[Bups-dis] How Useful Are Pre-Theoretical Intuitions?
Carl Baker
devils_avocado at hotmail.com
Wed Feb 28 14:13:19 PST 2007
Hi Everyone,We in philosophy often find ourselves appealing to pre-theoretical intuitions about any number of topics. Often we state (explicitly or implicitly) that these intuitions are relevant in the formation of theories; and, often, we reject philosophical theories on the basis of their not according with our pre-theoretical intuitions.I have an idea that pre-theoretical intuitions are of little use when we're debating subjects relating to abstract objects. I haven't had the chance to think this through as much as I'd like, but I'm interested to know what you all think. I'll explain my idea with an example from philosophy of music. Many people are led to reject Platonism about music - the doctrine that musical works are some kind of abstract object - because this position entails that musical works are not created by their composers. It's one of our most deeply-held pre-theoretical beliefs, so the story goes, that musical works are created - and we're told that any adequate theory of music should account for such intuitions.Here's why I think such an argument is wrong. Suppose for argument that musical Platonism is true; musical works are abstract objects. Would we expect, in that case, our pre-theoretical beliefs to point towards Platonism? I think no. Given that Platonistic abstract objects don't causally relate with space-time (not sure I've worded that too well), we in fact have reason to believe that our pre-theoretical beliefs would NOT point towards Platonism. Given the lack of causal relation, why would we expect our beliefs to point towards Platonism? I conclude, then, that arguments from pre-theoretical intuitions can't have any force in debates about abstract objects, because we have reason to believe them unreliable on such matters.As for weaknesses in my position, I wonder if someone might argue that the instantiations (or whatever, depending on how you like your Platonism) of Platonistic objects give us reason to think that our pre-theoretical beliefs WOULD point towards Platonism. But I can't think of a formulation of that argument that would undercut what I've said aboveAny thoughts?All the best,Carl
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