[Bups-dis] Peter Wolf on Hegel

[Pete Wolfendale]

I've just realized that I didn't post my previous response to the list, but
given that it was rather long and in depth I'll try to summarize Hegel's
general approach (to be more skeptical than the skeptic) and then show where
I think he goes wrong.

It's important to understand that there are two major pillars to Hegel's
philosophy: the Science of Logic and the Phenomenology of Spirit.

The Logic is both his explanation of the necessary categories of thought (a
la Kant) and his ontology, i.e. his description of the fundamental structure
of the world. That these two things coincide is not at all contingent, and
it is in fact the starting point of the Logic; the claim should be
formulated as the identity of thought and Being, meaning that
the fundamental structure of thought and the fundamental structure of the
world are necessarily the same. It is in this very specific sense that Hegel
is an idealist - Being is Thought. The Logic will exhibit a dialectical
structure whereby we start with what can be thought minimally, in
abstraction from all else - absolute, immediate indeterminacy, or Being -
and show how the thought of this transforms itself into the thought of
Nothing, then into Becoming, then Determinate Being, and so on. This is how
Hegel derives the categories of thought, by trying to show that if we just
think what can be thought minimally that we find that thought complexifies
itself and shows us its own necessary structures.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is importantly not a Philosophy of Spirit. Hegel
will write such a book later. Rather, the Phenomenology has a very specific
character, that of justifying the starting point of the Logic. So, if you
think that the Logic is the equivalent of Kant's metaphysical deduction, the
Phenomenology is the equivalent of the Transcendental Deduction. Given that
the Logic is philosophy proper then, the task of the Phenomenology is to
justify the absolute beginning of philosophy. It is is this sense that it
will have to tackle the Agrippan trilemma, which challenges every absolute
foundation.

To restate the trilemma for everyone, it is the problem of how one justifies
any given claim to knowledge (P) without either:-

1) Merely asserting its truth (P) (the horn of assertion).
2) Justifying it on the basis of a further claim (Q -> P), and thus
reintroducing the problem (the horn of regress)
3) Justifying it on the basis of itself (P-> P) (the horn of circularity)

As far as Hegel is concerned, this problem is produced by the Understanding,
which thinks in terms of formal rules. As far as he is concerned, it is only
on the basis of assuming a distinction between form and content, which then
mandates that we treat the content in terms of formal inferences, that
produces the trilemma. Speculative Reason, in opposition to the
Understanding, thinks the dialectical self-complexification of the content
itself, through its self-contradiction.

This all sounds quite odd, and its easy to see why Hegel gets
misinterpreted. Firstly, it's important to forget the idea of thesis,
antithesis, synthesis, which is not Hegel's own description of dialectic,
but that of Engels. This triadic form can in a way be made to fit the actual
movement, but it tends to cause more confusion than it's worth. The much
more important idea through which to understand dialectic is that of
determinate negation.

Determinate negation is the way Hegel takes speculative thought to proceed,
and it is opposed to the abstract negation of the Understanding, which we
would recognise as the law of double negation in formal logic. Abstract
negation, when it negates a particular position (- P) does not itself
mandate a new position, it merely opens up the field to a choice of
positions compatible with the falsity of P. As such, the trilemma always
appears at every point, because whenever there are multiple positions to
choose from, the question of what basis on which we should pick any given
one comes to the fore. On the other hand, determinate negation produces a
new determinate position out of the negation of the previous one. It is for
this reason that in Hegelian dialectic the double negation of a position (-
- P) is not just the initial position, it is in fact a totally new and more
complex content.

This is where a lot of confusion arises, and it is where Hegel is often
taken to be talking pure nonsense. It is thought that Hegel is describing
some kind of bizarre inference (like the rules of Tonk for instance) that
could be applied to any position, and as such could be represented formally
within the rules of formal logic. Obviously, if that were the case, Hegel
would be talking nonsense, but he isn't. Determinate negation is not meant
to be a repeatable formal inference that can be applied regardless of form.
Hegel claims that it only functions on the basis of abstracting from the
form content distinction and just thinking what the content itself
necessitates. In both the Phenomenology and the Logic, this will be to think
the internal contradiction inherent within the content, to make this
implicit contradiction explicit such that we negate the content and produce
a new necessary content. And, just as already explained, this negation of
the contradiction is not a formal reductio ad absurdam, which would give us
a choice of which premise to reject; it excludes other abstract possible
positions we could hold and forces us to think a single new position, that
which is the least we could think.

Now, here is the important bit. Being good skeptics we all recognise that
Hegel has just introduced a whole bunch of claims which we have to accept
before we can get going with Hegelian dialectical thought. But Hegel has an
answer for this, and this is the answer to the trilemma.

