in God is beneficial there is an equal an
opposite possibility which cancels it out, i.e. one in which you are actually
praying to a Satanic type God, one who will banish you to an eternity of pain if
you believe in him. If you calculate the expected gain, it will be zero, since
an eternity in hell would surely cancel out eternity in heaven. 

This Satanic possibility of God might seem a bit unlikely, but remember we're
only talking about possibility, and I suspect the existence of a benevolent God
is equally unlikely. If this still sounds far fetched we could probably run it
with a real example:

Suppose I have run through the reasoning of Pascal's wager and I come the
conclusion 'I need God!'. Next problem... which religion should I adopt? They
all seem to posit God(s) so it seems that choice is equally divided between
them. For simplicity let us suppose its just between Christianity and Islam. Now
one of my parent's American friends once told me that all non-christian
religions are satanic and would land you in hell (as would playing card games).
I suspect there are similar perspectives coming from some Muslims. So assuming
these two are right, your choice between Islam and Christianity is 50/50, i.e.
probability of Islam, p, and probability of Christianity, q, are equal. Then
going for Islam has expected gain p*(eternal heaven) + q*(eternal hell), but
this equals = 0 since p=q and (eternal heaven)= -(eternal hell). Similarly for
Christianity.


As for evidence, I don't think the lack of evidence for the existence of
something can be taken as evidence for its non existence. The fact that I've
never walked into the number 1 does not mean it does not exist. Take neutrino's
for example, they rarely causally react with anything, it can't be too much of a
stretch of the imagination to imagine a particle that does not interact at all!
Its completely causally inert, therefore we have no evidence for it, but neither
do we have evidence against it. For me such a particle is a metaphysical
possibility, which is outside the realm of science. The reason we do not posit
such particles is they seem superfluous. Its an application of Ockham's Razor.
There's no rational reason to believe in these particles, yet there are for
numbers (the quantifiers in physical theories range over numbers).

