From rezakhs at yahoo.com Fri Aug 1 08:11:07 2008 From: rezakhs at yahoo.com (Reza Hadisi) Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2008 08:11:07 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals Message-ID: <127027.9157.qm@web33702.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Hi everyone, This isn't exactly a discussion; just a question here: Does anyone know what's wrong here? (if (P AND Q), then R), logically entails ( (if P, then R) OR (if Q, then R)) But there are dozens of examples which make trouble for this inference. E.g.: P: Diego is Jim's father Q: Mary is Jim's mother R: Diego and Mary are Jim's parents or may be a better one: P: I call her by her first name Q: I call her by her last name R: She loves it! The translation of the sentence at the left side does not match with the equivalent sentence at the right side: For the first example, one might say it's a possible world conditional. (well then try it with P: Plato is a fool. Q: Quine is a fool. R: Russell is a fool.... still I think what is meant in the left side is different from what is meant in the right side). But let's see the second example which works better: At the left side, the sentence tries to say that "she loves it if I call her by her full name", while the second side says "she loves it either I call her by her first name or her last name". This seems to be a famous problem. I saw the problem just recently; but there was nothing on the solutions. Many of similar examples seemed to me to be indicative conditionals and yet they got this translational problem. Any idea on what should I look in? :-) Best, Reza __________________________________________________________ Not happy with your email address?. Get the one you really want - millions of new email addresses available now at Yahoo! http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/ymail/new.html From andrew.bacon at philosophy.ox.ac.uk Fri Aug 1 09:18:38 2008 From: andrew.bacon at philosophy.ox.ac.uk (Andrew Bacon) Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2008 17:18:38 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals In-Reply-To: <127027.9157.qm@web33702.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20080801161839.02AB1C049@webmail222.herald.ox.ac.uk> An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: not available Url: http://list.bups.org/pipermail/bups-dis/attachments/20080801/d129debe/attachment.pot From ishmel at hotmail.co.uk Fri Aug 1 14:45:12 2008 From: ishmel at hotmail.co.uk (Merlina Merlina) Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2008 21:45:12 +0000 Subject: [Bups-dis] Response to Merlina, on 'Three Approaches to Defending Abortion' In-Reply-To: <1217347393.488f3f4113162@webmail.shef.ac.uk> References: <1217347393.488f3f4113162@webmail.shef.ac.uk> Message-ID: Thanks very much. I think it is quite true that women are goaded into having children they don't want (not only over the abortion choice), and it is not right, though I think act / omission (rightly or wrongly) tends to make people feel that it is less bad. There is always a problem with choice, as the fact that the "I" that is choosing is the product not only of my own choices, but of my culture and the values I have been taught, and thus the choices of others. There is also the problem of those who may be incompetant. I once met a girl who'd been pregnant when she was twelve, and had an abortion, which she said that she had been pushed into. But I would not be surprised if many girls of twelve didn't understand either childbirth or abortion well enough to truly choose. If you were faced with that, would it really be immoral to suggest strongly to her that she should have an abortion, particually considering that very young teenagers tend to be physically injured by childbirth? (After all, you are talking of an age at which sex is technically rape because a girl is not just beneath the age of consent, but beneath the age of understanding what she is doing.) I think that I would have a right to pull out the plug even if only for five minutes, even if people would often chose not to do so. Someone has still violated and misused your body. I think here that there is a difference between claims made on the inside and the outside of the body. All we are talking about with the acciedent victim is outside the body. Others do have a claim on that. That leaves the foetus inside, and that is exclusively yours. I'd include sex as inside, inceidentally, assuming that consent to marriage works by a sort of toggle arrangement, it is given and once given remains, unless it is withdrawn. I know this is a line drawing problem, but do you think that is a useful sort of guideline? I think that saying that having sex includes a tacit assent to pregnacy creates a very knotty problem with users of contraception. I don't think it gets us very far, as in practice it is not the case. Whether it should be the case is a different question. I would say not considering the role sex plays in a healthy marriage as a bond between the couple (we are not the only creature for which mating has more implacations than its role in procreation: most social or monagomous pair animals have some extras surrounding mating), and considering that, being in a situation in which we have too much food all the time, women bear more children than they should (if the physical suffering is anything to go by with women who bear fifteen children in twenty years). I've heard, by the way, the natural reckoned at ten children born, and in good times three would live to breeding age (this is clearly a very rough estimate). Your analogy of the muggers is dodgy because other people's choices have intervened. They don't in pregnancy. The natural systems work as they have evolved to do. It would be a closer analogy to say that if you went into the jungle wearing brightly coloured clothing and got eaten by a tiger as a result. And in that case, as far as it is anyone's fault (assuming you had a choice or your lack of it was determined by other choices of yours) it would be yours. Legality and morality are very interesting here. I characterised what you were saying as legalistic, because it dealt mostly with the law, and also only with things going wrong, which tends to be when you need the law. Most women get quite happily pregnant with their husbands (or someone who is in effect), rejoice over it, and bear healthy children which they love and cherish. Unfortuanatly it doesn't always work like that, but it is worth keeping in mind that we are not talking here about a normal situation. I think that it is best for the law to uphold choice, because things do go wrong, and usually no one but the person concerned can really understand what the consequences would be. It is possible for this to be the case in our culture, because there is little enough eugenics or wish to select one gender over another (though there is a problem with minor disablity). This brings us back to the cultural problem. Morally, I think there are situations where it is wrong, and a few where it is right (very nasty ones), and quite a lot where it is subjective to individual choice. And for this reason I think the law has to be set up to defend choice, which includes a certain amount of checking and advice. Thanks again for your contribution. Merlina> Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 17:03:13 +0100> From: pia06jw at sheffield.ac.uk> To: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: [Bups-dis] Response to Merlina, on 'Three Approaches to Defending Abortion'> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > Cheers for replying to the post, I'd like to try and clear up/clarify a couple> of the points you made.