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Thought experiments iv
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Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?
Parte Ye Forthe
Modal Error
It would be at best premature of Yablo to claim that our modal intuitions
are perfect. In fact he claims nothing of the sort. Even if our modal
intuitions are generally sound we frequently fall into error. Yablo gives
various possible explanations for this. The first explanation is that of a
backing misapprehension.
7) I wrongly conceive p as possible.
8) That p is impossible is implied by q.
9) I believe that q is false, or it is false that
qp, and so I conceive of p despite its
impossibility.i
One alternative to this is to deny the denial and claim that I am simply
unaware that q or qp.
A problem arises for differences in modal intuition, particularly those of
brute disagreement with no obvious difference in the states of the subjects?
information. Yablo offers three strategies:
10) There is no conflict of conceivability intuition. One or both of the
subjects who are at odds is using a different concept of conceivability.
11) The conceivability intuitions are both true but the subjects are in fact
about different propositions.
12) Admit there can be a difference in conceivability intuitions but show
that one (or more) of the intuitions has a defeater, and is therefore open
to doubt.
10) is the strategy used to avoid the counter examples discussed above. 11)
is equivalent to claiming that there are instances in which two disputants
do not in fact disagree at all but are talking about two entirely separate
propositions. 12) is slightly more complicated. It suggests that one of the
disputants may have a false modal belief that may be accounted for by a
backing misapprehension as described above. It is difficult to see however
why the notion of a backing misapprehension is necessary to explain modal
error. The definition of conceivability:
CON) I can imagine a world that I take to verify p.
Already allows for error. That I can imagine a world that I take to verify
p, does not entail that such a world does verify p, although it may do so
with reasonable reliability. I do not think that such a situation requires
any backing misapprehension. If there were a genuine case of a disagreement
of modal intuition (that is a disagreement not explicable by 10) or 11)) 12)
may not be adequate to explain it. One subject may hold a false intuition
without any backing misapprehension. There may be a reason to doubt the
notion of backing misapprehension. It may be argued that:
qp
p

q
Since if q were contingent, it in some possible world p was not
necessary, if that were so in some possible world p is false. If
p is false in any possible world it is not necessary. Therefore any
backing misapprehension which is not the result of flawed reasoning is
itself the result of a backing misapprehension, which in turn is a result of
a still more fundamental backing misapprehension and so on, ad infinitum, or
down to the most fundamental modal intuition. If this is so then it would be
possible for two subjects to be in radical disagreement, each having
contrary intuitions on every modal subject. If there were no empirical data
that ether could draw onii Yablo?s explanations of disagreement would be
inadequate. With this in mind it is possible to reintroduce the circularity
objection. To claim that intuition is sufficient to resolve cases of modal
disagreement is merely to express a preference for one view over another. If
we wish to avoid modal sceptisism by resorting to the claim that intuition
gives a fallible guide to modal facts then a better explanation of modal
error is required.
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