Re: A predisposition to relativism?

["Pete Wolfendale" <pete.wolfendale@gmail.com>]

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I'm going to stick out my neck at this point and admit that I am a
moral relativist. How can this be? Perhaps because the relativism I
ascribe to is not the relativistic straw man which seems to be being
attacked here. Let us try to characterise this straw man. I believe it
is not necessarily the basic tenets of the position which the straw
man has wrong:

- There are no absolute moral truths and no particular moral system
has any kind of metaphysical priority over any other. All judgments
regarding the value of particular moral
statements/attitudes/beliefs/etc. are always based upon an already
existing moral context from which it is impossible to extricate
oneself entirely.

Rather, the problem is what we characterise as the wider consequences
of this position:

- Thus there can be no moral judgments that are based on anything but
prejudice or sentimentality.

I certainly do not hold this to be the case, and I doubt that those
you have characterised with a predisposition to relativism do either
(though I may be wrong). The problem is that often in the
philosophical community simply accepting the position, or something
like it, is simply assumed to equate with the latter, or some form of
nihilism.

It is at this point where it would be wise for me to lay out why I
think that this consequence does not follow from my position, but it
will in fact be useful for me to further examine those with the
relativistic predisposition.

I have a well thought out pattern of reasoning as to why I can hold my
relativist position and still take part in moral disourse, those with
a simple disposition do not necessarily have anything similar. This
does not mean that they are nihilist-relativists or whatever you would
call them, I imagine they do still engage in moral discourse, probably
more than most given their status as philosophy students.

It is very easy to hold this laissez faire relativist position where
the rough tenets of moral relativism are compatible with getting on
with your daily life in pretty much the same way as if you would
before, making justifcations for your actions and what-not. In fact,
there is a sense in which, as has been correctly pointed out, a well
educated, secular society, in its general adversity to dogmatism,
encourages such a position. This is not in itself a bad thing. Such
societies encourage such positions precisely because they allow for a
plurality of positions and encourage debate between them.

The problem, and I think this is where most of the objections to moral
relativism stem from, is that this can sometimes result in doing the
opposite, i.e., ending debate at certain issues. This is because the
respect which must be given to the opposing position within a debate,
which is necessary for a proper discussion to ensue, can be
overextended. This can be expressed as the move from: 'You have the
right to hold that position', to 'I can't tell you that you are wrong
in holding that position'. Obviously, this tendency is
counterproductive, but I would suggest that it is not necessarily the
root of a relativistic disposition in all cases, but rather can be an
unfortunate overextension of such.

My own position is that relativism should not prevent argument, but
merely make us sensitive to its conditions. That is, it is not
impossible to compare moral stances or cultures, but such comparison
requires a prior context of agreement which includes a whole range of
concerns and practices, or to throw in that Wittgensteinian word, a
form of life. Nor is it impossible to change a culture or moral
position for the better, because, as our discourse shows, our notions
of better or worse are perfectly useable despite not being
supra-contextual.

Essentially, we can approach morality from a rational perspective, we
simply have to understand that our reasoning does not give us access
to some fundamental moral or metaphysical structure of the world, but
rather is itself dependent on the same social structures that our
morals are. As such we should be aware that there is no end to
argument, no final set of moral prescriptions at which we can rest,
but that we will have to continue reasoning about our actions, both
individual and collective, as our societies continue to change and
develop.

This is sort of the Wittgensteinian view that has been discussed (or
is at least Wittgenstein inspired), although obviously I would not
classify it as some kind of non-metaphysical objectivism.


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