> > > Firstly, the gin and coathangers thing was a joke - albeit one in poor taste. > Of course abortions, if performed at all, need to be performed safely and I no> more think this ought not to be the case than I think that kidney transplants> should be performed using cutlery. Lay people aren't allowed to perform any> other complicated medical procedure in their own home, abortion should be no> different> > The question of women are influenced, bullied even, into having abortions> because of their fragile state is a genuine pickle. It does happen, and> presumably any political sustem that allowed abortion would have to offer some> sort of protection to ensure that abortion decisions are the woman's decision> alone. In any case, the door swings both ways, and presumably women can also> be goaded into bearing children they do not want.> > You are right to point out that any claim on me is also a claim on my body, and> that people can readily assert these claims. Thomson isn't arguing against> this though. Claims on your body can be made, but there are limits. An> injured man by the french roadside may have the claim on your time, energy and> phone credit by demanding that you call an ambulance, but he doesn't have the> claim that you carry him several miles down the road to the nearest hospital,> even if it would jolly nice to do so. Equally, if you only had to be plugged> into the violinist for five minutes it would downright callous for you to pull> the plug. Drawing an exact line where claims on the body end would be> near-impossible, but it is sufficient to say that the foetus crosses it.> > The next problem you seem to raise is the problem of actively consenting: If I> fully consent to the helping the roadside victim, I can't drop him halfway> because I'm tired. Whether performing consensual sex, in the knowledge that> you could become pregnant, equates to consenting to the foetus's use of your> womb. Sex could be seen as tacit consent to pregnancy, though I'm not sure> this is a very stable position. If I go out on a night-out in my flashest> clothes, I know I am exposing myself to the risk of mugging, but this facts> don't seem to amount to consent: If I do get mugged, I may admit I was> foolish, but I would hardly say I consented to it. In the case of people who> really do fully consent, in my post I admit that Thomson's argument comes a> cropper, and instead introduce Little's argument.> > Your last point is particularly interesting, and I probably should have talked> more about this sort of thing. The abortion debate is multi-faceted, and> cannot really be reduced to one prepackaged question. You characterised my> arguments as legal arguments, but I'm afraid this is not how I see them. They> are arguments for a moral right to abortion, and the question of whether their> ought to be a corresponding legal right is a seperate question: You may think> abortion is wrong, but there ought to be a legal right to put a stop to> dangersous backstreet abortions, or you may think women have a moral right but> that transforming it into a legal right creates such a minefield - because> questions could could arise about the moral and then legal status of other> groups - that we're better off just banning it altogether. The question you> raise is just another face of abortion ethics, and I can't offer an answer,> though I will admit that it is very interesting.> > Thank you very much for your contributions. I hope you - and others - have> further comments to add.> > > Johnny> > > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml _________________________________________________________________ Win a voice over part with Kung Fu Panda & Live Search?? and?? 100?s of Kung Fu Panda prizes to win with Live Search http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571439/direct/01/ From joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk Sat Aug 2 03:35:14 2008 From: joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk (josh seigal) Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2008 11:35:14 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals In-Reply-To: <20080801161839.02AB1C049@webmail222.herald.ox.ac.uk> References: <127027.9157.qm@web33702.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20080801161839.02AB1C049@webmail222.herald.ox.ac.uk> Message-ID: I've noticed a not completely unrelated problem for the analysis of counterfactual conditionals (a problem for which, I am sure, there is a very easy solution). The (putative) problem is this: a counterfactual is a subjunctive conditional where the falsity of the antecedent is assumed. However, it seems to me that, if this is the case, contradictions can easily be generated. For example, take the counterfactual conditional (p ? q). Using the above definition of counterfactuals, and the standard truth-conditions for conditionals, this comes out as true, since it antecedent, being counterfactual (ie contrary to fact) is false. However, this generates a problem when we notice that the counterfactual conditional (p ? ?q), for the same reasons, also comes out true, hence yielding a contradiction. As I?ve said, I?m sure there is a very easy way around this, and I?m sure it is no more than a superficial difficulty. It is just something I noticed when studying first-year logic and it is something that I haven?t got round to investigating further.> From: andrew.bacon at philosophy.ox.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2008 17:18:38 +0100> To: rezakhs at yahoo.com> CC: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: Re: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > Hi Reza,> > > (if (P AND Q), then R), logically entails ( (if P, then R) OR (if Q, then R))> > One thing to note is that it's not clear that this *is* a logical entailment. We> should not confuse the above, which seems to be schematic for an inference form> couched in English, with the following, which is a logical entailment:> > > ((P & Q) -> R), logically entails ( (P -> R) \/ (Q -> R))> > One reason that first inference might fail is that if the English conditional> goes by a Stalnaker semantics, then it is not valid. What is possibly more> striking is that, if we go by a possible world semantics for conditionals, it is> no longer clear that "if ..., then ..." is a logical constant! It will depend on> the criteria of logicality for modal connectives.