Andrew


> Andrew, I think I disagree about you as regards evidence for the
> non-existence of God. Were there a God I think that perhaps there would be
> some tangible evidence of his existence, for example, he might intervene in
> human affairs in order to bring about certain effects. There is no such
> evidence, and this lack of evidence I take as some degree of evidence for
> the non-existence of God. Sure this is isn't evidence of the strongest kind,
> but I think it is some kind of evidence. I'm not entirely sure about this
> though, so please feel free to disagree.
> 
> As regards this Pascal's wager, I suppose that it makes some kind of sense.
> However, I'm not sure about its "psychological feasibility." I can see that
> it would be a good idea to believe in God "just in case" but I think that
> nature has caused me at least to believe when I have evidence, consequently
> I cannot just make myself believe in God, just because in theory it is the
> sensible thing to do. The idea that to a large degree we decide which
> beliefs we have is a myth.
> 
> I'm also not sure whether believing in God just in case is quite the same as
> believing in God for the reasons that genuinely religious people might give.
> But maybe this is the same problem as the previous paragraph. Seeing that
> you should hold certain beliefs doesn't quite cut the mustard. When Newton
> hung up a horseshoe for luck "just in case" it was OK, since that didn't
> require him to actively believe in its efficacy: if the superstition was
> correct it would work nevertheless. However belief in God requires actually
> believing it, and so long as you have in your mind "this is the sensible
> thing to do since if God doesn't exist, but if He does, however improbable,
> then I win big time" then you clearly have huge amounts of doubt about its
> truth; since you are just being pragmatic because of your doubts (you are
> having to convince yourself it is worthwhile to believe in God), so you
> don't really believe after all.
> 
> So: I think there are two distinct problems with Pascal's wager. Firstly, as
> a matter of human psychology, we cannot just make ourselves believe
> something to be true, just because we want to (cf Wittgenstein's
> interpretation of the Moorean argument about scepticism: no matter what
> Moore just could not make himself doubt the existence of his hand, no matter
> what the theory. I think W also thought that were Moore to doubt his hand's
> existence he'd doubt loads of stuff necessary to set up the sceptical
> argument. Whatever, on a practical level, he just couldn't do it). Secondly,
> if you have the reasoning of Pascal's wager in your mind when you believe in
> God, what you are doing is weighing up which it would be better to believe
> on expected utility or expected something anyway, you are doing this because
> you do not immediately or already believe in God, since if you did believe
> in God, you would not resort to Pascal's wager to do so, hence if you
> "believe" because of Pascal's reasoning you doubt it too much to actually be
> said to believe it.  So whatever the theoretic virtues of Pascal's wager I
> am not sure that it is of much use in practice.
> 
> Finally, I am not sure God would be best pleased at your heavy pragmatism RE
> His own existence. He might send you to Hell anyway for taking the piss!
> 
> M.
> 
> 
> On 24/08/06, Andrew Bacon <andrew.bacon@lmh.ox.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email:
> > BUPS-DIS@bups.org
> >
> >
> > Hi there Elaine,
> >
> > I'm an agnostic and an atheist - and this is a consistent combination as
> > I'll
> > explain later. (An agnostic says we do not *know* if god exists or not,
> > and an
> > atheist *believes* God does not exist. As we all know, knowledge has
> > stronger
> > truth conditions than belief).
> >
> > In particular the following hold concerning my beliefs:
> > 1) 'I do not believe that god exists'
> > And more importantly, a logically stronger fact (careful of the scope
> > distinction):
> > 2) 'I believe that god does not exist'
> >
> > My disbelief in God is not based on evidence. The existence of God (as a
> > metaphysical claim) is unverifiable, there is no evidence that could
> > refute or
> > support it. The Vienna Circle would say that the existence of God is thus
> > meaningless since it has no verification conditions (but they had their
> > semantics back to front anyway). In contrast I would say the existence of
> > God is
> > a genuine metaphysical possibility, and as such there is no way we can
> > decide
> > whether our world is a God world or not. Therefore I am agnostic, I accept
> > that
> > there is no way in which I can *know* whether God exists or not.
> >
> > Yet I still *believe* he doesn't exist. And as I have already said, this
> > belief
> > is not based on empirical evidence. Note also this point has nothing to do
> > with
> > the metaphysical point above, this has to do with rationality. My belief
> > (I
> > claim) is rational via an application of Ockham's Razor. As Laplace once
> > retorted when Napoleon queried the role of God in his mechanics, "Sir, I
> > had no
> > need of that hypothesis". And we don't. It would be irrational to posit
> > tooth
> > fairies when we already have an explanation as to why leaving teeth under
> > your
> > pillow resulted in 50p in the morning.
> >
> >
> > As for Pascal's wager... I think you're onto something at the end of your
> > e-mail. Pascal's wager seems to provide a reason to *have* a belief in
> > God,
> > rather than a reason to believe in God. However, I'm not sure how well
> > this
> > distinction holds up. "I have a belief in God" and "I believe in God" seem
> > to be
> > synonymous.
> >
> > One thing I will say of Pascal's wager is if you are of my disposition,
> > i.e. you
> > believe in the metaphysical possibility of God, it would seem you should
> > believe
> > in him. The loss is 0, and the gain infinite (if gain is measured in years
> > of
> > 'life'), therefore however slim the probability, say it is p, it will
> > always be
> > the case that p*0 < p*infinity. That is, the expected gain is infinitely
> > better!
> > Perhaps I am being irrational for not believing in God? I haven't made
> > sense of
> > this yet.
> >
> > Anyway, to summarise, I would like to know what other people make of
> > Pascal's
> > wager. Am I being irrational? Also I would be interested as to whether
> > Pascal's
> > wager provides a reason to believe in God or not? Does the distinction
> > between a
> > reason to believe in God and a reason to *adopt* a belief in God stand up
