[Bups-dis] Action and conceivability

[lj lj]

Hi Ed,

Sorry for the long delay but I've been changing ISP's and I've not had easy 
access to a machine that could send e-mail.
-

Yes, I see what you are saying but that's exactly why I think that you need 
to be very careful when you talk about conceivability. I mean if X is 
inconceivable then it's inconceivable for any one (including you and me)- 
which makes our giving an analysis of x absurd since we are claiming to give 
an analysis of that which is inconceivable. Of course there is qualified 
conceivability, wherein my conception of x is possible but not actual: for 
example, it might be inconceivable for me right now thatteloprtation could 
occur but later it might very well be conceivable. And I suppose that's 
because conceivability is closely tied to epistemic possibility, insofar 
that what I am able to conceive of depends a great deal on what knowledge I 
possess (and, to a lesser extent, simply the beliefs that I possess).

But back to your definition: I find it very confusing (and I mean no offence 
by that). But I suppose that you are trying to talk about bridges- i.e. one 
can conceive of "willing to raise my arm" as the bridge between not raising 
my arm (or rest) and the raising of my arm. And one can thus avoid making 
mention of causes and effects.

"Admittedly, I was trying to sneak in a determinist claim. My
intuition is just the opposite (or the converse, or whatever): it is
talk of "willing to do x" which is meaningless... We often take if
for granted that we perform action x with full consciousness of our
action schema, from the moment we are doing nothing to the moment we
are performing x, and seldom raise the (justifiable, I believe)
epistemological concern about who or what actually caused the change
of state. "It was me", many would reply "because it felt like it was
me (ie it did not feel like it was a reflex, or someone else moving
my arm". My question is simply, how can you even talk about what it
"feels like" for you to want to do x, or to tell your body to do x,
if you can not conceive of such a sensation. In other words, I think
the statement "it felt like it was me" is simply derived from an
assumption we make to fill in the gaps. Does that make sense?"

Well, let me expand the example using the "bridge" terminology:
Let us assume that I do choose to raise my arm. It follows that I did so 
voluntarily.
Was I conscious that I was willing to raise my arm? Surely, yes.
Do I have to?
Well, voluntary action requires consciousness of options- else how'd you 
choose one action rather than any other (determinism aside)? And so I do 
need to be conscious of my options in order for my action to possibly be 
voluntary (I say "Possibly" because consciousness of options does not entail 
voluntariness of action since I might be fully conscious of my options and 
yet have no free will).
So voluntary action requires free will (whatever that might amount to) plus 
consciousness of ones options (whether one thinks that the latter is a 
precondition of the former is the relevant issue).
Before I try to approach that issue I want to sharply distinguish between 
the decision-making process and the action. I want to talk about the 
decision making process since it's that which seems to have more relation to 
the issue of consciousness being a precondition of voluntary actions.

OK:
You are right if you think that a great deal of human action is involuntary; 
but all human decision-making is voluntary (and therefore conscious). And, 
of course, I am talking about normal people (i.e. not those with brain 
damage or mental illnesses). And I think that's a fair comment since I wish 
to exclude those cases where people act out of compulsion (and they are 
excluded by the first condition of my definition of a 'voluntary decision').

I think that your worry is theoretically a good one but that in practice the 
answer is obvious. Just take the example of breathing: when one breathes 
there is no conscious effort but if one DOES try to exercise conscious 
effort to control ones breathing then there IS a difference of both the 
effort and, for want of a better word, 'directedness' . Of course, it's not 
easy to ARTICULATE what the difference actually is but I take the fact that 
most people can (reliably) RECOGNISE the difference as a sign that there is 
some difference.
Just consider the alternative case where we just act involuntarily (even if 
it's just through lack of consciousness of our options)- does it feel 
different? Well, in a sense, yes. Of course it doesn't feel warmer or 
colder, harder or softer etc. but not all feeling is sensory (e.g. I can 
feel happy or sad). But I guess that's probably all that I can articulate. I 
KNOW that there is a difference because there is some aspect of my 
experience (perhaps that there IS an experience at all when my action is 
voluntary) which is present in the case where my action is voluntary and 
absent when the action is involuntary.

Regards,

Luis.

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