[Bups-dis] Action and conceivability

[Edward Grefenstette]

Dear BUPSers,

I don't have much time to post this, so forgive me if I do little  
more than throw a malformed idea into the fray, hoping someone will  
have something to say about it (who knows...). I've been thinking  
about the following issue lately (ie. on the train home from work  
yesterday): can you perform an act you cannot conceive of? It is  
trivial to say that, through involuntary reaction (for example), you  
can perform an act you had not previously conceived of, but my  
question is precisely regarding an act you CANNOT conceive of.

Take for example, voluntarily raising your arm. If I voluntary raise  
my arm, then at a particular moment (presumably right before I  
actually lift my arm, or during the act of raising it) I will for my  
arm to be raised. However, while I can conceive of this in functional  
terms, I cannot imagine what it feels like to will my arm to be  
raised, no matter how many times I repeat the action. If you find no  
bone to pick with the above (highly unlikely!) then what does this  
all mean? What can we say about intentionality with regard to first  
order desires? Can consciousness of x be possible without x being  
conceivable? Or would you dissolve the above problem by looking into  
the epistemological aspects behind the question (ie. "Are you really  
conscious of your willing to raise the arm, just because you presume  
you voluntarily raised your arm a moment ago?).

I am eager to hear your thoughts on this.

Best,
Edward.