[Bups-dis] Transformation of the individual
lj lj
johnwayne0071 at hotmail.com
Fri Jul 27 07:54:56 PDT 2007
Greetings,
David-
"The first criticism Luis makes: it does not necessarily follow from the
fact
that understanding is non-atomistic that our relation to the world is
non-atomistic. If though the fundamental idea behind holism, that everything
is
essentially related, is generally true, why shouldnt this apply to the
individual and their relation to the world?"
But that wasn't the argument that I attacked. For sake of clarity let me
define two types of Holism:
1. Metaphysical Holism (MH) - this is the view that all things (or facts, if
you prefer) are inter-related.
The strong version says that all facts stand in necessary relations to one
another; the weak version simply says that some of the relations are
contingent.
2. Epistemic Holism (EH) - this is the view that knowledge of things (or
facts, if you prefer) is or must be inter-related.
The strong version says that all knowledge stands in a necessary relation to
all other knowledge (and thus we end up with an identity); the weak version
says that some of our knowledge is or should be contingently related to
other knowledge.
Now, what you did in your earlier post was move from EH to MH. Now you are
trying to go from MH to EH. That is question begging.
I don't have a burning problem with EH but I don't see any good way to move
from that to MH- that is, unless you want to dissolve the
metaphysical-epistemological distinction.
Similarly, I don't see how there is any non-question begging way to move
from MH to EH.
I mean exactly what kind of argument is there for MH independent of an
argument for EH?
Moreover, my second gripe on that matter was not to do with the move from EH
to MH (and vice versa) but, rather, with assumption that Holism was
incompatible with Atomism. Again, we can draw the same kind of distinctions
for Atomism as I've just done for holism and things seem far less clear-cut.
Why can't I be, for example, a metaphysical-atomist but an
epistemological-holist etc. etc.?
"To take the example of religion: say I have a holistic understanding of
this
area, I view religion as one relational aspect of the development of human
culture/life. As an individual within human culture though, I myself am not
isolated from that process, I cannot avoid being essentially related to
those
developments. On this view my whole relation to the world [as given in
consciousness] is irreducibly bound up with the psychological, social and
cultural relations that went into shaping religion over the past two
thousand
years. As such our relation to religion [not as an abstraction, but in its
full,
real, existence and relations] is necessarily holistic, a purely theoretical
relation, or say purely religious [in the sense a Christian might think
they
have] relation to religion is not, in reality, possible. Further, this
holistic
relation to religion exists whether or not the individual concerned is at
all
aware of this; their consciousness remains related to the
development of religion regardless of whether they know this to be the case"
But this is just re-iteration. Yes, I agree completely that UNDERSTANDING my
relation to the world must be holistic. What I deny is that: a) it entails
MH, and b) that it excludes atomism. I just don't think that you've done any
work to show why EH entails MH. It certainly isn't, as far as I can see,
logically entailed.
Now, when you talk about religion, yes, I agree that being religious is
probably metaphysically holistic in the weak sense- in the same way that
being human involves a metaphysical co-relation of specific physical facts
(i.e. combinations of nucleic acids and all that jazz). But from this an
entailment does not follow because for an entailment you'd need a strong
sense of MH. But the strong sense entails an identity because the strong
sense states that all relations are necessarily relations. So for every
statement P of the form 'A is related to B' (where A and B are things or
facts), P is a necessary truth. If that's right then 'it is not the case
that P' is necessarily false. it follows that 'it is the case that P' is a
necessary truth. So, as far as truth-values go: every statement P, Q, R
(given that Q, R etc. are of the same form as P) and so on have the same
truth-value and they do so necessarily.
If that's right then there's not much room for things like change and
contingency.
So let me just be clear about exactly why I think these relations are
necessary:
if holism is the view that all facts or knowledge are (or should be, in the
case of EH) inter-related then it cannot be the case that P is false
because, obviously, P's being false that would entail that at least one
relation was false (and thus that not everything was inter-related).
The problem is that you clearly want a very strong sense of MH (as when you
say:
"As such our relation to religion [not as an abstraction, but in its full,
real, existence and relations] is necessarily holistic, a purely theoretical
relation, or say purely religious [in the sense a Christian might think
they have] relation to religion is not, in reality, possible. Further, this
holistic relation to religion exists whether or not the individual concerned
is at all aware of this; their consciousness remains related to the"
But as I've suggested, as soon as you start talking about strong holism of
either variety you end up with the problem of relations being necessarily
necessary- i.e. never contingent-, which we don't want. And when one adopts
MH rather than EH then one ends up without even the room to say that our
understanding might be or need to be structured necessarily in a given way
to allow us to accurately access the world and yet and yet the world might
not really be like that.
Regards,
Luis.
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