[Bups-dis] A problem with philosophy in sophie's world

[lj lj]

Dear Sophie,

That is my mistake then. I do see what you mean when you say it appears 
ironic but I guess that your assumption about what ethics is, is presicely 
why I feel ambivalent about philosophy. You see, I don't see ethics as the 
study of how to live well- that would be an empirical matter. If ethics is 
about anything it is the examination of what goodness and badness are 
in-themselves. Sometimes I think that ethics should be far more than the 
examination of what goodness and badness are in-themselves. As I've 
suggested before, I think that there's something to Plato's view that 
wrong-doing is a matter of ignorance. I do, indeed, think that there's a 
kind of moral knowledge which just is the kind of thing that motivates us to 
do good and be good, and whose absence implies no such motivation. But I 
also think that if that's right then ethics just isn't like that since if it 
were that kind of knowledge then it would entail moral action (of course, 
it's a BIG 'if' as to whether I am right). The problem is obviously that 
studying ethics does not make one a more moral person in that way. Indeed, 
one might wonder about the ability that philosophy gives people to 
rationalise their own immoral actions to both themselves and to others (but 
I suppose that's a side-issue). So that's how I feel sometimes.
But, on the other hand, I often think that the issue of bad actions lays not 
in an ignorance of morality but in the domain of action- i.e. we KNOW what 
the right (or wrong) thing to do is but our problem is with what we actually 
DO. This is not just an oscillation that varies with general mood but also a 
matter of how much I feel inclined to emphasise personal responsibility. 
When I feel less inclined to emphasise personal responsibility then it seems 
easy enough to say that people do wrong because they do not have moral 
knowledge (in a strong sense) and that therefore since the purpose of 
philosophy is to acquire that knowledge, by proxy, it's purpose is to cause 
the philosopher to become a better moral person.
On the other hand, when I do feel inclined to emphasise personal 
responsibility it's a lot harder to say that moral wrongdoing is the result 
of moral ignorance. And thus it's much less clear to what extent 
philosophers should be concerned with making themselves into better moral 
agents purely by virtue of their study and practice of philosophy.
Of course, one might just think that I cannot make up my mind or that I'm 
being inconsistent. But I don't agree. I think that there's a big tendency 
for philosophers and or students to think that they are Vulcans who let only 
reason guide their views. I think that how we feel (and this is not just in 
terms of emotion) plays a tremendous role in what any of us believe and I 
don't see anything wrong in acknowledging that. I might just be abnormal in 
that I feel different ways about issues depending upon how I feel but even 
if I am I think it's only being intellectually honest to recognise that my 
views are influenced that way. I think there's this attitude that in order 
to be a rational being one must hold the same views no matter how one feels. 
So, by all right, I should choose one of my above positions and stick with 
it no matter what I am feeling. But I think that rather assumes that what I 
believe isn't being influenced by my feelings in the first place (and 
remembering that I'm construing 'feelings' in a VERY broad sense). I don't 
think that assumption is right and so no position has any priviledged 
position as far as my feelings go. I also wonder what effect the attitude 
that I have just disagreed with has on the mind of the individual? I mean, 
should philosophy just be about finding a position and sticking to it- in 
the way that Hillary Putnam derises as "being like the purveyor of a brand 
of cornflakes'? Or should philosophy be about finding ways in which we can 
find our place in the world; while recognising that our place in the world 
is not to be understood purely in terms of a relation between an insulated 
individual and an external world but, rather, that the way in which I 
understand the world is determined by the way in which I stand to that world 
which I understand. This sounds, I'm sure, very similar to the preceding 
talk about holism but it's different in an important respect: before it was, 
as far as I understand it, suggested that we could make a move from a claim 
about how knowledge is structured to a claim about the way that the world 
(including us) is structured. My suggestion is rather different in that I am 
making a rather conservative claim that our actual relation to the world 
varies and that therefore our knowledge should reflect that. The suggestion 
I'm making is slightly stronger though in that I want to deny that there is 
any given relation to the world to which is necessarily the one to which our 
knowledge should conform. But bear in mind that this is not the claim that 
there is no fact of the matter. There are indeed relations to which our 
knowledge can and should conform and they might even be objective in a 
strong sense. But what they are not are relations which are necessarily the 
objects of knowledge.

This all can, I think, be understood without the follwoing but I think that 
it helps if one pictures this stuff against the background of what I've said 
about what I think philosophy should be about especially with an eye on 
self-development. I see the above as reflecting what I think is an essential 
flexibility required to live a good life and develop oneself. I don't really 
see much benefit in finding a brand of conrflakes I like and just stikcing 
with it come hell or high-water. I think that sometimes we are indoctrinated 
into assuming that because rationality might require having an objective 
view of the world that therefore that view must remain static (the only 
changes being required simply because we don't have the right view yet). I 
guess I'm saying that I agree that our views must be objective but I deny 
that they cannot and do not change; and obviously I am not willing to simply 
say that when my view changes it is simply because I am wrong about some 
fact of the matter. I agree that there is an objective fact of the matter to 
which my understanding aims but I deny that it always has to be one to which 
my understanding aims.
I don't think that I'm perverting the concept of "objectivism" to suit 
myself because I think that somethings being objective means that there is 
some fact of the matter- and in this case I think that the relation in which 
I stand to the world is a fact of the matter. I just think that the fact is 
liable to change and thefore the fact of the matter of my relation to the 
world changes. I'd like to be able to rescue the situation by saying 
something like: 'well, let's understand 'objective' in the sense of 
objective across observers- so we can look at a given person and try to work 
out what relation they stand in to the world and see if other people agree 
with that assessment'. In that case we'd have a rather stronger sense of an 
'objective relationship' and we could then be in a position where it's 
possible for observers to make a judgement as to which of my relations to 
the world is the right one. But I'm not optimistic about such a possibility 
because I think that the very veil of ignorance which we need inter-observer 
agreement to combat also applies to each observer. It's one thing for 
observers (and I obviosuly mean 'observers' in a non-literal sense) to be 
able to see the various relations in which I stand with the world but on 
what grounds can they pick the right one? It's only if we assume that each 
individual observer has some kind of priviledged access to the right kind of 
relation that they can rationally agree on a particular observed relation of 
mine. But the only reason that we need inter-observer agreement is the 
assumption that there is something necessarily insufficient about the 
viewpoint of an individual. But if that's right then not even a group of 
obersevers can use their own viewpoints as the basis of a judgement about 
which of my relations to the world is the 'right one'. So unfortunately I 
don't see that as a way of restoring a very strong sense of an objective 
relation.

I've probably put everyone to sleep so I'll finish it there for now and 
reply to the rest later.

Regards,

Luis.

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