Thought experiments

["Andrew Turner" <ajturner.email@googlemail.com>]

A not insignificant amount of philososphy, though not just philosophy, involves conducting 'thought experiments' of one sort or another.

 

If they are used merely to guage our intuitions about something, then as a method the thought experiment is fairly benign.

 

If however we are using thought experiments to tell us what must be the case (for example, I can't imagine a world where... so ... is never the case), then it seems there is a danger that the apparent necessity of the experimental results could be nothing more than our own lack of imagination.

 

Does this mean that we should not use this second kind of thought experiment?

 

For example if I can't imagine a mode of representing the world that is not spatiotemporal should my conclusion be:

a) non-spatiotemporal representation is impossible.

b) non-spatiotemporal representation is impossible for humans, but might be available to other possible beings.

c) non-spatiotemporal representation is impossible for me, but others might be able to manage it.

d) non-spatiotemporal representation is impossible for me, but not necessarily, because if I try harder tomorrow theres the possiblilty I'll realise it isn't.