> > Also worth noting that the Stalnaker semantics appears to get the right verdict> for both your examples. We might just take this as a point for Stalnaker over> the material conditional analysis.> > Andrew> > > > > > > But there are dozens of examples which make trouble for this inference. E.g.:> > > > P: Diego is Jim's father> > Q: Mary is Jim's mother> > R: Diego and Mary are Jim's parents> > > > or may be a better one:> > > > P: I call her by her first name> > Q: I call her by her last name> > R: She loves it!> > > > The translation of the sentence at the left side does not match with the> equivalent sentence at the right side:> > > > For the first example, one might say it's a possible world conditional. (well> then try it with P: Plato is a fool. Q: Quine is a fool. R: Russell is a> fool.... still I think what is meant in the left side is different from what is> meant in the right side). But let's see the second example which works better:> > > > At the left side, the sentence tries to say that "she loves it if I call her> by her full name", while the second side says "she loves it either I call her by> her first name or her last name". > > > > This seems to be a famous problem. I saw the problem just recently; but there> was nothing on the solutions. Many of similar examples seemed to me to be> indicative conditionals and yet they got this translational problem. Any idea on> what should I look in? :-)> > > > Best,> > Reza> > > > > > __________________________________________________________> > Not happy with your email address?.> > Get the one you really want - millions of new email addresses available now at> Yahoo! http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/ymail/new.html> > _______________________________________________> > > > -> > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list> at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml> > -- > Andrew Bacon> New College> 07830048336> http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900> > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml _________________________________________________________________ Get Hotmail on your mobile from Vodafone http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571435/direct/01/ From joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk Sat Aug 2 03:53:12 2008 From: joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk (josh seigal) Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2008 11:53:12 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] (no subject) Message-ID: as regards my last post, it seems that the symbols did not show up in the message. The counterfactual conditionals to which I referred should have been: 'if p then q' and 'if p the not-q' Yours, with technological ineptitude, Josh _________________________________________________________________ Make a mini you on Windows Live Messenger! http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571437/direct/01/ From t.short at ucl.ac.uk Sat Aug 2 08:00:24 2008 From: t.short at ucl.ac.uk (Tim Short) Date: Sat, 02 Aug 2008 16:00:24 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals In-Reply-To: References: <127027.9157.qm@web33702.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20080801161839.02AB1C049@webmail222.herald.ox.ac.uk> Message-ID: <48947688.4070806@ucl.ac.uk> Josh - I can't quite see your notation because of a formatting or font problem, but it looks like you are saying the following. Apologies if I have misrepresented you. You say that the sentence (IF P THEN Q) is true if P is false because that is how the truth table for the sentence works. That's fine. Then you point out that (IF P THEN NOT Q) is also true for the same reason if P is false. That's also fine. Then you say that you have a contradiction and this is where I think the problem is. I guess the issue is that if both of these sentences are true and P is false, then Q must be true and so must NOT Q. That isn't the case though because (IF P THEN Q) is still true as a sentence when Q is false. Is this what you were getting at...? josh seigal wrote: > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org > - > > > I've noticed a not completely unrelated problem for the analysis of counterfactual conditionals (a problem for which, I am sure, there is a very easy solution). > > The (putative) problem is this: a counterfactual is a subjunctive conditional where the falsity of the antecedent is assumed. However, it seems to me that, if this is the case, contradictions can easily be generated. > > For example, take the counterfactual conditional (p ? q). Using the above definition of counterfactuals, and the standard truth-conditions for conditionals, this comes out as true, since it antecedent, being counterfactual (ie contrary to fact) is false. However, this generates a problem when we notice that the counterfactual conditional (p ? ?q), for the same reasons, also comes out true, hence yielding a contradiction. > > As I?ve said, I?m sure there is a very easy way around this, and I?m sure it is no more than a superficial difficulty. It is just something I noticed when studying first-year logic and it is something that I haven?t got round to investigating further.> From: andrew.bacon at philosophy.ox.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2008 17:18:38 +0100> To: rezakhs at yahoo.com> CC: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: Re: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > Hi Reza,> > > (if (P AND Q), then R), logically entails ( (if P, then R) OR (if Q, then R))> > One thing to note is that it's not clear that this *is* a logical entailment. We> should not confuse the above, which seems to be schematic for an inference form> couched in English, with the following, which is a logical entailment:> > > ((P & Q) -> R), logically entails ( (P -> R) \/ (Q -> R))> > One reason that first inference might fail is that if the English conditional> goes by a Stalnaker semantics, then it is not valid. What is possibly more> striking is that, if we go by a possible world semantics for conditionals, it is> no longer clear that "if ..., then ..." is a logical constant! It will depend on> the criteria of logicality for modal connectives.> > Also worth noting that the Stalnaker semantics appears to get the right verdict> for both your examples. We might just take this as a point for Stalnaker over> the material conditional analysis.