> > to
> > scrutiny?
> >
> > Andrew
> >
> >
> >
> > > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email:
> > BUPS-DIS@bups.org
> > >
> > >
> > > Faith: rational or irrational?
> > >
> > > Should faith, which seems necessarily to involve some element of
> > uncertainty
> > > ? some blindness on the part of the believer ? always be non-rational
> > (or
> > > even irrational) or does it involve some rational calculation?
> > >
> > > [Disclaimer: I?m often confused about how to read Kierkegaard. I?m aware
> > > that the following presents just one reading. But it is the idea itself
> > in
> > > which I?m interested, not really the accuracy of the literary
> > interpretation
> > > ? heresy, I know?]
> > >
> > > Kierkegaard is famed for arguing that faith defies rationality, for, in
> > order
> > > to be faith rather than knowledge, the commitment cannot be based on
> > evidence.
> > > In this sense it is ?blind?. Reacting against the more traditional
> > rationalist
> > > approach (especially when it was applied to religious belief), he
> > abhorred
> > > the idea that someone could claim to have a faith in God based on
> > evidence
> > > or logic, a notion exemplified by Pascal?s Wager, which reasoned that
> > being
> > > part of a Faith was the safer option. Briefly, the reasoning runs: If
> > you
> > > are wrong and there?s no God or Afterlife, then you haven?t lost much,
> > whereas
> > > if you are right and God does exist, then you are rewarded greatly
> > rather
> > > than being severely punished as those would be who did not follow him.
> > For
> > > Kierkegaard this was a superficial and selfish way to live based on
> > scientific
> > > evidence or calculation rather than on character and faith. As a result,
> > > his writings distinguish between objective truths which he sees as the
> > information
> > > we gain through science, rationality and other worldly observations, and
> > > subjective truths, recognized through passion, conviction and faith.
> > >
> > > ?the objective way of reflection leads to the objective truth, and while
> > > the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also
> > becomes
> > > indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective validity;
> > for
> > > all interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity.  The way
> > > of objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to
> > historical
> > > knowledge of different kinds; and always it leads away from the subject,
> > > whose existence or non-existence, and from the objective point of view
> > quite
> > > rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent.? Concluding Unscientific
> > Postscript
> > >
> > > Specifically on faith he states:
> > >
> > > ?Faith does not simply result from scientific enquiry; it does not come
> > directly
> > > at all?Rather it is the case that in this voluminous knowledge, this
> > certainty
> > > that lurks at the door of faith and threatens to devour it, [the
> > believer]
> > > is in so dangerous a situation that much effort will be needed, in great
> > > fear and trembling, lest he fall victim to the temptation to confuse
> > knowledge
> > > with faith.? Concluding Unscientific Postscript
> > >
> > > However, another important aspect of subjective truth is that it
> > requires
> > > a full commitment. It makes no sense to say ?I believe that pigs can
> > fly,
> > > but I?m probably wrong?, for the element of doubt means that it is not
> > full
> > > belief. Thus for a truth to be fully subjective, there must be no
> > reliance
> > > on objective evidence and no element of doubt.
> > >
> > > ?if [the believer] had assumed [belief] by virtue of any proof he would
> > have
> > > been on the verge of giving up his faith.? Concluding Unscientific
> > Postscript
> > >
> > > Herein lies a problem for me. I don?t understand how one can allow for
> > doubt
> > > in the certainty of the belief without requiring some rationality, by
> > which
> > > the doubt can be dealt with or overcome. I fail to see how the ?blind?
> > faith
> > > so far discussed is anything but tenacity. The believer, to have real
> > faith,
> > > must surely recognize that his belief is epistemologically uncertain;
> > otherwise
> > > it would seem (to him) to be in the same category as the objective truth
> > > which Kierkegaard argues destroys faith. Tenacity lacks the
> > epistemological
> > > value of faith because it takes into account neither the subjective
> > ?passion?
> > > of belief nor the objective justification.
> > >
> > > We needn?t only consider religious faith here either. I think that the
> > debate
> > > can be applied to any epistemologically uncertain or seemingly
> > non-provable
> > > belief. Many people would accept the rational element of faith in a
> > theory
> > > for day-to-day, scientific or otherwise academic beliefs, but not allow
> > a
> > > rational component of religious Faith (capital f). Is this justified? ?
> > many
> > > people claim to experience God just as clearly as they experience the
> > material
> > > processes of science. It?s not clear to me that people have less of a
> > justification
> > > to look for reasons to believe in God than they do to believe scientific
> > > theories.
> > >
> > > For the record, I don?t think Pascal?s Wager provides rational reason
> > for
> > > faith ? it?s more of a rational motivation to try to come to faith.
> > However,
> > > I think it does emphasize the requirement for recognizing uncertainty
> > and
> > > acting upon it rationally.
> > > So, what do you think?  Must faith involve rationality?  Must it
> > preclude
> > > it?
> > >
> > > -Elaine
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > [I?m eager to avoid the following discussion becoming a theist-bashing
> > exercise,
> > > so could we focus on the question of whether or not faith should be
> > rational,
> > > not whether people are correct to believe in God? Thank you :-) ]
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ___________________________________________________________
> > >
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> >
> > --
> > Andrew Bacon
> > Lady Margaret Hall
> > 07830048336
> > http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900
> >
> >
> >
> > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing
> > list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml
> >

-- 
Andrew Bacon
Lady Margaret Hall
07830048336
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900



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