Those of us who are not Hegelian speculative philosophers who have
discovered the immanent movement of thought, are in what Hegel calls the
standpoint of natural consciousness, or some variant thereof. Implicit
within this standpoint is the distinction between form and content, and as
such the implicit standpoint of the Understanding. It also contains the
distinction between thought and Being, which Hegel is keen to collapse. It
seems like Hegel is making further assertions here, but he is not so naive,
and to understand this one has to understand the form of natural
consciousness.

Hegel describes the very simple logical form of consciousness as follows:
consciousness distinguishes itself from its object, yet at the same time
relates itself to it. This means that consciousness is consciousness of
something (not necessarily a physical object like a chair or an apple, as
the word object might suggest to us nowadays), and that as relating itself
to this something in its consciousness of it, it is knowledge, i.e. its
knowledge of its object. But, it distinguishes between itself as knowledge
of the object and the object as it is in truth, or in-itself. This is simply
to say that we take ourselves to know something, but also take this
something to be independent of our knowledge, such that our knowledge could
be true or false.

It might be helpful here to think of this as the difference between
representation and represented. On the classical view, that which is
represented provides content which is given form as a representation, which
can then be thought in accordance with formal rules; it is also possible for
the ways we represent the represented to fail to correspond to it (I say
'the chair is red' when it is brown).

There is however an additional dimension to this description, and it is this
which enables Hegel to answer the first two horns of the trilemma. Hegel
points out that it is consciousness which distinguishes _itself_ from its
object, which sets the in-itself over against its knowledge. This means
that:-

1) That consciousness is conscious of itself as distinguished from its
object, making it a limited form of self-consciousness, or rather providing
it with a pre-reflective awareness similar to Kantian transcendental
apperception.

2) The in-itself is not really in-itself, but must be consciousness'
conception of the in-itself. So, consciousness must have a limited
understanding or criterion of truth in order for it to understand the
independence of its object, i.e. in order to understand how its knowledge
could differ from it.

These implications solve the problem of assertion and regress, respectively.


Hegel objects to Kant and Locke on the basis that they try to inquire into
the nature of knowledge before they think they can know anything, and that
this leads them into regress, in that they must inquire into their knowledge
of knowledge, etc. Hegel takes himself to get out of this problem by not
inquiring into the truth of knowledge, or the reality of the relation
between representation and represented, but simply into the way it appears.
Given that on the description of consciousness Hegel is providing
consciousness appears to itself, he need not _assert_ the true nature of
consciousness, all he has to do is describe how it is that we appear to
ourselves, which, given that it is a very simple description, is hard to
deny (I personally think it's pretty solid).

His problem then, is to get us to think through the content of our appearing
to self without assuming anything else, specifically without assuming the
distinction between form and content. This is not to say that he must assume
the absence of a distinction, but simply get us to abstract from it and to
think our appearing to selves properly, which will be the same thing as
being critical of our own self-criticism (being more intensely self-critical
than Kant or Locke). It is in this sense that we do Phenomenology for Hegel,
we think through the appearance of consciousness to itself. Importantly,
this is not like Husserlian phenomenology, in that it is not about paying
attention to our inner experience, but about thinking through the _logic_ of
our experience.

The way this is done is very subtle. Although Hegel has shown us that the
very logical structure of consciousness implies that its in-itself (or
criterion) is for-it (its own conception) and not truly in-itself
(completely independent of consciousness), consciousness itself cannot be
conscious of this. Another way of saying this is that consciousness
suppresses the mediation between the form of its representation and the
structure of the represented. So, one cannot have this implication pointed
out to you and remain natural consciousness (at least in this train of
thought). To put this another way, consciousness is not fully self-conscious
in that it is not conscious of its own self-consciousness, but in becoming
aware of consciousness' self-consciousness and the fact that its criterion
is _always_ for-it, we are transformed into the phenomenologist. The logical
structure of consciousness of which we are now fully conscious becomes the
object of our thought, it becomes in Hegel's terminology the Notion of
Concept of Natural Consciousness, which we will then think immanently. This
means that Hegel has not had to assume any facts about consciousness to get
us to this point, and has avoided the horn of assertion.

If this idea of suppression of mediation sounds strange, consider that we do
this in all discourse. When we talk _about_ things, we abstract from the
possible difference between the form in which we talk about them and the
structure of the things themselves. This is not to say that we can't talk
about the possibility that this is so, contra transcendental realists like
Strawson and to an extent the early Wittgenstein, but rather that even this
talk is itself subject to a different form of suppression, because more
abstract terms are being deployed (like world and representation, as opposed
to say belief and desire). This is another place where I think Hegel has a
fundamentally correct insight that can be built on in interesting ways.