> > Andrew> > > > > > > But there are dozens of examples which make trouble for this inference. E.g.:> > > > P: Diego is Jim's father> > Q: Mary is Jim's mother> > R: Diego and Mary are Jim's parents> > > > or may be a better one:> > > > P: I call her by her first name> > Q: I call her by her last name> > R: She loves it!> > > > The translation of the sentence at the left side does not match with the> equivalent sentence at the right side:> > > > For the first example, one might say it's a possible world conditional. (well> then try it with P: Plato is a fool. Q: Quine is a fool. R: Russell is a> fool.... still I think what is meant in the left side is different from what is> meant in the right side). But let's see the second example which works better:> > > > At the left side, the sentence tries to say that "she loves it if I call her> by her full name", while the second side says "she loves it either I call her by> her first name or her last name". > > > > This seems to be a famous problem. I saw the problem just recently; but there> was nothing on the solutions. Many of similar examples seemed to me to be> indicative conditionals and yet they got this translational problem. Any idea on> what should I look in? :-)> > > > Best,> > Reza> > > > > > __________________________________________________________> > Not happy with your email address?.> > Get the one you really want - millions of new email addresses available now at> Yahoo! http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/ymail/new.html> > _______________________________________________> > > > -> > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list> at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml> > -- > Andrew Bacon> New College> 07830048336> http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900> > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml > _________________________________________________________________ > Get Hotmail on your mobile from Vodafone > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571435/direct/01/ > _______________________________________________ > > - > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml > From joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk Sat Aug 2 08:54:56 2008 From: joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk (josh seigal) Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2008 16:54:56 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals In-Reply-To: <48947688.4070806@ucl.ac.uk> References: <127027.9157.qm@web33702.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20080801161839.02AB1C049@webmail222.herald.ox.ac.uk> <48947688.4070806@ucl.ac.uk> Message-ID: hmm. I guess I'm saying the following. Suppose p = I went to the shops and q = I would have had an ice-cream. If (if p then q) is a counterfactual conditional, then we assume the falsity of p (ie, we assume that p is 'contrary to fact'). Now, given the truth-conditions of (if p then q), if p is false then (if p then q) is true, so it is true that if i went to the shops, I would have had an ice-cream. However, for the same reason, it is also true that (if p then not-q); it is true that if I went to the shops then it is not the case that I would have had an ice-cream. So, we have a situation where the following two sentences are both true: 1.) if I went to the shops then I would have had an ice-cream 2.) if I went to the shops then it is not the case that I would have had an ice-cream. This seems to me to be something of a contradiction. However, as I've said, I'm probably making some kind of extremely basic error somewhere. Probably in my interpretation of the truth-conditions for counterfactual conditionals as opposed to material conditionals. And, yes, there was a formating error... cheers, Josh > Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2008 16:00:24 +0100> From: t.short at ucl.ac.uk> To: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: Re: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > > Josh -> > I can't quite see your notation because of a formatting or font problem, > but it looks like you are saying the following. Apologies if I have > misrepresented you.> > You say that the sentence (IF P THEN Q) is true if P is false because > that is how the truth table for the sentence works. That's fine. Then > you point out that (IF P THEN NOT Q) is also true for the same reason if > P is false. That's also fine.> > Then you say that you have a contradiction and this is where I think the > problem is. I guess the issue is that if both of these sentences are > true and P is false, then Q must be true and so must NOT Q. That isn't > the case though because (IF P THEN Q) is still true as a sentence when Q > is false.> > Is this what you were getting at...?> > josh seigal wrote:> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> > -> >> >> > I've noticed a not completely unrelated problem for the analysis of counterfactual conditionals (a problem for which, I am sure, there is a very easy solution).> > > > The (putative) problem is this: a counterfactual is a subjunctive conditional where the falsity of the antecedent is assumed. However, it seems to me that, if this is the case, contradictions can easily be generated.> > > > For example, take the counterfactual conditional (p ? q). Using the above definition of counterfactuals, and the standard truth-conditions for conditionals, this comes out as true, since it antecedent, being counterfactual (ie contrary to fact) is false. However, this generates a problem when we notice that the counterfactual conditional (p ? ?q), for the same reasons, also comes out true, hence yielding a contradiction.> > > > As I?ve said, I?m sure there is a very easy way around this, and I?m sure it is no more than a superficial difficulty. It is just something I noticed when studying first-year logic and it is something that I haven?t got round to investigating further.> From: andrew.bacon at philosophy.ox.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2008 17:18:38 +0100> To: rezakhs at yahoo.com> CC: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: Re: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > Hi Reza,> > > (if (P AND Q), then R), logically entails ( (if P, then R) OR (if Q, then R))> > One thing to note is that it's not clear that this *is* a logical entailment. We> should not confuse the above, which seems to be schematic for an inference form> couched in English, with the following, which is a logical entailment:> > > ((P & Q) -> R), logically entails ( (P -> R) \/ (Q -> R))> > One reason that first inference might fail is that if the English conditional> goes by a Stalnaker semantics, then it is not valid. What is possibly more> striking is that, if we go by a possible world semantics for conditionals, it is> no longer clear that "if ..., then ..." is a logical constant! It will depend on> the criteria of logicality for modal connectives.