Subjectivity and suicide

I think Mathew?s comments represent something of a false start to the discussion. His position seems to be, broadly speaking, that whether life is worth living is a purely ?subjective? issue. That is to say that, ultimately, the question can be reduced to one of personal ?attitude? toward life, something which no external discussion can affect. I would argue contrary to this that in the case of an individual?s life what matters involves more than what they happen to ?think? or ?feel? about their life?s value. This comes from an approach that regards ?objective? and ?subjective? conditions of value not as ?separate? but, rather, as in reality, interrelated and irreducible aspects of one another. Consequently, on this view, no valuation of a life could ever be purely subjective, any more than it could be purely objective, and any genuine analysis must instead begin from an understanding of the interrelations between these two aspects.

To demonstrate this consider the case of an individual whose life consists of working in a demeaning job and watching pornography, yet is someone who views his own life as ?valuable?, that is; he affirms his own life. In this instance we can discuss a number of factors in his life outside his own ?subjective view? that are relevant. We might point out, that having meaningful relations with other human beings is an important constituent part of a valuable human life, and that this is something he lacks. Here it is clearly not a purely subjective issue as to whether television and pornography provide such relations; they manifestly do not. Perhaps, Mathew might say, there is no ultimate ?proof? that meaningful relations contribute to a valuable human life. But then again there is no ultimate ?proof? that Brecht is more valuable than East-enders, yet we can reasonably make that assumption, without requiring a standard of ?ultimate? objectivity. Further, as this example goes to show, philosophy, and art, can shed light on the value of human life, and potentially change our outlook, even in the absence of ultimate objectivity. For example, if we believe that genuine human communication is impossible, and that human relations are doomed to in-authenticity, then a case for human life being worthwhile, in general, is seriously undermined.

Another deficiency of Mathew?s approach, and one he shares with most British economists and political scientists, is that he does not attempt to ask why people hold the beliefs or attitudes that they do. If he did enquire, he would discover that most people considering life ?worthwhile? is not an _expression of some purely subjective ?taste? or ?preference?, but rather a reflection of both the society in which they live, and the condition of living itself. To explain: since most people take life as given, and, unless in extreme circumstances, do not consider suicide an option, they are compelled, in order to avoid despair, to reconcile themselves to existence. It also goes without saying that society, for its own continuation and survival, encourages people to see the existing ?way of life?, as well as life in general, as essentially affirmative. That individuals then might, out of necessity and suggestion, be reconciled to life therefore says precious little about whether their lives, or life in general, is worth living. [Indeed it is in-itself a depressing fact that people leading oppressive lives can be so convinced of their own ?happiness?]

I should also point out, against what Mathew has said, that my concern was never primarily with whether any particular life might be worth living, but whether life in general could be affirmed. Naturally the two questions are connected, but the difference with the latter is that draws attention to the general features, and nature, of human life, and of a particular historical situation, as opposed to any individual?s preferences or attitudes. I say this because I think the former question opens up a more productive, and interesting, line of debate than the familiar ?does someone have a right to kill themselves?, ?should you be allowed to die if your severely ill? and ?are any values ultimately objective? discussions. Moreover this former question demands a response that attempts to engage with, rather than suppress, the reality of our place in a process of historical and social development, as well as that of our essentially problematic human nature.