[Bups-dis] truth tracking and necessity

[Andrew Bacon]

Hi James,

You basically have put your finger on it already. If p is necessary then,
according to Nozick, you cannot believe p without knowing p. But of course this
is false, I believe that Goldbachs conjecture is true even though I don't know
it is (assume here that G's conjecture is true.)


Just a few comments though. Firstly, are you sure Nozick uses the
Lewis/Stalnaker semantics for subjunctives? I don't know, but I don't remember
him explicitly citing them. Secondly, there is a tradition (usually in formal
epistemology), in which logical truths are assumed to be known. Nozick's
analysis might still work with this idealised version of knowledge. However, an
idealised notion of knowledge would most probably be closed under implication,
which doesn't sit well with Nozick's rejection of this principle.

Best,

Andrew

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> -
> 
> As I'm sure we all know Robert Nozick proposed the following conditions for
> knowledge:
> 
> S knows p iff:
> 
> 1) p
> 2) S believes p
> 3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. (In every near possible world
> in which p is false, S does not believe p.)
> 4) If p were true, S would believe p. (In every near possible world in which
> p is true, s believes p.)
> 
> So far, so good. I have been thinking about cases where p is necessarily
> true. In such a case 3) would be satisfied vacuously. There is no world in
> which p is false.
> 
> I have a hunch that something is wrong with this but for the life of me I
> can't put my finger on what. Does anyone have any ideas?
> 
> x
> 
> James
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-- 
Andrew Bacon
Lady Margaret Hall
07830048336
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900