> > Also worth noting that the Stalnaker semantics appears to get the right verdict> for both your examples. We might just take this as a point for Stalnaker over> the material conditional analysis.> > Andrew> > > > > > > But there are dozens of examples which make trouble for this inference. E.g.:> > > > P: Diego is Jim's father> > Q: Mary is Jim's mother> > R: Diego and Mary are Jim's parents> > > > or may be a better one:> > > > P: I call her by her first name> > Q: I call her by her last name> > R: She loves it!> > > > The translation of the sentence at the left side does not match with the> equivalent sentence at the right side:> > > > For the first example, one might say it's a possible world conditional. (well> then try it with P: Plato is a fool. Q: Quine is a fool. R: Russell is a> fool.... still I think what is meant in the left side is different from what is> meant in the right side). But let's see the second example which works better:> > > > At the left side, the sentence tries to say that "she loves it if I call her> by her full name", while the second side says "she loves it either I call her by> her first name or her last name". > > > > This seems to be a famous problem. I saw the problem just recently; but there> was nothing on the solutions. Many of similar examples seemed to me to be> indicative conditionals and yet they got this translational problem. Any idea on> what should I look in? :-)> > > > Best,> > Reza> > > > > > __________________________________________________________> > Not happy with your email address?.> > Get the one you really want - millions of new email addresses available now at> Yahoo! http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/ymail/new.html> > _______________________________________________> > > > -> > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list> at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml> > -- > Andrew Bacon> New College> 07830048336> http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900> > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml> > _________________________________________________________________> > Get Hotmail on your mobile from Vodafone > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571435/direct/01/> > _______________________________________________> >> > -> > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml> > > > > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml _________________________________________________________________ Make a mini you on Windows Live Messenger! http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571437/direct/01/ From t.short at ucl.ac.uk Sun Aug 3 10:48:30 2008 From: t.short at ucl.ac.uk (Tim Short) Date: Sun, 03 Aug 2008 18:48:30 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals In-Reply-To: References: <127027.9157.qm@web33702.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20080801161839.02AB1C049@webmail222.herald.ox.ac.uk> <48947688.4070806@ucl.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4895EF6E.90008@ucl.ac.uk> OK. The only time we falsify the sentence (if p then q) is if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false (consistent with what you say below). As you also say, the sentence (if p then q) is always true if p is false i.e. the sentence is true whether or not q is true or false. In your case 1.), the sentence is true because you did not go to the shops and you did not have an ice cream (both p and q are false but in fact we don't care whether q is true or not). In your case 2.), the sentence is true because again p is false but you have inverted the definition of q such that if it was previously false it is now true and vice versa. (This is fine I think; I am not pointing it out because I think it is a problem.) So the counterintuitive element is that case 1.) "if I went to the shops then I would have had an ice-cream" is true because you did not go to the shops. Likewise, "if I went to the shops then it is not the case that I would have had an ice-cream" is also true as a sentence because you did not go to the shops. I guess what is happening is that we simply do not tie down q in the situation where p is false... Note further that the following sentence is also true if p is false: (if p then (q and not q)) - for any definition of q! It might be the case that the quasi-mathematical world of logic does not always map cleanly on to our perceptions of how the world seems to work...in particular I seem to recall that there is some hand-waving around the truth table selection for (if) related to 'we already used that for something else so this one has to be (if)'...there are only so many combinations of T and F in two dimensions. josh seigal wrote: > hmm. I guess I'm saying the following. Suppose p = I went to the shops > and q = I would have had an ice-cream. If (if p then q) is a > counterfactual conditional, then we assume the falsity of p (ie, we > assume that p is 'contrary to fact'). Now, given the truth-conditions > of (if p then q), if p is false then (if p then q) is true, so it is > true that if i went to the shops, I would have had an ice-cream. > However, for the same reason, it is also true that (if p then not-q); > it is true that if I went to the shops then it is not the case that I > would have had an ice-cream. So, we have a situation where the > following two sentences are both true: > > 1.) if I went to the shops then I would have had an ice-cream > 2.) if I went to the shops then it is not the case that I would have > had an ice-cream. > > This seems to me to be something of a contradiction. However, as I've > said, I'm probably making some kind of extremely basic error > somewhere. Probably in my interpretation of the truth-conditions for > counterfactual conditionals as opposed to material conditionals. > > And, yes, there was a formating error... > > cheers, > Josh > > > > > Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2008 16:00:24 +0100 > > From: t.short at ucl.ac.uk > > To: bups-dis at bups.org > > Subject: Re: [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals > > > > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: > BUPS-DIS at bups.org > > - > > > > > > Josh - > > > > I can't quite see your notation because of a formatting or font > problem, > > but it looks like you are saying the following. Apologies if I have > > misrepresented you. > > > > You say that the sentence (IF P THEN Q) is true if P is false because > > that is how the truth table for the sentence works. That's fine. Then > > you point out that (IF P THEN NOT Q) is also true for the same > reason if > > P is false. That's also fine. > > > > Then you say that you have a contradiction and this is where I think > the > > problem is. I guess the issue is that if both