Back to the problem of regress, which is the real thing Matt is interested
in (sorry for taking so long to get here). Given that consciousness is both
conscious of its knowledge and conscious of its criterion of truth, any
comparison between them can take place entirely within consciousness itself,
without any appeal to external positions. So, if we are thinking
consciousness, its possible for us to think through any contradictions that
there might be between its knowledge and its object without having to think
about a real consciousness (i.e., a consciousness situated in a world
looking at a chair or the like). All we need is to start with the most basic
way we can think the simple logical structure of consciousness (which for
Hegel is an 'I' relating to a pure 'this'), and see whether if the
implications of this structure harbor contradictions that would force
consciousness itself to change its knowledge.

So, we think the minimal (immanent) implications of consciousness knowledge,
thus we think explicitly the implicit contradiction between its knowledge
and its object and in this process we negate the knowledge, and out of this
a new determinate knowledge is produced, as the minimal result we are forced
to think on the basis of the negation. To take the example of Sense
Certainty again, we think the simplest form of consciousness as knowing
'this' and its criterion being immediacy and specificity (pure 'thisness' or
haeccaiety). But, we find that the this is implicitly spatio-temporal, it is
a 'this, here and now', and we then find that each of these representations
can apply to any 'this' and as such are not specific. So, we have negated
the first knowledge, and out of this we think consciousness' indexing of its
knowledge to itself, i.e. its knowledge becomes 'this, here and now, for
ME'. This process is of course repeated when it is discovered that the I is
'this I', but we won't go through the whole dialectic.

The important thing is that this movement does not just repeat this formula,
but rather, through the dialectical progression of consciousness' knowledge,
its criterion of truth is itself negated.

This happens because, as has been noted, each determinate negation excludes
all other abstract possibilities, and is as such necessary. This means that
there comes a point at which all possibilities for knowledge under this
criterion of truth have been excluded, meaning that either there is no
knowledge, or that the particular conception of knowledge (i.e. the
criterion) is false. This occurs when the new knowledge which is produced is
not just implicitly contradictory, but explicitly contradicts the criterion,
as such being the negation of the criterion. In Sense Certainty this happens
when the new knowledge that is produced is that of an internally mediated
universal this, or a complex of interrelated here's and now's. This final
knowledge then provides the content of the new criterion, which will require
a sensuously mediated universal (which will in turn be contradicted when a
non-sensuous unconditioned universal is produced at the end of Perception).

Yet, this is still not the full description of the movement of the
Phenomenology. There is not just a dialectic of knowledge, which constitutes
a dialectic of the criterion or conception of knowledge. The dialectic of
the criterion exhausts its possibilities in exactly the same way as that of
the knowledge, and thus reveals a further criterion for the judgment of
criterion, which is negated, and which thus produces another dialectic. This
happens at the end of the Consciousness section, and results in the
comparison changing from that of knowledge with criterion of truth to desire
with criterion of satisfaction.

I won't give you a walk through of how many higher dialectics get produced,
partly because I haven't worked it out exactly, but I'm pretty sure this is
how the Phenomenology works. If we think of it in opposition to the
skeptical regress, we can see that it is a turning of the regress in on
itself, so as to produce a progressive movement that creates new content.
What I mean by this, is that rather than at each point repeating the same
move (What criterion (1) is there to choose between P and -P, what criterion
is there to choose between criterion 1 and not criterion 1, etc.) which is a
purely abstract static movement, we criticise this structure itself, as it
is found implicitly within our ordinary conception of representation
(Hegel's concept of natural consciousness). In immanently criticising the
very form of self-criticism, we do not constantly ask for a new external
criterion to be provided, in order for the content that is external to the
(formal) movement of thought to be justified, but rather we uncover the
implicit criterions already involved within this form, continuously moving
deeper in uncovering more of its implicit features and showing their
contradictions.

This relates to the bad infinite, in that the skeptical regress is exactly
what Hegel describes as an example of the bad infinite in the Logic. The bad
infinite is that which keeps on making the same move ad infinitum, being
only implicitly potential infinity, rather than grasping explicit actual
infinity. We move beyond bad infinity by not just proceeding along the line
of regressive inference, but recognising its repetitive character, isolating
the content of this character and thinking this very content through such
that we get new content. This dialectical production of new content
culminates in the overcoming of the very heart of the form of natural
consciousness itself, i.e. the divide between represented and
representation, Being and thought. This final position of absolute knowing,
or absolute spirit, is the point from which real philosophy or the Logic can
begin. We could identify this standpoint with the good infinite
corresponding to the regresses bad infinite. All of the mediations between
knowing and known (how do you know that, and that, and that, and that...
etc.) are superceded in a certainty of the identity of thought and being (I
know absolutely).

