[Bups-dis] Action and conceivability

[Edward Grefenstette]

Hello Luis,

> What do you mean by "I can conceive of this in functional terms"?  
> Are concepts functional? Yes, they can be but are their contents?  
> I'm not sure what that would even mean.

Perhaps your first question stems from my awkward use of the word  
functional, as I have most likely overlooked a more appropriate term  
in my hurry. I mean that we can conceive of "willing to raise my arm"  
as the intermediary step between "not raising my arm" (neutral state)  
and "raising my arm", ie the cause of the latter, or the causal link  
between the neutral state and the act it is related to (er... I hope  
that doesn't sound too garbagey). In other words, we could conceive  
of "willing to do x" in functional terms in the same way we can  
conceive of pain in functional terms: "pain is what brings us from a  
certain type of state (stimulus, ie stepping on a nail) to another  
(yelling out in pain, holding your foot, etc)".

> I think that there are two broad issues here and I think that the  
> one that is going to be the most problematic is the issue of  
> whether it makes sense to talk about the inconceivable.
> And therein lays the problem with your question: conceivable for  
> whom? Just the agent or anyone whom happens to be observing or just  
> anyone in theory?

Ah yes, this is only about the agent. I mean, perhaps there's  
something to be said about it, but I personally don't see how there'd  
be much point in arguing whether or not I can conceive of what you  
feel when you raise your arm, after observing that raise your arm.  
(Sounds like a debate about qualia... there's enough of that out  
there as it is).

> There's lots that I could say on this topic but I wonder if it  
> might be meaningless.

That's very possible, which is why I suggested that someone a bit  
less fuzzy-brained than I might be tempted to dissolve the problem by  
examining how it is framed, rather than address it. :)

Let me nonetheless attempt to clarify my point a little...

> And by this I'm not sure if it even makes sense to talk about the  
> inconceivable. I mean, does our supposedly detached position really  
> immunise us from the charge that simply TALKING about the  
> inconceivable is meaningless? Isn't this a conceptual analysis that  
> we are attempting to do? And, if so, what would it even MEAN to say  
> that some (voluntary) actions might be inconceivable? That they are  
> actions or not is irrelevant: the issue here is that if they are  
> genuinely inconceivable then they are not conceivable by an agent  
> that is the object of the analysis nor are they conceivable by us  
> who are providing the analysis.

Admittedly, I was trying to sneak in a determinist claim. My  
intuition is just the opposite (or the converse, or whatever): it is  
talk of "willing to do x" which is meaningless... We often take if  
for granted that we perform action x with full consciousness of our  
action schema, from the moment we are doing nothing to the moment we  
are performing x, and seldom raise the (justifiable, I believe)  
epistemological concern about who or what actually caused the change  
of state. "It was me", many would reply "because it felt like it was  
me (ie it did not feel like it was a reflex, or someone else moving  
my arm". My question is simply, how can you even talk about what it  
"feels like" for you to want to do x, or to tell your body to do x,  
if you can not conceive of such a sensation. In other words, I think  
the statement "it felt like it was me" is simply derived from an  
assumption we make to fill in the gaps. Does that make sense?

- Ed.