of these sentences are > > true and P is false, then Q must be true and so must NOT Q. That isn't > > the case though because (IF P THEN Q) is still true as a sentence > when Q > > is false. > > > > Is this what you were getting at...? > > > > josh seigal wrote: > > > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: > BUPS-DIS at bups.org > > > - > > > > > > > > > I've noticed a not completely unrelated problem for the analysis > of counterfactual conditionals (a problem for which, I am sure, there > is a very easy solution). > > > > > > The (putative) problem is this: a counterfactual is a subjunctive > conditional where the falsity of the antecedent is assumed. However, > it seems to me that, if this is the case, contradictions can easily be > generated. > > > > > > For example, take the counterfactual conditional (p ? q). Using > the above definition of counterfactuals, and the standard > truth-conditions for conditionals, this comes out as true, since it > antecedent, being counterfactual (ie contrary to fact) is false. > However, this generates a problem when we notice that the > counterfactual conditional (p ? ?q), for the same reasons, also comes > out true, hence yielding a contradiction. > > > > > > As I?ve said, I?m sure there is a very easy way around this, and > I?m sure it is no more than a superficial difficulty. It is just > something I noticed when studying first-year logic and it is something > that I haven?t got round to investigating further.> From: > andrew.bacon at philosophy.ox.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2008 17:18:38 > +0100> To: rezakhs at yahoo.com> CC: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: Re: > [Bups-dis] Question on the Conditionals> > To reply to this message or > start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > Hi Reza,> > > > (if (P AND Q), then R), logically entails ( (if P, then R) OR (if Q, > then R))> > One thing to note is that it's not clear that this *is* a > logical entailment. We> should not confuse the above, which seems to > be schematic for an inference form> couched in English, with the > following, which is a logical entailment:> > > ((P & Q) -> R), > logically entails ( (P -> R) \/ (Q -> R))> > One reason that first > inference might fail is that if the English conditional> goes by a > Stalnaker semantics, then it is not valid. What is possibly more> > striking is that, if we go by a possible world semantics for > conditionals, it is> no longer clear that "if ..., then ..." is a > logical constant! It will depend on> the criteria of logicality for > modal connectives.> > Also worth noting that the Stalnaker semantics > appears to get the right verdict> for both your examples. We might > just take this as a point for Stalnaker over> the material conditional > analysis.> > Andrew> > > > > > > But there are dozens of examples > which make trouble for this inference. E.g.:> > > > P: Diego is Jim's > father> > Q: Mary is Jim's mother> > R: Diego and Mary are Jim's > parents> > > > or may be a better one:> > > > P: I call her by her > first name> > Q: I call her by her last name> > R: She loves it!> > > > > The translation of the sentence at the left side does not match with > the> equivalent sentence at the right side:> > > > For the first > example, one might say it's a possible world conditional. (well> then > try it with P: Plato is a fool. Q: Quine is a fool. R: Russell is a> > fool.... still I think what is meant in the left side is different > from what is> meant in the right side). But let's see the second > example which works better:> > > > At the left side, the sentence > tries to say that "she loves it if I call her> by her full name", > while the second side says "she loves it either I call her by> her > first name or her last name". > > > > This seems to be a famous > problem. I saw the problem just recently; but there> was nothing on > the solutions. Many of similar examples seemed to me to be> indicative > conditionals and yet they got this translational problem. Any idea on> > what should I look in? :-)> > > > Best,> > Reza> > > > > > > __________________________________________________________> > Not > happy with your email address?.> > Get the one you really want - > millions of new email addresses available now at> Yahoo! > http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/ymail/new.html> > > _______________________________________________> > > > -> > Browse or > search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list> > at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml> > -- > Andrew Bacon> New > College> 07830048336> http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1900> > > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search > the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: > http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > Get Hotmail on your mobile from Vodafone > > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571435/direct/01/ > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > - > > > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the > mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > - > > Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the > mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtml > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Make a mini you on Windows Live Messenger! Try it Now! > From joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk Fri Aug 8 05:06:35 2008 From: joshuaseigal1986 at hotmail.co.uk (josh seigal) Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 13:06:35 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] The Paradox of Swearing Message-ID: George Orwell, in ?Down and Out in Paris and London?, drew my attention to a curious paradox that seems to be at the heart of using swear words. I would be most grateful to hear any views that anyone may have on this subject. The paradox (if indeed that is the correct term for it) seems to be this: a word becomes an oath because it means a certain thing, but once it has become an oath it seems to lose the very meaning that made it into an oath in the first place. Let me elucidate: the word ?fuck? was originally considered rude and shocking because it pertained to something which (at the time) was thought should be kept secret (namely, the sexual functions). However, once the word became an oath it in effect ceased to mean this at all; it became simply that ? an oath. As Orwell says (p157): ?The Londoners do not now use, or very seldom use, this word in its original meaning; it is on their lips from morning till night, but it is merely an expletive and means nothing.? Similarly with insults. A word becomes an insult because it means something bad, but once it has become well established as an insult it loses this meaning and becomes insulting simply by dint