[Bups-dis] truth tracking and necessity

[James Cunningham]

As I'm sure we all know Robert Nozick proposed the following conditions for
knowledge:

S knows p iff:

1) p
2) S believes p
3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. (In every near possible world
in which p is false, S does not believe p.)
4) If p were true, S would believe p. (In every near possible world in which
p is true, s believes p.)

So far, so good. I have been thinking about cases where p is necessarily
true. In such a case 3) would be satisfied vacuously. There is no world in
which p is false.

I have a hunch that something is wrong with this but for the life of me I
can't put my finger on what. Does anyone have any ideas?

x

James