That took an awful long time, and I thank anyone who is still reading. On to
the objection.

So, Hegel has gotten past the horns of assertion and regress, but what about
the horn of circularity?

Some people might at this point leap to their feet and claim that Hegel
still hasn't justified his conception of thought, and that he's still
assuming the whole dialectical method, or something of the sort. Again,
Hegel isn't that naive. Here are the two main kinds of this objection:-

1) Hegel assumes the dialectical method: he doesn't. As I showed above,
determinate negation is not an inference. He doesn't need to bring any rules
to the table, all he has to do is think minimally. Nor can one object that
determinate negation is impossible a priori, because all this is to do is to
assume the formal logic of the Understanding uncritically, and thus not to
meet Hegel on his own terms, i.e. he's being more self-critical than you. He
does not assume some form of determinate negation, nor does he outright deny
the legitimacy of the Understanding, his respond is simply - Just think
consciousness, and see what happens.

2) Hegel assumes Absolute Knowing: this is to say that he assumes the
identity of thought and Being. This objection is usually based on the idea
that the Phenomenology can only be true is Hegel assumes that things which
are thought immanently are true. Again, Hegel doesn't need to do this, all
he needs is to abstract from the question entirely, because you cannot
assume the non-identity of thought and Being. Responses like "but its
possible that thought and Being might be non-identical" hold no water,
because Hegel's claim is that thought and Being are necessarily identitcal
and as such all you're doing is _asserting_ the opposite.

The latter of these objections is a circularity objection, and, as I have
shown, it doesn't hold. However, it isn't the only kind of circularity
objection. It's interesting to differentiate between two kinds of
circularity with reference to Descartes.

Descartes appeals to something called 'clear and distinct perception' in
order to get his rationalism going. His claim is that everything which is
clearly and distinctly perceived is true. There are two kinds of circularity
in the way he deploys this:-

1) He justifies the claim that everything clearly and distinctly perceived
is true by appeal to a God who is not a deceiver, but justifies the claim to
a non-deceiving God on the basis of clear and distinctly perceiving it. This
is what is called the Cartesian Circle, and some reject it as an invalid
interpretation. I do not care about this here, as I'm using it as an
analogue. We can see that the circularity objection above takes this kind of
form, i.e. Hegel has to claim that everything thought immanently is true. He
need not assume this, all he has to do is think immanently.

2) How does one know one is clearly and distinctly perceiving? Descartes
tackles this in the meditations under the problem of error, and his answer
is astoundingly poor and properly circular - you clearly and distinctly
perceive that you're clearly and distinctly perceiving - the experience
justified itself. This means that you can 'think' you're clearly and
distinctly perceiving, but not actually be. The question here then is: how
do we know there is such a thing as clear and distinct perception at all?
Hegel is vulnerable to the same problem: how do I know I am thinking
immanently, or minimally? How do I know I have reached the level of 'pure
thought'? How do I know the content of the Notion of natural consciousness
is moving itself, and that I am not adding anything? The answer to these can
only be that thought reveals itself as pure, immanent and self-moving.

Now, in any given case this is not a problem for Hegel. To the objection:
"how do I know this is the least that can be thought?" he can simply respond
"put your money where your mouth is and think more immanently then, be more
critical than me". However, we can recognise that like Descartes, Hegel must
assume not just that this is the minimum, but that there is a minimum at
all. He must assume that one can _just think_ or rather _just think
consciousness_.

To conclude, I have an immense amount of respect for Hegel and this attempt
to solve the trilemma. In the end, I don't think the trilemma is
theoretically solvable. Another way of saying this would be to claim, in
opposition to Hegel, that I think Reason is always more like the Kantian
Practical Reason than the Hegelian Speculative one. However, I do believe he
has opened up the door to something very interesting with his analysis of
natural consciousness, or, as I'm reading it, the structure of
representation in general. It might be that through looking deeper into the
very structure that generates the regress (much like Hegel's move away from
the bad infinite does), that we can develop new philosophical insights into
the relationship between thought and Being. However, it is my belief that
any such attempt must always recognize that its own discourse on the
conditions of discourse is always subject to those very conditions, even if
this subjection is practical rather than transcendental (like Stawson and
Tractarians).

That was rather long (I just counted the words, 3,914!!!). Hope it's of some
use.

Pete