of being intended as an insult. Take the word ?bastard?: originally this was thought of as a heinous insult because of the religious sin associated with having a child out of wedlock. However, nowadays it is arguable that most people do not consider this a ?sin?, and yet the word ?bastard? retains its insult-value. Thus, the word became an insult because of what it means, but nowadays, having been firmly established as an insult, the word has in effect lost its meaning. It is now simply that ? an insult. Other insults are insulting seemingly in spite of what they mean. Thus, calling a woman a ?cow? is offensive in spite of the fact that, as Orwell says (p158), ?cows are amongst the most likeable of animals.? The word is an insult simply because it is intended as an insult, not because of what the word means. What do people think of these things? I am interested to hear your views. _________________________________________________________________ Win New York holidays with Kellogg?s & Live Search http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571440/direct/01/ From pia06jw at sheffield.ac.uk Thu Aug 14 09:31:15 2008 From: pia06jw at sheffield.ac.uk (J M Whiteley) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 17:31:15 +0100 Subject: [Bups-dis] Second Response to Merlina Message-ID: <1218731475.48a45dd3879dc@webmail.shef.ac.uk> Thanks for the second response; it gave a lot of food for thought. Hopefully, I can tidy some things up. It is certainly the case that goading is problematic. Whether it is more onerous to pressure someone into having a child or procuring an abortion I have no idea, but I don?t think that it really affects the rightness or wrongness of abortion. If euthanasia was legal, you could be goaded into it, but that doesn?t make euthanasia wrong in principle: To use a more banal example, you could be goaded into signing up for a credit card you don?t need and can?t afford, but that?s not a damning indictment of the credit industry itself. Another problem you raise is the problem of choice, and whether people are capable of making informed choices. In the strict, idealistic, sense of ?informed choice?, I would say no, because to have that ability to make untainted choices implies a kind of metaphysical freedom we don?t possess. This doesn?t deliver a killer blow for abortionists though, because free choice is something we have to assume in order to move in any direction ? any choice would be a bad choice because no choice would be a free choice ? and, provided we ascertain that the agent is being used as a ?puppet?, we can call her choice a free one. The next point I?d like to look at is claims on the inside and the outside of our bodies. I don?t think there?s really any relevant difference between the two, and I?ll try to explain why. Imagine our violinist once more, but imagine that instead of providing him with the use of your kidneys, you have been forced to run on a treadmill which powers his life-support machine: Do you have the right to step off the machine? If they demand you run on it for a week non-stop then you can certainly step-off, but what about if they only need you for five minutes? Our intuition would be that the treadmill-claim is greater than the kidney-claim, precisely because of this inside/outside distinction, but there doesn?t seem to be any relevant difference between using someone?s kidneys and using their leg muscles. I do think that sex (protected or unprotected) doesn?t really amount to tacit consent for sex, and this was the purpose of my ? as you rightly pointed out, rather weak ? mugger analogy. Instead of using this analogy, I?m going to run with your colourfully insightful tiger-mauling analogy: We may call the man who gets mauled by a tiger foolish, but this isn?t really sufficient to place a strong burden on him. Assuming the man survived the attack, would we say that a doctor could legitimately refuse him treatment on the basis that he is blameworthy for his injuries? We surely wouldn?t say that this man should bear the burden of his injuries, no matter how careless he was. We may call people who get accidentally pregnant ?foolish? for doing so, but we wouldn?t necessarily want them to bear the brunt of this costly mistake. Anyway, I hope the above is worth considering. I?d be very interested hearing your thoughts on it. Johnny From ishmel at hotmail.co.uk Thu Aug 14 12:37:04 2008 From: ishmel at hotmail.co.uk (Merlina Merlina) Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 19:37:04 +0000 Subject: [Bups-dis] Second Response to Merlina In-Reply-To: <1218731475.48a45dd3879dc@webmail.shef.ac.uk> References: <1218731475.48a45dd3879dc@webmail.shef.ac.uk> Message-ID: > Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 17:31:15 +0100> From: pia06jw at sheffield.ac.uk> To: bups-dis at bups.org> Subject: [Bups-dis] Second Response to Merlina> > To reply to this message or start a new topic please email: BUPS-DIS at bups.org> -> > Thanks for the second response; it gave a lot of food for thought. Hopefully, I> can tidy some things up.> > It is certainly the case that goading is problematic. Whether it is more> onerous to pressure someone into having a child or procuring an abortion I have> no idea, but I don?t think that it really affects the rightness or wrongness of> abortion. If euthanasia was legal, you could be goaded into it, but that> doesn?t make euthanasia wrong in principle: To use a more banal example, you> could be goaded into signing up for a credit card you don?t need and can?t> afford, but that?s not a damning indictment of the credit industry itself.> > Another problem you raise is the problem of choice, and whether people are> capable of making informed choices. In the strict, idealistic, sense of> ?informed choice?, I would say no, because to have that ability to make> untainted choices implies a kind of metaphysical freedom we don?t possess. > This doesn?t deliver a killer blow for abortionists though, because free choice> is something we have to assume in order to move in any direction ? any choice> would be a bad choice because no choice would be a free choice ? and, provided> we ascertain that the agent is being used as a ?puppet?, we can call her choice> a free one.