[Bups-dis] The Metaphilosophical Question

[M.Tucker at uea.ac.uk]

I'm just throwing up a few extra points for the earlier comments rather
than attempting to follow any of them though for the moment.

Firstly, the 'inappropriate' comment is clearly a tactical word for the
general public, but essentially the only one they could have used: as her
parents, to simply say that she was wrong would have been an attack on her
when it is clear that their family loyalties should lie with her despite
her views (she is under considerable attack anyway, if her parents had
attacked her publically then that would be pretty serious betrayal!) The
point I'm making is that whatever their personal views are, they have
presumably been asked to give a general statement that I would guess they
would have rather avoided and so they had to be as ambigious as possible.

Secondly, points about not changing his religious views despite
philosophical conclusions is at least highly honest. As a philosopher one
would like to say that we will be commited to whatever is the most
philosophically sound argument. However, that is rarely the case. For one
thing, that would commit most philosophers to universal relativism and
agnostasism (of the kind that you were complaining about in the first
section) - as you say, it is very difficult to claim that you are
philosophically right (and that is a perfectly rational comment)
therefore, being rational, you are commited to recognising that you may be
wrong and that any action you take, believing it to be a correct one,
could in fact be morally abhorent. To claim that one is a devout catholic
but that you could possibly disbelieve them is already to unsubscribe to
devoutness. (to know you believe and that you only believe is to not
believe). My first point here is to say that, even if he was to change his
beliefs as a result of his research, he cannot believe that now. On the
other hand, what is worrying me at the moment is how rarely philosophers
ever change their beliefs. I'm currently reseaching various arguments
about free will and what keeps striking me is the absolute refusal of any
of the philosophers to back down: they will happily concede that they have
made a mistake in their arguments, but not that they are mistaken in their
beliefs. (typically, the history of the arguments will work along the
lines of 1990, A argues X, 1991, B refutes X, 1992, A expands X to account
for B, 1993 B dismisses the expansion, 1994, A changes his argument
completely but still argues for X... etc) Somehow, all of these
philosophers, prior to reaching their conclusions, are commited to their
beliefs that they wish to prove. It worries me, and I just want to get
them all to sit in a room and tell me and each other exactly why they
began their arguments....
I'm not saying that philosophy arguements are entirely subjective, but its
easy to start thinking that way,

Lastly, however, it surely doesn't matter, even if philosophy should be
seen as a science, if we do not reach the truth. The point about sciences
is they are always correcting previous beliefs. The wonderful thing about
philosophy is because it is concerned not just with the answers but with
the method as well, it is far easier to realise if a particular series of
scientific proofs is going the wrong way. You mention that you believe
Aristotle's philosophy to be one of the closest to the truth; I'm sure
that you would concede that there have been developments and revelations
in post-Aristotlian philosophy that, at the very least, develop
Aristotle's arguments. The point about both science and philosophy is that
to undertake it you are acknowledging that you are helping to develop
thought and understanding, not to complete it.

Matthew