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RE: "Doing" Epistemology?
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Dear All,
Dan,
Here?s the strategy of my *argument.* If I can find just *one* distinctively
epistemological meta philosophical question, it will establish there can be
distinctive epistemic meta philosophical questions.
Take the neutrally formulated Meta philosophical questions:
(a) ?what are the conditions of sense for ?.??
We *can* apply this neutral *question* to domain of epistemology, in the
following way:
(a*) ?what are the conditions of sense for the term ?justification???
We can put this latter question to many different philosophical disciplines.
When we do meta ethics we can ask (a*) because in ethics we talk about what
justifies a persons actions. Perhaps the answer given in the ethical context
will be different to the answer given in the epistemic context. Perhaps not.
(a*) is not a meta question that can only be asked of epistemology, is the
point.
So to another example. In its general form:
(b) what are the conditions of the possibility of the practice of ?.
In an epistemological form:
(b*) ?what are the conditions of the possibility of the practice of
epistemology?
Can we put the latter question to any other disciplines of philosophy? I
think not. When im doing meta ethics, wouldn?t it be quite out of place to
ask the ?what are the conditions of the practice of epistemology?
And yet (b*) is a meta philosophical question. It *seems* that (b*) can only
be applied to epistemology.
The question (b*) asks is NOT a trivial one. An answer to it could have
*profound* ramifications to our practice of doing epistemology.
what im suggesting is this. There are three classes of question
1. there are general, natural, meta philosophical questions which apply
across the board
2. there are specific meta philosophical questions which apply across the
board
3. there are specific metaphilosphical questions which apply only to
individual, or selected fields.
As to my point about your unintelligibility, you are absolutely right. The
claim ?I take it that epistemology becomes a case study rather than a
specific object of enquiry? is not unintelligible. I was mistaken. It is
just vague. I do not see (a) what exactly you mean and (b) how it is
relevant. If my very simple argument it successful, it proves the antecedent
its false.
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