> > The next point I?d like to look at is claims on the inside and the outside of> our bodies. I don?t think there?s really any relevant difference between the> two, and I?ll try to explain why. Imagine our violinist once more, but imagine> that instead of providing him with the use of your kidneys, you have been> forced to run on a treadmill which powers his life-support machine: Do you> have the right to step off the machine? If they demand you run on it for a> week non-stop then you can certainly step-off, but what about if they only need> you for five minutes? Our intuition would be that the treadmill-claim is> greater than the kidney-claim, precisely because of this inside/outside> distinction, but there doesn?t seem to be any relevant difference between using> someone?s kidneys and using their leg muscles. > > I do think that sex (protected or unprotected) doesn?t really amount to tacit> consent for sex, and this was the purpose of my ? as you rightly pointed out,> rather weak ? mugger analogy. Instead of using this analogy, I?m going to run> with your colourfully insightful tiger-mauling analogy: We may call the man> who gets mauled by a tiger foolish, but this isn?t really sufficient to place a> strong burden on him. Assuming the man survived the attack, would we say that> a doctor could legitimately refuse him treatment on the basis that he is> blameworthy for his injuries? We surely wouldn?t say that this man should bear> the burden of his injuries, no matter how careless he was. We may call people> who get accidentally pregnant ?foolish? for doing so, but we wouldn?t> necessarily want them to bear the brunt of this costly mistake. > > Anyway, I hope the above is worth considering. I?d be very interested hearing> your thoughts on it.> > Johnny> > _______________________________________________> > -> Browse or search the BUPS-DIS archives, or unsubscribe from the mailing list at: http://www.bups.org/mailinglist.shtmlThanks very much. I think we have here with goading the problem between the legal and ethical side again. Ethically, we only need be concerned that it is sometimes right, and possibly when that is, and why. Legally, one has to be concerned with all sorts of things such as undue pressure, and also when we can allow it practically etc. I think that people are reluctant to legalise euthanasia because they feel that the degree of wrong done if someone was forced into it, or even merely because people feel that it is proper, is greater than that if someone who might have wished it isn't able to die so. Though the problem with abortion is slightly different, there are several similarities. But it is well attested that there is no degree of pressure or law that will stop women trying to take back this piece of control, and so I find it difficult to say it must always be wrong. It seems to be what we are. As to wrong, I do think it is bad, but I can allow (I think) for lesser of the two evils. I uphold choice with checking in law because I think that is what gives the highest degree of right. Morally, I would say that there has to be something very wrong, rape, underage and incompetant, mentally or physically ill, or will be made so by bearing the child. I don't uphold it simply because a woman doesn't feel like bearing a child this year, but wanted one next year. But I think the lines are difficult and I would say that it is best if everyone draws their own precise ones. It isn't as if anyone could be very certain what is right or wrong. And there will always be error. As to the credit card, no, it isn't, but it could be. I think your next paragraph raises some very interesting points. (I assume, by the way, that you meant, "not a puppet"). I have toyed with the idea that it is always better to assume a slightly greater degree of responisblity, moral and otherwise, than you actually have, because things work better when people do. We gain more choice by supposing we have it or can have it, (of course, there is a limit to this). My problem was more one of comparison that of metaphysics or even social pressure one way or another. That is, I can assume that the forty year old, who has no close relations (including husband) and has already has three children, knows what she is saying when she says that she does not want to bear another one. But a rather dim twelve year old will not. Or suppose you have a teenager who has been a rigid virgin, and started to develop manic depression or some other problem, and in the onset has got herself pregnant. That second is a particually knotty one. Do others, family, friends, doctors, have a right to make the decision that would be best for her to the best of their ability, or even do what they believe she would have wanted? It's also hard to know when healthy influence wanes and pressure begins. We aren't only indiviuals. I disagree with your entertaining extention of the violinist analogy, partly because that wasn't what I was trying to say. I meant that you could have a claim on the outside of someone, but not on the inside. It doesn't mean that you can't make a wrongful claim on the outside. The claims we spoke of before came into what I think of as the social contract duties (I think morality is pluralist), that is, the things it is we all need to do for each other. There may be other valid ones. But what you are describing there is slave labour, not the right of anyone to have assitance summoned by anyone else who finds them injured. Slave labour is a violation of the possession of the body by its nature, because to have it requires denying that people possess themselves at all. I admit the inside/outside distiction is not very exact, but actual line drawing is hard. That is, I think it is rare in morality for there to be an exact line, not that we are having trouble finding it. My intution doesn't agree with yours on this. You need do no injury to the body to run a treadmill for five minutes, wrong though I agree it is, but to link someone to someone else's kidney's you do. And bearing a child may result in injury, but it doesn't have to. I'd be particually interested to see a reply to this defence. There might be a point, I think, where one would be entitled to refuse paid for treatment for the tiger mauling. If the man, a genuinely competant adult, has, in spite of warning and regualtion etc. snuck off into the jungle in clothes in which he will inevitably be attacked (dressed like a wounded deer, if you will excuse the flipancy) there must come a point when the state is no longer bound to pay for his treatment. However, in general I agree with you. In your view, does sex constitue a moral choice? If it does do you think it affects abortion legally and/or morally. I think it is a moral choice, but I say (more or less what you said) that one can't necerily insist that people bear the burden of the mistake. I think there is also a bit of a problem in that all these analogies, the tiger, the violinist, are injury or artificial medicine, while childbearing is a natural process. But between the mess one gets into trying to judge any indiviual case due to lack of knowledge, and mercy (a cultural value that I will assess one day) I don't think it is worth trying to be moralist in the political sense. Thanks again for the reply, Merlina _________________________________________________________________ Make a mini you on Windows Live Messenger! http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/107571437/direct/01/