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Proper Names, Definite Descriptions, and Scope
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Hi guys,
Just thought I'd send some of my thoughts on proper names, if you want to skip
the introduction about Kripke and proper names scroll down to the bit I've
marked with ==== signs.
Kripke famously argued that the Russellian notion that proper names definite
descriptions in disguise is false.
He gives two arguments to this effect: the modal argument and the epistemic
argument. In the former he argues that proper names are rigid designators,
designating the same object in every possible world, while definite descriptions
generally are not. For example if the DD for 'Gödel' is 'the author of the
incompleteness theorems' then first term refers to Gödel in all possible worlds,
but the second term changes reference in a world where say I (yes, a wishful
world) proved the incompleteness theorems.
In the epistemic argument he shows that whatever description we give to a proper
name, there is situation that might actually obtain (for all we know), in which
the description fails to designate the correct person. For example if the
description associated with 'Gödel' is the author of the incompleteness
theorems, if it turned out Gödel had stolen credit for them from Schmidt,
'Gödel' would still refer to Gödel and not Schmidt.
Since Kripke's lectures both these objections have been countered. The modal
problems with the use of definite descriptions with world indexed properties
(Plantinga) or with hidden indexicals like 'actually' (Linsky). The epistemic
problems can simply be countered by using the true account of how names refer in
the description. For example, if Kripke's account (the causal chain account) is
true, then 'Gödel' means 'the (actual) person standing in a Kripkean causal
chain to the name 'Gödel''.
But what is the benefit of treating proper names as definite descriptions? Well,
there are three puzzles it solves, and these are roughly equivalent to Russell's
three puzzles for definite descriptions:
1) 'Lois Lane doesn't believes that Superman is Clark Kent'
2) 'Father Christmas has a beard'
3) 'Sherlock Holmes does not exist'
The first is known as 'Frege's' puzzle. If names do not have sense as Kripke
would have it, then 1) ascribes Lois Lane the belief that Superman is self
identical. 2) is a problem for if we look through the things that have a beard
we don't find Father Christmas and if we look through the things that *don't*
have a beard we don't find him either. So it would appear that 'Father Christmas
has a beard' is false *and* 'Father Christmas doesn't have a beard' is false.
Lastly, surely 3) is true? But if 'Sherlock Holmes' refers directly then its a
meaningless sentence.
=========================
Alot of the discussion centres around whether *proper names have a sense*.
However, there seems to me to be another good reason to prefer the definite
description account: proper names seem to have scopes.
Firstly there is this quote from the SEP entry on propositional attitude reports:
?It could bethat Lois spots a man walking in the corridor, and makes a height
judgment that leads her to say two things:
? He is taller than Superman.
? He is not taller than Clark Kent.
I might recognize the man in question as Rudy Sanchez, someone known to me and
the people I am speaking to, but unknown to Lois (outside of the brief sighting
in the corridor). I can then make these attributions:
? Lois believes that Rudy Sanchez is taller than Superman.
? Lois believes that Rudy Sanchez is not taller than Clark Kent.
Is this acceptance or doxation? It seems that it must be both, because the name
?Rudy Sanchez? is not being used to indicate Lois's mode of representation of
the individual, but the names ?Superman? and ?Clark Kent? are (according to a
theorist who might find this ambiguity theory attractive)."
If we allow names scope we can read this as:
(Rudy Sanchez x)[Lois believes that (Clark Kent y)[x is not taller than y]].
Secondly, the problem with 'Father Christmas has a beard' *and* 'Father
Christmas doesn't have a beard' both being false can be dealt with if we treat
it as a scope distinction.
(Father Christmas x)¬Beard(x)
¬(Father Christmas x)Beard(x)
Lastly, it seems that proper names meld with quantifiers seamlessly:
'Peter and several of his friends went to the pub'
So it would be helpful if 'Peter' was treated as a quantifier, since 'several of
his friends' and 'peter and several of his friends' are both quantifiers.
If proper names are treated as DD's then we get all of these nice properties.
What do you guys think?
--
Andrew Bacon
Lady Margaret Hall
07830048336
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900
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