[Bups-dis] truth tracking and necessity

[Craig French]

Just a quick note: Nozick is utterly non-committal on the semantics of =
subjunctives. Which is obviously annoying because it leaves things open =
to interpretation. Hence, someone like Crispin Wright, in his paper =
'Keeping Track of Nozick' exploits this.

BUPS Philosophy Societies Liaison Officer

www.bups.org
www.bups.org/pages/societies.shtml=20

Personal
craig at craigfrench.co.uk
www.craigfrench.co.uk

Heythrop College, University of London
www.heythrop.ac.uk
www.philweb.org


-----Original Message-----
From: bups-dis-bounces at list.bups.org =
[mailto:bups-dis-bounces at list.bups.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Bacon
Sent: Saturday, May 05, 2007 1:25 AM
To: James Cunningham
Cc: BUPS
Subject: Re: [Bups-dis] truth tracking and necessity

To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: =
BUPS-DIS at bups.org
-

Hi James,

You basically have put your finger on it already. If p is necessary =
then,
according to Nozick, you cannot believe p without knowing p. But of =
course this
is false, I believe that Goldbachs conjecture is true even though I =
don't know
it is (assume here that G's conjecture is true.)


Just a few comments though. Firstly, are you sure Nozick uses the
Lewis/Stalnaker semantics for subjunctives? I don't know, but I don't =
remember
him explicitly citing them. Secondly, there is a tradition (usually in =
formal
epistemology), in which logical truths are assumed to be known. Nozick's
analysis might still work with this idealised version of knowledge. =
However, an
idealised notion of knowledge would most probably be closed under =
implication,
which doesn't sit well with Nozick's rejection of this principle.

Best,

Andrew

> To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: =
BUPS-DIS at bups.org
> -
>=20
> As I'm sure we all know Robert Nozick proposed the following =
conditions for
> knowledge:
>=20
> S knows p iff:
>=20
> 1) p
> 2) S believes p
> 3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. (In every near possible =
world
> in which p is false, S does not believe p.)
> 4) If p were true, S would believe p. (In every near possible world in =
which
> p is true, s believes p.)
>=20
> So far, so good. I have been thinking about cases where p is =
necessarily
> true. In such a case 3) would be satisfied vacuously. There is no =
world in
> which p is false.
>=20
> I have a hunch that something is wrong with this but for the life of =
me I
> can't put my finger on what. Does anyone have any ideas?
>=20
> x
>=20
> James
> _______________________________________________
>=20
> -
> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the =
mailing list
at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml
>=20

--=20
Andrew Bacon
Lady Margaret Hall
07830048336
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900

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